AMRIK SINGH BEDI Vs NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI BEFORE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

CNR No. DLHC010049252026

BAIL APPLN. 610/2026

Date of Decision**: 19.08.2026**

IN THE MATTER OF:

AMRIK SINGH BEDI,

AGED 52 YEARS,

S/O LATE SURJEET SINGH BEDI,

R/O E-130, NARAYANA,

NEW DELHI – 110028

PRESENTLY LODGED IN JAIL NO. 4,

CENTRAL JAIL COMPLEX, TIHAR ......Petitioner

(Through: Mr. Amit Chadha, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Aditya, Mr.

Saiyam Malik, Ms. Shivani Sharma, Mr. Harjas Singh, Mr. Dhruv

Tomar and Mr. Kamaksh Sharma, Advocates.)

versus

NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU,

DELHI ZONAL UNIT, R.K. PURAM,

NEW DELHI, PIN CODE – 110066

......Respondent

(Through: Mr. Arun Khatri, SSC with Ms. Shelly Dixit, Mr.

Pranayjeet Singh, Advs. and Mr. Shantanu Jugtawat, SPP.)

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

JUDGEMENT

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J.

This is the second application seeking regular bail on behalf of the

applicant in connection with Case No. VIII/36/DZU/2024, registered for the

offences punishable under Sections 8, 21, 23, 25, 27A and 29 of the Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 („NDPS Act‟). The first Bail

application of the present applicant was dismissed as withdrawn vide order

dated 05.01.2026 with liberty to file afresh before the trial Court.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The prosecution case, as emerging from the complaint and the

material placed on record, is that on 11.11.2024, the Narcotics Control

Bureau (NCB) received secret information regarding a parcel lying at the

Smart Logistics Courier Office, Nangal Raya, New Delhi, suspected to

contain narcotic substance and destined for Australia. Upon examination of

the said parcel, 1.015 kilograms of cocaine was allegedly recovered.

Thereafter, on 13.11.2024**,** on receipt of information regarding a person

coming to collect the said consignment from the warehouse of Trans Safe

Global Express, the NCB team apprehended one Shivraj, stated to be the

driver of co-accused Lokesh Chopra**.** The investigation, thereafter, led the

NCB to co-accused Avadhesh Yadav @ Gopi, from whose residence, upon a

search conducted on 14.11.2024**,** 81.515 kilograms of cocaine was allegedly

recovered.

As regards the role attributed to the present applicant, the prosecution,

inter alia, relies upon the statement of co-accused Rishi Sachdeva recorded

during investigation. According to the said statement, Rishi Sachdeva, along

Bail Appln. 4381/2025 with the applicant, one Amit Mathur and one Navjot Kaur, had travelled to

Dubai and met co-accused Pawan Thakur @ Pinchu. During the said

meeting, co-accused Pawan Thakur allegedly informed them about a

consignment stated to be lying at a factory in Mehsana, Gujarat**,** and that an

Apple AirTag had been affixed to the said consignment. The applicant

thereafter allegedly travelled to Mehsana, Gujarat on 22.03.2024 and,

according to the prosecution, located the factory where the consignment was

suspected to be lying.

4. The prosecution further alleges that, during his visit to Mehsana, the

applicant entered the factory premises and interacted with the factory

manager, Mahesh Sharma. It is alleged that the applicant introduced himself

as “Bobby Walia” and sought information regarding the consignment. The

prosecution relies upon the statement of Mahesh Sharma in relation to the

said interaction. The prosecution also relies upon the statement of one

Gurbani Talwar**,** who was working with the applicant and had accompanied

him to Gujarat, wherein she is stated to have disclosed that the applicant was

following a location on his mobile phone, stopped the vehicle in the factory

area and thereafter went towards the indicated location. She further stated

that, although she had accompanied the applicant for a purported video

shoot, no such shooting was ultimately undertaken.

5. It is further the prosecution case that the consignment was

subsequently collected on 24.03.2024 by co-accused Avadhesh Yadav @

Gopi**,** pursuant to instructions received from Pawan Thakur @ Pinchu. The

prosecution also relies upon the statements recorded during investigation

concerning the subsequent movement of the consignment. The prosecution

also refers to the statement of the applicant recorded under Section 67 of the

NDPS Act, wherein he is stated to have disclosed that he had received

₹12,00,000 in cash in connection with the work allegedly undertaken by

him. The prosecution, thus, seeks to place the applicant‟s alleged visit to

Mehsana and the circumstances surrounding the same in the larger chain of

events concerning the consignment subsequently recovered by the NCB.

