SRS INFRATECH PVT LTD & ANR. Vs KUMUD CHAUDHARY & ORS.

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 1 of 21

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 03.08.2026

Pronounced on: 13.08.2026

Uploaded on: 13.08.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010264102023

+ CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 & CRL.M.A. 18166/2023

SRS INFRATECH PVT LTD & ANR. .....Petitioners

Through: Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Ms. Mridula

Ray Bharadwaj, Dr. Vedant

Bharadwaj, Mr. Shiva Khadelwal, Mr.

Anshu Singh, Ms. Amrita Behera, Ms.

Anshita Sharma, Advs.

versus

KUMUD CHAUDHARY & ORS. ......Respondents

Through: Mr. Barun Kumar Sinha, Mrs. Pratibha

Sinha, Mr. Rakesh Mudgal, Mr. Sneh

Vardhan & Mr. Vaibhav Singh, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

JUDGMENT

MADHU JAIN, J.

1. The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’) has been filed by the

Petitioners assailing the judgment dated 25.03.2023 passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge-03, South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi

in Criminal Revision No.23/2023, whereby the challenge to the order dated

17.10.2022 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-09, South-East

District, Saket Courts, New Delhi was dismissed.

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 2 of 21

2. By the order dated 17.10.2022, the Respondents were permitted to

recall Ms. Kavita Chowdhary under Section 311 CrPC for further examination

in relation to the promissory note dated 16.11.2009. The Petitioners also assail

the subsequent marking of the said promissory note as Ex. CW-1/7 and seek

setting aside of the aforesaid proceedings.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The dispute arises out of a complaint instituted by Late Shyam

Chaudhary under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘NI Act’) against the Petitioners. The case of the

complainant is that Petitioner No. 1, through Petitioner No. 2, had availed a

loan of Rs. 25 lakhs from him and had entered into a loan agreement dated

16.11.2009 in this regard. During the pendency of the proceedings, the

original complainant passed away and his legal representatives, who are the

Respondents herein, were substituted in his place.

4. The Petitioners contested the complaint. Their defence, as noticed in

the proceedings before the learned ASJ, is that no loan transaction had taken

place between the parties and that the cheque in question had been issued as

security in connection with a proposed forward sale of property belonging to

the original complainant, which transaction did not materialise.

5. The record further shows that the complainant’s witness had been

examined and discharged, the statement of the accused had thereafter been

recorded, and Petitioner No. 2 had also stepped into the witness box in defence

and had been cross-examined. The proceedings subsequently continued at the

stage of defence evidence.

6. During the pendency of the defence evidence, the Respondents sought

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 3 of 21

to bring on record a promissory note dated 16.11.2009. An application

seeking to place an additional Affidavit along with the said promissory note

on record had been filed on 19.02.2020. The additional Affidavit stated that

the promissory note had not been placed on record earlier and that the legal

representatives of the deceased complainant had subsequently come across

the document. The promissory note was annexed with the said application.

7. The aforesaid application remained pending before the learned Trial

Court. On 10.11.2021, the learned Trial Court recorded that no reply to the

application had been filed despite opportunity. After some arguments, learned

counsel for the complainant sought permission to withdraw the application.

The relevant portion of the order dated 10.11.2021 reads as under:

“An application for taking on record additional

affidavit has been filed by the complainant which is

pending for disposal. No reply to the said application

has been filed till date despite being given an

opportunity.

After some arguments, Ld. Counsel for complainant

submits that he wishes to withdraw the present

application. Heard and allowed.”

8. Subsequently, on 07.09.2022, the Respondents moved an application

under Section 311 CrPC seeking recall of Ms. Kavita Chowdhary, who had

earlier deposed as the complainant’s witness, for further examination. The

application stated that the promissory note had been filed in the case and that

examination of the said witness was required for bringing the document on

record.