The applicant was arrested on 09.12.2024 and has remained in

custody thereafter, except for the period of 45 days during which he was

enlarged on interim bail. His earlier application for regular bail came to be

rejected by the Special Judge, and the subsequent application before the

Special Court was also dismissed on 27.01.2026. The first bail application

before this Court was dismissed as withdrawn. The applicant has now

approached this Court by way of the present second application for regular

bail.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PARTIES

Mr. Amit Chadda, learned senior counsel for the applicant submits

that the case against the applicant essentially rests upon the allegation that,

on 22.03.2024, he accompanied co-accused Rishi Sachdeva to Mehsana,

Gujarat, for locating a consignment with the aid of an Apple AirTag. It is

contended that the alleged AirTag itself was never recovered and there is no

independent material connecting the same with the applicant. It is further

submitted that, even if the prosecution case is accepted as it stands, the

applicant is not alleged to have taken possession of, transported, stored or

delivered the contraband. At the highest, the allegation is that he went to

Gujarat to locate the consignment and made an attempt to have it released,

which was never carried through. According to him, therefore, the allegations against the applicant do not disclose his actual involvement in

the handling of the contraband.

Learned senior counsel next draws attention to the statement of

Mahesh Sharma, Manager of G.R. Metal Alloys, relied upon by the

prosecution. It is submitted that the WhatsApp conversation placed on

record shows that, after the alleged visit, it was Mahesh Sharma who

attempted to contact the applicant, but the applicant did not respond to those

messages. It is also contended that Mahesh Sharma did not identify the

applicant before the investigating agency as the person who had visited the

factory. The allegation regarding the applicant having worn a turban is

stated to find no corroboration in the statement of the said witness. On this

basis, learned counsel submits that the circumstances relied upon by the

prosecution in relation to the alleged visit to the factory do not furnish a

reliable link between the applicant and the contraband.

Mr. Amit Chadda also questions the electronic evidence relied upon

by the prosecution. It is submitted that the mobile phone allegedly used by

the applicant for communicating with the factory manager has itself not been

recovered. More importantly, according to learned senior counsel, the SIM

said to have been used for the said communication was activated only on

16.10.2024, whereas the alleged visit to Gujarat is of March, 2024. It is,

therefore, argued that the said SIM could not have been used by the

applicant at the relevant time and that the prosecution‟s reliance upon the

location and communication attributed to the said number is consequently

doubtful. Learned senior counsel also submits that the statement of Gurbani

Talwar ought not to be relied upon, particularly when she has not been cited

as a witness in the trial, and that the circumstances stated by her regarding the applicant‟s visit to Gujarat cannot, therefore, furnish substantive

incriminating material against him.

It is further argued that there is no material establishing a direct nexus

between the applicant and the contraband recovered in November, 2024. He

points out that the applicant is alleged to have visited Gujarat on 22.03.2024,

whereas the recoveries were effected almost eight months thereafter, and

there is nothing on record, according to him, to establish that the

consignment allegedly located in Gujarat in March, 2024 was the same

consignment which was subsequently recovered. It is also submitted that no

contraband was recovered either from the applicant or at his instance and

that there is no allegation that he booked, transported, stored or distributed

the same.

Lastly, learned senior counsel seeks parity with co-accused Rishi

Sachdeva and Lokesh Chopra, who have already been granted regular bail

by Trial Court. It is submitted that the applicant was implicated on the basis

of the statement of Rishi Sachdeva, who himself has been enlarged on bail,

and that the role attributed to the applicant is considerably lesser than that

attributed to the said co-accused. It is further submitted that Lokesh Chopra,

despite the allegations of having coordinated the logistics and transportation

of the consignment, has also been granted bail, whereas the role attributed to

the present applicant is confined principally to his alleged visit to Gujarat.

He submits that the applicant has no criminal antecedents, has remained in

custody since 09.12.2024, the investigation stands completed and the

complaint has already been filed. It is accordingly urged that the applicant

satisfies the requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act and deserves to be

released on regular bail.

Per contra, Mr. Arun Khatri, learned Special Public Prosecutor

appearing for the NCB opposes the application. It is submitted that the

material collected during investigation has to be considered in its entirety

and not by examining individual circumstances in isolation. He submits that

the present case involves recovery of commercial quantity of cocaine and,

consequently, the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act are

attracted. It is further submitted that, at the stage of considering bail, the

Court is not required to undertake a detailed or meticulous appreciation of

the evidence, particularly where the prosecution relies upon a chain of

circumstances to attribute a role to the applicant. According to the NCB, the

applicant has failed to demonstrate, on the basis of the material on record,

reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of the offences alleged

against him.