9. The application came to be allowed by the learned Trial Court vide

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 4 of 21

order dated 17.10.2022. The learned Trial Court recorded the submission on

behalf of the Respondents that, since the original complainant had expired,

the promissory note had come into the possession and knowledge of his legal

representative subsequently. The learned Trial Court also noticed that an

earlier application for bringing the promissory note on record had been

withdrawn.

10. While allowing the application, the learned Trial Court observed as

under:

“U/s 311 CrPC the court has ample powers to

either call or summon or recall and re-examine any

witness if it appears that it is essential for the just

decision of the case. The phrase ‘just decision’ and

‘appears’ are not mystical phrases, the threshold

in deciding the application u/s 311 CrPC is set at

where a witness appears to be essential for the just

decision of the case. While it is true that section

311 CrPC cannot be used by either of the parties

to fill up the lacunas in their respective cases.

However, in the present case the said pronate was

filed alongwith the application which was later

withdrawn and also considering the fact that the

accused will have the opportunity to cross examine

the witness on the point of the said pronate, I do

not see any prejudice being caused to the accused

if the said pronate is tendered into evidence against

him.”

11. The learned Trial Court accordingly permitted additional evidence by

way of Affidavit along with the original promissory note to be filed, with

advance copy to learned counsel for the accused.

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 5 of 21

12. Aggrieved by the order dated 17.10.2022, the Petitioners preferred

Criminal Revision No.23/2023 before the learned ASJ. The principal grounds

urged were that the application under Section 311 CrPC did not disclose

sufficient reasons for introduction of the promissory note at such a belated

stage; that permitting the subsequent application amounted to review of the

order dated 10.11.2021 contrary to Section 362 CrPC; that the Respondents

were attempting to fill lacunae in their evidence, and that the second

application amounted to re-agitation of the relief which had earlier been

withdrawn.

13. By judgment dated 25.03.2023, the learned ASJ dismissed the revision

petition. The learned ASJ noticed that the loan agreement dated 16.11.2009

related to a principal amount of Rs. 25 lakhs with interest at the rate of 27%

per annum and that the promissory note sought to be proved was also dated

16.11.2009, was for Rs. 25 lakhs and reflected the same rate of interest. The

learned ASJ, therefore, found that the promissory note was in consonance

with the case of the complainant as already presented before the learned Trial

Court.

14. The learned ASJ also took note of the fact that the original complainant

had expired and that the Respondents claimed to have acquired knowledge of

the promissory note subsequently. While acknowledging that the document

was sought to be proved at a considerably late stage, the learned ASJ held that

delay alone could not be determinative of an application under Section 311

CrPC where the material was required for arriving at a just decision. The

learned ASJ, however, compensated the Petitioners for the delay by imposing

costs of Rs.10,000/- upon the Respondents. The revision petition was

accordingly dismissed.

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 6 of 21

15. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment dated 25.03.2023, the Petitioners

have approached this Court by way of the present petition under Section 482

CrPC.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

16. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners submits that the

promissory note dated 16.11.2009 was sought to be introduced at an

impermissibly belated stage. He places reliance upon the chronology of the

proceedings to contend that the issues had already been settled, the

complainant’s evidence had concluded, the accused had been examined and

Petitioner No. 2 had also entered the witness box in defence before the

Respondents sought to rely upon the promissory note. It is, therefore,

submitted that the Respondents cannot be permitted to reopen the

complainant’s evidence after the defence of the Petitioners has already been

disclosed.

17. Learned counsel further submits that the very same promissory note

had earlier been sought to be placed on record and that the application was

withdrawn on 10.11.2021 after arguments. Learned counsel vehemently

asserts the subsequent application under Section 311 CrPC was merely an

attempt to obtain, through a different provision, substantially the same relief

which had earlier been abandoned. It is thus contended that permitting the

subsequent application amounted to reviewing the earlier order, which is

prohibited by Section 362 CrPC.

18. Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court did not record the

requisite satisfaction that recall of the witness and production of the

promissory note were essential for a just decision of the case. Learned counsel

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 7 of 21

submits that the application under Section 311 CrPC itself did not explain why

the document had not been produced earlier or how its production was

indispensable for adjudication of the complaint.

19. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Harbhajan Lal Nayyar v. State,

MANU/DE/0416/1990, to contend that the party invoking Section 311 CrPC

must make out a proper case and the Court must be satisfied that the proposed

evidence is necessary for the just decision of the proceedings. Learned counsel

also relies upon Ram Jeet v. State, MANU/UP/0109/1958, and Rajaram

Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar & Anr., MANU/SC/0663/2013, particularly

the principles requiring the Court to determine whether recall or additional

evidence is genuinely essential to the just decision of the case.

20. Learned counsel further submits that the promissory note is specifically

disputed by the Petitioners. Reliance is placed upon Section 294(3) CrPC to

contend that only a document whose genuineness is not disputed can be read

in evidence without formal proof. It is submitted that once the Petitioners

disputed the promissory note, the learned Trial Court could not have permitted

it to be brought on record and marked in evidence in the manner done.

21. Learned counsel also relies upon Practice Direction No. 9(h)(xv) issued

by this Court and submits that the procedure relating to production,

admission/denial and marking of documents requires the documents to be

produced at the appropriate stage. It is contended that permitting a fresh

document after conclusion of the complainant’s evidence defeats the

prescribed procedure.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

22. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondents submits that the

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 8 of 21

controversy concerns only one document, namely, the promissory note dated

16.11.2009. It is submitted that the original complainant had passed away

during the pendency of the proceedings and that his legal representatives

subsequently came across the said document.

23. Learned counsel emphasises that the promissory note was not sought

to be introduced for the first time through the application dated 07.09.2022.

The Respondents had already sought to place the document on record by way

of an additional Affidavit filed on 19.02.2020. Therefore, the allegation that

the document was devised or introduced only after disclosure of the defence

is without basis.

24. Learned counsel further places reliance upon the order dated

10.11.2021 and submits that the earlier application was never rejected on

merits. The learned Trial Court neither held the promissory note to be

inadmissible nor returned any finding upon its genuineness. The application

was merely withdrawn at the request of learned counsel for the complainant.

It is further pointed out that the said order itself records that no reply to the

application had been filed by the Petitioners despite opportunity.

25. Learned counsel further submits that the subsequent application under

Section 311 CrPC was moved specifically to recall Ms. Kavita Chowdhary

for the purpose of tendering the promissory note in evidence. It is submitted

that the Petitioners would have a full opportunity to cross-examine the said

witness in respect of the document and, therefore, no prejudice would be

caused to them.

26. Learned counsel relies upon Rajaram Prasad Yadav (supra) and

submits that the determinative consideration under Section 311 CrPC is

whether the evidence is required for arriving at a just decision. It is submitted

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 9 of 21

that the jurisdiction under Section 311 CrPC is wide and cannot be curtailed

merely on account of the stage at which the application is filed, provided the

Court considers the proposed evidence necessary and protects the right of the

opposite party to rebut the same.

27. Insofar as Section 294(3) CrPC is concerned, learned counsel submits

that the provision merely dispenses with formal proof where the genuineness

of a document is admitted. It does not provide that a disputed document cannot

be brought on record or proved by the party relying upon it. It is submitted

that the Petitioners would remain entitled to dispute the execution,

genuineness and evidentiary value of the promissory note during cross-

examination and at the stage of appreciation of evidence.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

28. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and has perused

the material on record.

29. The principal question which arises is whether, at the stage at which the

proceedings had reached, recall of Ms. Kavita Chowdhary for the limited

purpose of bringing the promissory note dated 16.11.2009 into evidence was

permissible in exercise of powers under Section 311 CrPC. The objections

raised under Sections 362 and 294(3) CrPC, as also the objection founded

upon the stage of production of the document, arise from this principal issue.