As regards the role attributed to the applicant, learned SPP submits

that the prosecution case does not rest merely upon his having travelled to

Mehsana, Gujarat. It is contended that the applicant had travelled to Dubai

and met co-accused Pawan Thakur @ Pinchu and thereafter proceeded to

Mehsana, Gujarat, where he allegedly tracked the consignment and

approached the factory in which the consignment was lying. According to

the prosecution, the applicant introduced himself to the factory manager as

“Bobby Walia” and sought release of the consignment. The statement of

Mahesh Sharma, the factory manager, is relied upon in support of these

circumstances. It is submitted that the subsequent conduct attributed to the

applicant, including his leaving the factory when asked to wait for the owner

and his failure to respond when the manager subsequently attempted to

contact him, also forms part of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.

In response to the submissions concerning the electronic material,

learned SPP submits that the prosecution has placed reliance upon the

communications between the applicant and various co-accused persons,

including Pawan Thakur @ Pinchu, Puneet Sachdeva and Avadhesh Yadav

@ Gopi. It is submitted that these communications, including those

exchanged in groups, have to be considered along with the other

circumstances appearing in the investigation. The prosecution has also relied

upon the applicant‟s prior acquaintance with Pawan Thakur @ Pinchu and

upon photographs and communications which, according to the NCB, form

part of the material collected during investigation. The prosecution has also

placed reliance upon the material concerning the alleged financial dealings

of the persons connected with the transaction, which, subject to its

evidentiary assessment at trial, forms part of the surrounding circumstances

relied upon by the prosecution.

Mr. Khatri further submits that the applicant‟s contention that there

was no actual recovery from him does not, by itself, conclude the question

of his involvement, particularly when the prosecution case attributes to him

a role in relation to the movement and attempted retrieval of the

consignment. It is submitted that the prosecution case is not founded solely

upon the statements of co-accused persons, but is also supported by the

statements of the factory manager and Gurbani Talwar, who was working as

an assistant with the applicant and had accompanied him to Gujarat,

concerning the applicant‟s visit and the circumstances surrounding the same.

The NCB submits that these circumstances, taken together, provide material

which requires consideration in the context of the alleged conspiracy and cannot be discarded at the threshold merely because the contraband was

ultimately recovered from other locations.

As regards the plea of parity, learned SPP submits that the applicant

seeks parity with co-accused Rishi Sachdeva and Lokesh Chopra on the

ground that both have already been enlarged on bail. Learned SPP, however,

submits that the material available against the applicant has to be considered

on its own footing and that, unlike the case of the aforesaid co-accused, the

prosecution relies upon the statements of public witnesses as well as the

circumstances surrounding the applicant‟s alleged visit to the factory. Even

otherwise, Mr. Khatri submits that the orders granting bail to co-accused

Rishi Sachdeva and Lokesh Chopra are under challenge before this Court

vide Crl. M.C. No. 1142/2026 and Crl. M.C. No. 4878/2026, and that this

Court was pleased to issue notice therein on 15.07.2026 and 20.07.2026. It

is, therefore, submitted that the said orders, particularly when under

challenge before this Court, cannot, by themselves, furnish a ground for

extending the benefit of parity to the applicant.

The NCB accordingly submits that the applicant has failed to satisfy

the conditions prescribed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act and the present

application deserves to be dismissed.

I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the

record.

ANALYSIS

Before adverting to the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS

Act, it would be apposite to deal with the submission of learned Senior

Counsel that the applicant was neither involved in the transportation nor storage of the contraband and that no recovery was effected from him or at

his instance. The submission, however, cannot be accepted as a ground to

exclude the applicability of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In State of Punjab

v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, the Supreme Court reiterated that, in a case

involving commercial quantity, the statutory conditions under Section 37 of

the NDPS Act, cannot be diluted on account of absence of recovery from the

accused.

The same principle assumes relevance on the facts of the present case.

In Harpreet Singh Talwar alias Kabir Talwar v. State of Gujarat through

National Investigating Agency, the Supreme Court, despite there being no

direct recovery from the appellant, considered the alleged coordinating and

facilitating role attributed to him in the broader matrix of the prosecution

case and observed that absence of direct seizure is not dispositive where the

case proceeds on conspiracy and facilitation. The relevant paragraphs are

extracted as under:-

“26. We say so for the reason that despite no direct recovery of

contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution's case is that he

played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of

narcotics concealed as talc through M/s Magent India—which he

allegedly controlled through a proxy. The consignment, although not

seized with heroin, shares structural and logistical similarities with those

where heroin was ultimately found.