30. Section 311 of the CrPC is couched in wide terms. It empowers a Court,

at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon a person as a

witness or recall and re-examine a person already examined. The latter part of

the provision mandates such exercise where the evidence appears to the Court

to be essential to the just decision of the case. The width of the power is

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 10 of 21

accompanied by a corresponding requirement that it be exercised judicially

and for the purpose for which the provision has been enacted.

31. The principles governing Section 311 CrPC have been authoritatively

summarised by the Supreme Court in Rajaram Prasad Yadav (supra). For

the present case, the following principles are relevant:

“23. (g) The court must satisfy itself that it was in

every respect essential to examine such a witness or

to recall him for further examination in order to

arrive at a just decision of the case.

...

(i) The court arrives at the conclusion that additional

evidence is necessary, not because it would be

impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but

because there would be a failure of justice without

such evidence being considered.”

32. The Supreme Court further held that the evidence sought to be tendered

must be germane to the issue involved, an opportunity of rebuttal must be

afforded to the opposite party, and the power must be exercised with care,

caution and circumspection. At the same time, the Court cautioned that a party

cannot invariably be foreclosed from correcting an error where relevant

material has not been brought on record due to inadvertence.

33. One aspect of Section 311 CrPC requires emphasis in the context of the

Petitioners’ contention that the application dated 07.09.2022 did not itself

contain a detailed explanation as to why the evidence was essential. The

jurisdiction under Section 311 CrPC is vested in the Court. Its exercise is not

dependent exclusively upon the sufficiency of pleadings contained in an

application filed by either party. Indeed, the provision permits the Court to

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 11 of 21

summon or recall a witness even on its own motion. The relevant inquiry,

therefore, is whether the evidence sought to be introduced is germane and

whether its reception is required for a just adjudication, while ensuring that

no unfair prejudice is caused to the opposite party.

34. The Petitioners have principally objected to the recall on the ground

that the complainant’s evidence had already concluded, the defence of the

Petitioners stood disclosed and the proceedings were at the stage of defence

evidence. The stage of the proceedings is undoubtedly a relevant

consideration. It is, however, not by itself determinative.

35. In this regard, P. Chhaganlal Daga v. M. Sanjay Shaw,

MANU/SC/1290/2001, is of particular relevance. The said case also arose out

of proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. The complainant had

completed his examination, cross-examination and re-examination.

Arguments had concluded and the matter had been posted for judgment when

an additional document, namely, a postal receipt, was sought to be produced

in exercise of powers under Section 311 CrPC. The High Court interfered on

the ground that permitting the document at that stage would enable the

complainant to fill a lacuna.

36. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court judgment, while relying

upon Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, MANU/SC/0397/1999, and observed

as under:

“8. It is a common experience in criminal courts that

defence counsel would raise objections whenever

courts exercise powers under Section 311 of the Code

or under Section 165 of the Evidence Act by saying

that the Court could not 'fill the lacuna in the

prosecution case'. A lacuna in the prosecution is not

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 12 of 21

to be equated with the fallout of an oversight

committed by a Public Prosecutor during trial, either

in producing relevant materials or in eliciting

relevant answers from witnesses. The adage 'to err is

human' is the recognition of the possibility of making

mistakes to which humans are proved. A corollary of

any such laches or mistakes during the conducting of

a case cannot be understood as a lacuna which a

court cannot fill up.”

37. The Supreme Court further reiterated that the power under Section 311

CrPC could be exercised “even if evidence on both sides is closed”, the

controlling consideration being whether the material is essential for the just

decision of the case.

38. The principle which emerges is that a distinction has to be maintained

between an inherent lacuna in the case of a party and an omission to bring

relevant material into evidence. Section 311 CrPC cannot be employed to

fundamentally alter the nature of the case or to give a party an unfair

opportunity to construct a new case after seeing the evidence of the opposite

side. Equally, however, an omission in producing material which is otherwise

germane to the controversy does not become incurable merely because the

proceedings have advanced.

39. Applying the aforesaid test to the present case, there are certain

circumstances which are material. The controversy concerns one identified

document, namely, the promissory note dated 16.11.2009. It is not a document

which surfaced for the first time with the application under Section 311 CrPC

in September, 2022. The record shows that the Respondents had sought to

bring the same promissory note on record through an additional Affidavit filed

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 13 of 21

on 19.02.2020. In that Affidavit, Ms. Kavita Chowdhary specifically stated:

“3. That the aforesaid Promissory Note dated

16.11.2009 inadvertently not placed on record by the

Complainant. The legal representative has come

across this promissory note recently which is

executed by Accused No. 2. Therefore, this

Promissory Note dated 16.11.2009 is being placed

before this Hon’ble Court.”

40. Thus, the document had already been placed before the Court in

February, 2020, during the continuance of defence evidence. The subsequent

application under Section 311 CrPC did not seek to introduce an altogether

new document for the first time. Its object was to recall Ms. Kavita

Chowdhary, who had already deposed as the complainant’s witness, so that

the document could be brought into evidence. The application itself records

that the promissory note had already been filed and that her further

examination was sought for bringing the same on record.

41. This chronology is relevant while examining the allegation that the

application was merely a device to fill a lacuna after disclosure of the

Petitioners’ defence. It does not, at this stage, establish the genuineness of the

document or the correctness of the explanation offered for its late discovery.

It does, however, show that the promissory note was not introduced for the

first time through the application under Section 311 CrPC.

42. The document is also not extraneous to the subject matter of the

complaint. The complaint concerns an alleged transaction of Rs. 25 lakhs

between the original complainant and the Petitioners. The promissory note is

dated 16.11.2009, i.e., the same date as the agreement forming part of the

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 14 of 21

complainant’s case, and is asserted by the Respondents to have been executed

by Petitioner No. 2 in connection with the same transaction. Whether that

assertion is ultimately established is a matter of proof. However, the document

cannot, at this stage, be characterised as wholly foreign or collateral to the

controversy.

43. This distinction is important. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction

under Section 311 CrPC, is not called upon to finally determine whether the

proposed evidence is truthful or whether the document sought to be proved is

genuine. Such an inquiry would amount to adjudicating the evidentiary worth

of the document before it is tested. The question at this stage is whether the

material is sufficiently connected with the controversy to justify its being

brought into evidence and subjected to the ordinary process of proof.

44. The allegation that the promissory note is forged and fabricated,

therefore, cannot by itself constitute a ground for excluding the document at

the threshold. The Petitioners are entitled to dispute its execution, challenge

the explanation regarding its discovery, cross-examine the witness through

whom it is sought to be proved and raise all objections available to them in

law. Those objections are matters for appreciation of evidence and cannot be

conclusively determined in proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

45. The decision in Harbhajan Lal Nayyar v. State (supra), relied upon by

the Petitioners, does not lead to a different conclusion. There, after

prosecution evidence had been closed following examination of 11 witnesses,

the statement of the accused had been recorded, defence evidence had

concluded and the matter had reached final arguments, an application was

moved seeking examination of as many as 24 additional witnesses. The

application merely stated that the witnesses had somehow remained

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 15 of 21

unexamined and that their testimony was essential for a just decision.

46. It was in that factual background that this Court found absence of

material demonstrating how the testimony of those witnesses was essential.

The present case stands on a materially different footing. It concerns one

specified witness sought to be recalled in relation to one identified document;

the document had already been sought to be placed on record in February,

2020; and it pertains, on the Respondents’ case, to the very transaction which

forms the subject matter of the complaint. Harbhajan Lal Nayyar (supra),

therefore, does not support an absolute proposition that recall becomes

impermissible merely because the evidence of the concerned party has earlier

concluded.