28. This Court is cognizant of the fact that no heroin or narcotic

substances were directly recovered from the consignment linked to the

Appellant. However, the investigative narrative does not rest solely on

physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and

facilitation. In such cases, the absence of direct seizure is not dispositive,

particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious

entities, and barter-based compensation— features which, according to

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1058

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1103

the prosecution, mark the smuggling architecture employed in the present

matter.”

[emphasis supplied]

The said aspect also came to be considered by the Supreme Court in

Md. Nawaz Khan v. Union of India, while considering the applicability of

the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, examined the surrounding

circumstances notwithstanding the absence of recovery from the accused

and emphasised that the statutory test requires an assessment of the material

available on record as a whole. Thus, the absence of personal recovery

cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence.

The fact that the applicant is not alleged to have physically possessed

or transported the contraband does not, by itself, answer the allegation under

Section 29 of the NDPS Act, which concerns abetment and criminal

conspiracy in relation to offences under the NDPS Act. The question at this

stage is whether the material relied upon by the prosecution furnishes

reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant had no connection with

the alleged conspiracy.

The accusation relates to recovery of commercial quantity of

contraband. Once the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are attracted,

the Court can grant bail only upon satisfaction of the twin conditions

stipulated under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act, namely, (i) that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of the alleged offence;

and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, in addition

to the usual considerations governing grant of bail.

(2021) 10 SCC 100

Signature Not Verified

Signed By:AMIT KUMAR

SHARMA

Signing Date:19.08.2026

16:11:41

The legal position with regard to the rigours of Section 37 of the

NDPS Act is well settled. In State of M.P. v. Kajad, the Supreme Court,

while considering the parameters governing grant of bail in cases involving

commercial quantity, has held as under:

“5. …A perusal of Section 37 of the Act leaves no doubt in the mind of the

Court that a person accused of an offence, punishable for a term of

imprisonment of five years or more, shall generally be not released on

bail. Negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception under sub-

clause(ii) of clause(b) of Section 37(1). For granting the bail the Court

must, on the basis of the record produced before it, be satisfied that there

are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the

offences with which he is charged and further that he is not likely to

commit any offence while on bail. It has further to be noticed that the

conditions for granting the bail, specified in clause(b) of subsection (1) of

Section 37 are in addition to the limitations provided under the Code of

Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force regulating

the grant of bail. Liberal approach in the matter of bail under the Act is

uncalled for.”

As regards the expression “reasonable grounds” occurring in Section

37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, it would be apposite to refer to the

observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India through Narcotics

Control Bureau, Lucknow v. Md. Nawaz Khan, wherein the scope and

meaning of the said expression have been explained as under:

“14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b)

of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and

grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of

the alleged offence. For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and

circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the Court to believe

that the accused person would not have committed such an offence.

Dove-tailed with the aforesaid satisfaction is an additional consideration

that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail...”

[emphasis supplied]

(2001) 7 SCC 673

(2021) 10 SCC 100

The expression “reasonable ground” came to be considered by the

Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Rajesh, wherein, reiterating the

aforesaid principle, the Court held that the expression contemplates

something more than mere prima facie grounds and requires substantial

probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged

offence. The Court further emphasised that, having regard to the underlying

object of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, a liberal approach in the matter of

grant of bail is uncalled for**.**

The material relied upon by the prosecution is required to be

considered in its entirety and the individual circumstances cannot be viewed

in isolation. In Harpreet Singh Talwar alias Kabir Talwar (supra), the

Supreme Court, while examining the alleged complicity of the accused,

considered the broader matrix of facts and the cumulative effect of the

meetings, communications, coordination and other circumstantial linkages.

The relevant paragraph is extracted as under:-

“27. The charge against the Appellant must also be evaluated in light of

the broader matrix of facts, including (i) his alleged meetings in Dubai

with a principal foreign accused; (ii) the transfer of documents through

intermediaries for the clearance of a flagged consignment; (iii) efforts to

retrospectively fabricate invoices and assign responsibility to others; (iv)

the use of multiple firms allegedly connected to him to obfuscate the true

nature of the transactions; and (v) his telephonic calls to certain co-

conspirators. These aspects, supported by the statements of protected

witnesses and circumstantial linkages, currently meet the threshold of

prima facie satisfaction regarding the Appellant's complicity.”

The same approach is warranted in the present case, where the

applicant‟s travel, his alleged presence at Mehsana, Gujarat, the electronic

material, the factory visit and the statements relied upon by the prosecution

(2020) 12 SCC 122

Signature Not Verified

Signed By:AMIT KUMAR

SHARMA

Signing Date:19.08.2026

16:11:41 are required to be considered cumulatively.

Adverting to the first requirement under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS

Act, the expression “reasonable grounds” contemplates something more than

mere prima facie grounds and requires the Court to have credible and

plausible material on the basis of which it can form an opinion that the

accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The prosecution seeks to

connect the applicant with the consignment of cocaine subsequently

recovered by relying upon a series of circumstances which are required to be

considered cumulatively. The prosecution relies upon the statement of coaccused Rishi Sachdeva, according to which the applicant had travelled with

him to Dubai and met co-accused Pawan Thakur @ Pinchu and, thereafter,

applicant travelled to Mehsana, Gujarat, on 22.03.2024 for locating the

consignment allegedly through an Apple AirTag.

It is further the prosecution case that the applicant, along with Rishi

Sachdeva, visited the factory in Kadi Industrial Area where the consignment

was suspected to be lying and obtained the contact details of the factory

manager. The prosecution further relies upon the statement of Mahesh

Sharma, the factory manager, as well as the statement of Gurbani Talwar,

who had accompanied the applicant to Gujarat. The absence of recovery of

the AirTag, therefore, does not by itself dislodge the other material relied

upon by the prosecution concerning the applicant's presence at the factory

and his interaction with the factory manager.

The aforesaid material, however, is not confined to the statement of

the co-accused. The prosecution has also placed reliance upon the mobile

number 8168450310, stated to have been used by the applicant during the

relevant period. The tower location particulars relied upon by the prosecution are stated to correspond with the applicant‟s travel itinerary and

to place the said number in the vicinity of the places forming part of the

prosecution‟s version of the Gujarat visit. The CDR material further reflects

repeated communication from the said number with the number attributed to

factory manager Mahesh Sharma. When considered alongside the statements

of co-accused Rishi Sachdeva and Mahesh Sharma, the electronic material

prima facie lends corroboration to the prosecution case regarding the

applicant‟s presence at Mehsana and his interaction with the factory

manager.

Mr. Amit Chadda has contended that the mobile number 8168450310

could not have been used by the applicant during the relevant period, as the

SIM corresponding to the said number is reflected as having been activated

on 16.10.2024, whereas the alleged visit to Gujarat was in March, 2024. The

contention, however, does not appear to be borne out from the CDR material

placed on record. As rightly pointed out by learned SPP, the CDR record

reflects usage of the said number during March, 2024, i.e. during the period

relevant to the prosecution case. The activation date 16.10.2024, as

explained by the NCB, relates to re-issuance of the SIM after the number

had remained inactive for a continuous period and, therefore, cannot by

itself, be treated as the date on which the number was first used. This is also

borne out from the CDR material, which records usage of the said number

during March, 2024 and was specifically requisitioned for the period from

01.03.2024 to 31.03.2024. Thus, the submission that the said number came

into existence only on 16.10.2024 does not, at this stage, dislodge the

electronic material relied upon by the prosecution.

The circumstances surrounding the applicant‟s travel to Gujarat also merit consideration. The material placed on record indicates that the

applicant travelled to Ahmedabad along with Gurbani Talwar by an Indigo

flight on 22.03.2024 and that a return journey had been booked for the

following day. The prosecution, however, relies upon the circumstance that

the applicant did not undertake the scheduled return journey and instead

returned to Delhi by an earlier flight along with Rishi Sachdeva and Amit

Mathur. No satisfactory explanation, at this stage, has been brought on

record as to why the applicant, if his visit was solely in connection with his

stated professional commitments, did not avail of the return journey which

had already been booked and instead returned along with the aforesaid coaccused. This circumstance assumes significance when considered with the

statement of Gurbani Talwar, who had accompanied the applicant and has

stated about his movements during the visit, including his following of a

location on the mobile phone and proceeding towards the indicated location.

The said statement, therefore, provides an additional circumstance

concerning the applicant‟s presence and conduct in Gujarat.

Learned Senior Counsel has contended that Gurbani Talwar has not

been cited as a witness and, therefore, her statement cannot be relied upon.

The submission is a matter which may be urged at trial; however, the

omission to cite a witness at this stage is not necessarily incapable of

correction, as the trial Court possesses wide powers to summon a material

witness where such evidence is essential for a just decision, as recognised in

8 9

Mina Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa, and Varsha Garg v. State of M.P.

In any event, the present assessment does not rest upon her statement alone.