47. Similarly, Ram Jeet v. State, (supra), does not assist the Petitioners on

the question of stage. The decision holds that, for the purpose of the

corresponding provision in the earlier Code, the trial continues until

pronouncement of judgment and that fresh evidence may be received until

that stage. The Court specifically concluded that a Magistrate or a Judge

sitting alone is entitled to call fresh evidence up to the stage of delivery of

judgment.

48. The contention founded upon Section 362 of the CrPC also does not

merit acceptance. The Petitioners proceed on the basis that the earlier attempt

to bring the promissory note on record had already been rejected and that the

subsequent invocation of Section 311 CrPC amounted to review of that

decision.

49. The contemporaneous record does not support this premise. The

proceedings dated 10.11.2021 record that the application for taking the

additional Affidavit on record was pending and that no reply had been filed

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 16 of 21

despite opportunity. After some arguments, learned counsel for the

complainant stated that he wished to withdraw the application, which request

was allowed. There is no adjudication upon the genuineness, admissibility or

evidentiary value of the promissory note. Nor is there any finding that the

document was forged or fabricated.

50. Section 362 CrPC provides that, once a Court has signed its judgment

or final order disposing of a case, it shall not alter or review the same except

for correction of a clerical or arithmetical error. The proceedings dated

10.11.2021 contain no adjudication of the issue on merits, much less a

judgment or final order disposing of the case. There was, therefore, no

determination concerning the promissory note which could be said to have

subsequently been reviewed. The objection under Section 362 CrPC

consequently fails.

51. The objection under Section 294(3) CrPC proceeds on a different

footing. The Petitioners contend that, since the genuineness of the promissory

note is disputed, the document could not have been marked as Ex. CW-1/7 or

read in evidence.

52. Section 294 CrPC, however, makes a clear distinction between

production of a document and dispensation with its formal proof. Sub-section

(1) contemplates filing of documents by either side and admission or denial

of their genuineness. Sub-section (3) provides that where genuineness is not

disputed, the document may be read in evidence without proof of the signature

of the person by whom it purports to have been signed.

53. Therefore, sub-section (3) does not provide that a document whose

genuineness is disputed becomes inadmissible or is incapable of being

produced. It merely denies the party relying upon such document the benefit

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of dispensing with formal proof.

54. The position has been considered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court

in Naveen Panchal v. State (NCT of Delhi), MANU/DE/6907/2024. After

examining Section 294 CrPC, the Court held:

“27. The next aspect for consideration is what

happens after the admission-denial of the documents.

In case the documents are admitted, their formal

proof is dispensed with. However, in case the

documents are denied, the concerned party has to

prove the documents in accordance with Law.”

xxx

“29. (i) Section 294 Cr.P.C. applies equally to the

prosecution and the accused and does not limit the

production of the documents at any particular stage.

Both prosecution and accused are at par in a trial and

therefore, both can produce the documents for

admission and denial any time after the framing of

Charge;

...

(vi) However, where the genuineness of the document

is denied as in the case of private documents, the

burden would have to be discharged by the

prosecution or the accused as the case may be, to

establish its genuineness.”

55. The Petitioners’ construction of Section 294(3) CrPC would effectively

convert a provision intended to dispense with unnecessary formal proof into

a rule excluding every disputed document from evidence. Such an

interpretation is neither borne out from the language of the provision nor from

Naveen Panchal (supra).

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 18 of 21

56. Consequently, merely because the promissory note has been marked as

Ex. CW-1/7 does not establish its execution, genuineness or contents. Since

its genuineness is disputed, the Respondents must prove the document in

accordance with law. The marking of the document does not foreclose any

objection of the Petitioners to its proof, admissibility or evidentiary value.

57. The objection founded upon Practice Direction No. 9(h)(xv), as

referred to by the Petitioners, also does not create an absolute bar against

reception of the document. The material placed before this Court describes

the Practice Direction as dealing with the stage of production, identification

and marking of documents. However, nothing in the material supplied

demonstrates that the said Practice Direction curtails the statutory jurisdiction

expressly conferred by Section 311 CrPC to recall a witness “at any stage”

where the requirements of the provision are otherwise satisfied. The stage at

which a document is sought to be introduced remains relevant to delay, bona

fides and prejudice; it cannot, without more, extinguish the statutory power

itself.