(2013) 16 SCC 173

(2023) 19 SCC 646

Signature Not Verified

Signed By:AMIT KUMAR

SHARMA

Signing Date:19.08.2026

16:11:41

The circumstance emerging from the investigation regarding her

accompanying the applicant is being considered only as an additional

circumstance, alongside the CDR, flight records and the statement of

Mahesh Sharma, the factory manager.

35. At this stage, it is also necessary to deal with the objection by the

learned Senior Counsel founded upon Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil

Nadu. The law declared therein is binding and, as noticed by the Supreme

Court in Md. Nawaz Khan (supra), the statement recorded under Section 67

cannot be relied upon as a confessional statement against the accused even

at the stage of bail. The said principle, however, does not require the Court

to disregard independent material otherwise available on record against the

accused. The assessment under Section 37 of the NDPS Act must, therefore,

be undertaken on the basis of the material which is legally capable of being

considered, without placing reliance upon the statement under Section 67,

NDPS Act, as a confessional statement.

36. The Supreme Court, in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit

Aggarwal, while giving effect to the principle laid down in Tofan Singh

(supra), nevertheless proceeded to examine the circumstantial material

independently available against the accused and declined to grant bail under

Section 37. The Court also rejected the contention that absence of recovery

from the accused was, by itself, sufficient to conclude that he was not guilty.

The decision thus makes it clear that, once the Section 67 statement is kept

aside, the remaining material must still be examined to determine whether

the rigours of Section 37 stand satisfied.

(2021) 4 SCC 1

(2022) 18 SCC 374

The position is further illustrated by Union of India (NCB) v. Khalil

Uddin, wherein the Supreme Court, while conscious of the law laid down

in Tofan Singh (supra) and its applicability even at the stage of bail,

proceeded to examine the independent material available against the accused

and held that the matter stood on a different footing on account thereof. The

decision thus reinforces that, while a statement under Section 67 cannot

itself be relied upon as a confessional statement, independent material

otherwise available on record remains relevant for examining the

requirements of Section 37.

38. In the present case also, this Court does not place reliance upon the

applicant‟s statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, for recording its

satisfaction under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The assessment proceeds on

the other material placed on record, including the statements of the persons

relied upon by the prosecution, the CDR and tower-location material, the

flight records, the applicant‟s alleged presence at Mehsana and his visit to

the factory, which circumstances are required to be considered cumulatively.

It is this cumulative body of material, and not the statement recorded under

Section 67, NDPS Act, which falls for consideration while determining

whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that the applicant is not

guilty of the offences alleged against him.

39. The prosecution case regarding the factory visit is further sought to be

supported by the statement of Mahesh Sharma. According to the

prosecution, the applicant approached the factory and introduced himself as

“Bobby Walia” and sought information concerning the consignment. The

prosecution further relies upon the fact that the mobile number from which

2022 SCC OnLine SC 2109

Signature Not Verified

Signed By:AMIT KUMAR

SHARMA

Signing Date:19.08.2026

16:11:41 the said person had communicated with Mahesh Sharma was saved by the

latter under the name “Boby Balia Director of Midiya”.

The description allegedly given by the said person regarding the

contents of the parcel, namely, that it contained a resin-type chemical

powder used in printing, is also relied upon by the prosecution. The

applicant has disputed the said circumstance and has questioned the

identification as well as the statement of the factory manager. These are

matters which would ultimately fall for consideration at the stage of trial. At

this stage, however, the statement of Mahesh Sharma, when read with the

statement of Rishi Sachdeva, Gurbani Talwar and the electronic material

relied upon by the prosecution cannot be said to be wholly without

corroboration.

The subsequent conduct attributed to the applicant also requires

consideration in the backdrop of the aforesaid circumstances. Learned senior

counsel has placed reliance upon the WhatsApp messages exchanged

between Mahesh Sharma and the applicant and submitted that it was Mahesh

Sharma who attempted to contact the applicant and that the applicant did not

respond to the said messages. However, the chronology emerging from the

statements relied upon by the prosecution indicates that the applicant had

already left Ahmedabad by the time of the subsequent attempts to contact

him, which is further corroborated by the flight tickets. Consequently, the

mere absence of a response to the said messages cannot, by itself, displace

the earlier material concerning the applicant‟s alleged visit to the factory and

his interaction with Mahesh Sharma.

Mr. Chadda has also emphasised that no contraband was recovered

from the applicant or at his instance and that, even if the prosecution case is accepted at its highest, the applicant did not ultimately take possession of or

transport the recovered contraband. The said submission, however,

overlooks that the applicant is also alleged to have participated in the larger

transaction attracting Section 29 of the NDPS Act. At the stage of bail, the

Court is not required to determine whether the prosecution will ultimately be

able to establish the entire chain beyond reasonable doubt.

The submission that the applicant‟s visit to Gujarat in March, 2024

has no nexus with the recovery effected in November, 2024 also does not, at

this stage, appear persuasive. The material on record indicates that the

applicant went to Mehsana on 22.03.2024 and located the factory where the

consignment was stated to be lying. On 24.03.2024, co-accused Avdhesh

Yadav @ Gopi, pursuant to the instructions attributed to Pawan Thakur @

Pinchu, travelled to Mehsana, contacted Bhairuram, collected the drugs and

took them to Ahmedabad. The drugs were thereafter brought to Delhi and

kept at the residence of co-accused Rishi Sachdeva for about fifteen days,

before being removed through Avdhesh Yadav.

The subsequent recovery assumes significance in this context. Coaccused Avdhesh Yadav was apprehended in November, 2024 and, pursuant

to the information furnished by him, 81.515 kilograms of cocaine was

recovered from his residence. Thus, the prosecution case places the

applicant, co-accused Avdhesh Yadav and Rishi Sachdeva at successive

stages in the movement and handling of the consignment, from its location

at Mehsana to its subsequent movement and eventual recovery. While this

Court is not required, at this stage, to conclusively determine that the

substance recovered in November, 2024 was the very same consignment

located in March, 2024, the continuity of the persons involved and the successive movement and alleged storage of the consignment prima facie

provide a connecting link between the two events. The March transaction,

therefore, cannot, at this stage, be regarded as an isolated or wholly

unconnected occurrence.

The limited question is whether, on the material presently available,

there are reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant is not guilty of

the alleged offences. Having considered the material in its entirety,

particularly the statement of Rishi Sachdeva, the statement of Mahesh

Sharma, the electronic material, the flight records and the surrounding

circumstances, with the statement of Gurbani Talwar being considered only

as an additional circumstance, this Court is unable, at this stage, to form

such an opinion. The material, taken cumulatively, raises circumstances

which prima facie connect the applicant with the alleged transaction and,

therefore, the first requirement under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act is

not satisfied.

As regards the plea of parity, learned Senior Counsel submits that coaccused Rishi Sachdeva and Lokesh Chopra have already been enlarged on

bail. It is true that the orders granting bail to the said co-accused are

presently under challenge before this Court in Crl. M.C. No. 1142/2026 and

Crl. M.C. No. 4878/2026, in which notice has been issued on 15.07.2026

and 20.07.2026. The pendency of the said proceedings, however, does not

preclude this Court from examining the plea of parity in the present

application. The question here is confined to whether, on the material

presently available against the applicant, he stands on a footing comparable

to the said co-accused.

The answer, in the facts of the present case, is in the negative. The principle of parity, as explained by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan

Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, requires a comparative

assessment of the role attributed to the accused and the material available

against him and cannot be applied mechanically. Without expressing any

opinion on the correctness of the orders granting bail to Rishi Sachdeva and

Lokesh Chopra, which are the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings,

this Court finds that the material relied upon against the present applicant

includes the statement of the factory manager, the circumstances

surrounding his visit to the factory, the statement of Gurbani Talwar and the

electronic and other corroborative material discussed hereinabove. The

applicant, therefore, cannot claim parity merely on the basis that the

aforesaid co-accused have been enlarged on bail.

As regards the second requirement under Section 37(1)(b) of the

NDPS Act, the nature of the allegations and the circumstances in which the

alleged offence is stated to have been committed also assume significance.

The prosecution case concerns an alleged organised drug-trafficking

operation having international linkages, and alleges that the applicant‟s role

extended beyond a mere incidental association, including his travel to

Dubai, his subsequent visit to Mehsana for locating the consignment and his

interaction at the factory where the consignment was stated to be lying. The

material relied upon by the prosecution, including the statements of the coaccused and witnesses, the electronic material and the circumstances

surrounding the applicant‟s movements, is stated to indicate his association

with the alleged network. The allegations, therefore, are not in respect of an

isolated or individual act, but pertain to an alleged organised international

(2021) 6 SCC 230

Signature Not Verified

Signed By:AMIT KUMAR

SHARMA

Signing Date:19.08.2026

16:11:41 drug trafficking network, involving commercial quantity of cocaine.