58. The question of prejudice must finally be considered. The Petitioners

have already disclosed their defence and the promissory note is sought to be

introduced at a late stage. This circumstance cannot be treated lightly. At the

same time, the nature of the prejudice has to be examined. The Petitioners are

not being deprived of an opportunity to meet the document. Ms. Kavita

Chowdhary is being recalled precisely so that the document may be brought

through evidence, thereby giving the Petitioners an opportunity to cross-

examine her in relation to its alleged discovery, execution and contents. The

Petitioners remain free to lead such evidence as may be permissible in law in

rebuttal.

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 19 of 21

59. This is also consistent with the principle in Rajaram Prasad Yadav

(supra) that additional evidence must be germane and that the opposite party

must be afforded an opportunity of rebuttal. The safeguard against prejudice

lies not in excluding relevant evidence merely because it is produced late, but

in ensuring that the opposite party is given a complete and effective

opportunity to challenge it.

60. The recent decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in VE

Commercial Vehicles Ltd. v. Sunil Kapoor, MANU/DE/4292/2026,

reiterates that Section 311 CrPC confers wide discretion exercisable “at any

stage”, with a just decision of the case remaining the paramount

consideration, while the power must nevertheless be exercised with judicial

circumspection.

61. On a cumulative consideration of the record, this Court finds that the

present case does not involve an attempt to introduce evidence wholly

unrelated to the existing controversy or to fundamentally alter the case of the

complainant. The promissory note is an identified document stated to relate

to the same transaction; it had been sought to be placed on record in February,

2020; the earlier application was withdrawn without any adjudication on the

merits of the document; and the Petitioners retain the right to contest the

document through cross-examination and in accordance with the ordinary

rules of proof.

62. The delay in production of the promissory note is undoubtedly

substantial and the explanation offered by the Respondents would have to

withstand scrutiny during the trial. However, delay by itself cannot be

elevated into an absolute rule of exclusion, particularly in light of the express

language of Section 311 CrPC and the decision of the Supreme Court in P.

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Chhaganlal Daga (supra).

63. Equally, the allegation that the document is forged or fabricated

remains an allegation at this stage. Permitting a document to be brought into

evidence cannot be equated with accepting it as genuine. Its execution and

genuineness have to be established by the party relying upon it, and its

evidentiary worth has to be assessed thereafter.

CONCLUSION

64. This Court is, therefore, of the view that no ground is made out for

exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. Interference at this

stage would have the effect of excluding the promissory note without

permitting the process of proof and cross-examination to run its course,

despite the document being prima facie connected with the transaction which

forms the subject matter of the complaint.

65. It is, however, clarified that nothing stated herein shall be construed as

expressing any opinion on the genuineness, execution or evidentiary value of

the promissory note dated 16.11.2009. The fact that the document has been

permitted to be brought on record and marked as Ex. CW-1/7 shall not

dispense with its admissibility in accordance with law.

66. The Petitioners shall remain at liberty to cross-examine the concerned

witness in respect of the promissory note and to raise all objections concerning

its execution, genuineness, admissibility and evidentiary value. All such

questions shall be determined independently on the basis of the evidence led

by the parties, without being influenced by any observation contained in the

present judgment.

67. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Pending application(s),

if any, are also disposed of.

CRL.M.C. 4753/2023 Page 21 of 21

68. The interim protection operating in the present proceedings stands

vacated.

69. Considering that the complaint has remained pending for a

considerable period, the proceedings shall now be taken forward

expeditiously, in accordance with law.

70. A copy of this judgment be communicated to the concerned learned

Trial Court for necessary information and compliance.

71. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.

MADHU JAIN

(JUDGE)

AUGUST 13, 2026/m