The nature of the alleged offence also assumes significance. The

prosecution case concerns the alleged movement of commercial quantity of

cocaine as part of an organised network having international linkages. Such

alleged trafficking in narcotic drugs is not merely an offence affecting an

individual but carries wider ramifications for public health and the larger

interests of society. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh

@ Billa (supra), while considering the implications of organised drug

trafficking, has observed that the supply of drugs has a vital bearing upon

the national economy and the health of the people and that, where the

interests of the nation and personal liberty come into conflict, the former

shall prevail. The relevant observation is extracted as under:-

“…..In view of the said reference, we do not wish to deliberate on this

issue further, save and except that in our view paramount consideration is

nothing but interest of justice for all. Should there be any conflict

between the sovereignty of country and personal liberty, undoubtedly,

the former shall prevail, particularly, when a war is waged against the

nation, be it in the form of supply of drugs, which vitally affects the

national economy and health of the people.”

[emphasis supplied]

The societal and public-health consequences of organised narcotics

trafficking are, therefore, relevant while appreciating the legislative policy

underlying the stringent conditions prescribed under Section 37 of the NDPS

Act. These considerations, however, have to operate within the statutory

framework governing the grant of bail and cannot supplant the requirements

of Section 37. In cases governed by such stringent statutory regime, the

larger societal and national consequences of organised narcotics trafficking

cannot be lost sight of while considering the prayer for bail.

The material presently available indicates that the applicant is alleged to have knowingly undertaken a specific role in locating and facilitating

access to a consignment of commercial quantity of cocaine, in coordination

with persons allegedly involved in its subsequent retrieval and movement.

The alleged conduct, therefore, is not shown to be an isolated or inadvertent

association, but is alleged to form part of a coordinated transaction. In the

absence of any material which would enable this Court to reasonably

conclude that such involvement was an aberration and that the applicant is

unlikely to repeat such conduct if enlarged on bail, the second requirement

under Section 37(1)(b) is also not satisfied.

As regards the period of incarceration, the applicant was arrested on

09.12.2024 and, save for the period of 45 days during which he was

enlarged on interim bail, has remained in custody thereafter. The completion

of investigation and filing of the complaint, as also the period of custody

undergone by the applicant, are relevant considerations. However, these

circumstances cannot, by themselves, override the statutory mandate of

Section 37.

In Balraj Singh @ Billa (supra), the Supreme Court also considered

the plea of prolonged incarceration and observed that, in the facts of that

case, custody of one year and seven months did not warrant grant of bail

having regard to the statutory scheme and the maximum punishment

prescribed. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:-

“19. Moreover, the respondent has only undergone 1 year 7 months, and if

found guilty a maximum sentence of twenty years may be imposed upon

him. Therefore, it cannot be said that he has suffered incarceration for a

long period, warranting interference in view of Article 21 of the

Constitution.

20. While this Court has recognized on several occasions that prolonged

incarceration warrants the grant of bail in view of Article 21 of the

Constitution, we have noticed that the application thereof is not uniform.

Moreover, there is no doubt that what constitutes “prolonged

incarceration” for the purposes of bail, has not been expounded by this

Court or the law of the land.

21. While judicial discretion is an important facet of justice dispensation,

this Court cannot overlook the fact that similarly situated persons in

custody may receive different outcomes, dependent on the approach

adopted by the respective bench…….”

[emphasis supplied]

The said decision does not, however, prescribe any inflexible period

beyond which incarceration must necessarily result in grant of bail. The

period of custody is therefore taken into consideration, but cannot be viewed

in isolation from the statutory requirements under Section 37 and the

material available against the applicant.

The applicant has also placed reliance upon the fact that the

investigation stands completed, the complaint has been filed and he has

remained in custody for a considerable period. In Narcotics Control Bureau

v. Mohit Aggarwal (supra), the Supreme Court held that the length of

custody, filing of the chargesheet and commencement of trial, by

themselves, cannot constitute persuasive grounds for grant of bail when the

statutory conditions under Section 37 remain unsatisfied.

The period of custody undergone by the applicant and completion of

investigation are undoubtedly relevant considerations, but cannot be viewed

in isolation from the nature of the allegations, the material on record and the

statutory scheme. Having regard to the punishment prescribed for the

principal offences alleged, which may extend to 20 years, this Court is of the

view that the period of incarceration undergone by the applicant, by itself,

does not furnish sufficient ground for grant of bail when the requirements of

Section 37 remain unsatisfied.

Bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the case and the material placed on record, at this stage this Court is not inclined to enlarge

the applicant on regular bail since the applicant has failed to satisfy either of

the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act.

However, nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression on

the merits of the case, which shall be considered by the Trial Court on the

basis of evidence led before it.

The application is therefore, dismissed.

AUGUST 19, 2026

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J