KASHMIR RAM @ PAPPI VS. STATE OF PUNJAB

2026 INSC 854Page 1 of 46

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3897 OF 2025

KASHMIR RAM @ PAPPI … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. The instant criminal appeal arises out of SLP

(Criminal) No. 13839 of 2025 assailing the judgment

dated 30.10.2019 passed by the High Court of Punjab

and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA-S-2073-SB-2018,

whereby the appeal preferred by the Appellant against

his conviction and sentence stood dismissed.

2. Kashmir Ram @ Pappi (hereinafter referred to as “the

Appellant”) and Dharam Pal @ Bobby, co-accused

brother of the Appellant, were convicted and sentenced

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by the Special Court, Jalandhar, in CIS Case No.

NDPS/1160/2014 vide judgment dated 26.03.2018

under Section 15(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter

referred to as “NDPS Act 1985”) to rigorous

imprisonment for ten years and a fine of INR

1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) and, in default of

payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

a further period of one year.

3. Dharam Pal @ Bobby, and the Appellant preferred a

joint appeal, which stood dismissed by the impugned

judgment. Dharam Pal @ Bobby has till now chosen

not to challenge the judgment and is, thus, not before

this Court.

4. Both the above mentioned accused, stood forwarded

by the Station House Officer, Police Station Phillaur,

District Jalandhar, to face trial under Section 15 of the

NDPS Act 1985 upon the allegation that on

04.05.2014 at about 11:30 AM, in the area of Pul

Nehar, Tehang, they were found in conscious

possession of ten plastic bags of poppy husk, each of

twenty kilograms, from the back portion of Tata Safari

vehicle and further of eight plastic bags of poppy husk,

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each of twenty kilograms, on disclosure kept in the

room of their house without any valid licence or

permit.

5. The prosecution case is that on 04.05.2014 Inspector

Shiv Kumar, Incharge, Special Staff, Jalandhar, along

with other police officials, had laid a naka at the Canal

Bridge, Village Tehang, in connection with the

checking of suspected persons and vehicles. At about

11:00 AM, a secret informer disclosed to him that the

Appellant and his brother were selling poppy husk on

a large scale in the area. They had kept plastic bags

containing poppy husk in a Safari car bearing

registration number PB-08-AM-2821 and they were

proceeding from Saiffabad towards Tehang for the

purpose of supplying the same. Finding the

information reliable, the Investigating Officer scribed a

ruqa and sent it to Police Station Phillaur, upon the

basis whereof FIR No. 89 dated 04.05.2014 came to be

registered under Sections 15, 61 and 85 of the NDPS

Act 1985. The ruqa was exhibited as Ex. P-1 and the

formal FIR as Ex. P-2.

6. A nakka was thereafter laid at the disclosed place. The

Tata Safari, when appeared, was signalled to stop. The

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driver attempted to turn it around but the vehicle was

apprehended. The person at the wheel disclosed his

name as Dharam Pal @ Bobby and the person seated

adjoining the driver's seat as Kashmir Ram @ Pappi-

the Appellant, both residents of Village Saiffabad.

Upon being apprised of their right to be searched in

the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer, both

declined to be searched by the Investigating Officer

and elected to be searched before a Gazetted Officer,

separate memos to that effect being prepared as Ex. P-

3 and Ex. P-4. The Investigating Officer thereupon

telephoned the Deputy Superintendent of Police (D),

apprising him of the receipt of the secret information

and of the apprehension of the vehicle and the

accused, and requesting him to reach the spot. Deputy

Superintendent of Police (D) Ashwani Kumar arrived,

apprised both accused that he was a Gazetted Officer

and that they were at liberty to be searched before any

other Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, and both

reposed confidence in him, separate consent memos

being accordingly prepared. Independent witnesses

were approached but showed their unwillingness to

join the proceedings.

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7. The search of the vehicle was conducted under the

supervision of the Deputy Superintendent of Police (D).

Beneath a tarpaulin at the rear were found ten plastic

bags, all of which contained poppy husk. The contents

were emptied upon the tarpaulin and mixed, two

samples of 250 grams each were drawn, and the

remaining material, weighing approximately 200

kilograms, was converted into bulk parcels. The

Deputy Superintendent of Police (D) affixed his seal

bearing the impression “AK” upon all the parcels and

the Investigating Officer his seal bearing the

impression “SK”, and Form M-29, Ex. DC, was filled in

at the spot bearing both impressions. The recovered

substance and the vehicle were taken into police

possession vide recovery memo Ex. P-6, and both

accused were arrested. A personal search of both was

also conducted vide memos Ex. P-9 and Ex. P-10, from

which nothing was recovered.

8. Upon separate disclosure statements, Ex. P-12 and

Ex. P-13, a further eight plastic bags of poppy husk,

weighing approximately 160 kilograms, were recovered

from a room in the house the accused at Village

Saiffabad, the identical procedure of mixing, sampling

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and sealing being followed and a second Form M-29,

Ex. DB, being prepared. Upon return to the Police

Station the case property was produced before the

Station House Officer, who affixed his seal bearing the

impression “PSS” on all the parcels as also the Forms

M-29, whereafter it was deposited with the Mohrir

Head Constable.

9. On the following day, 05.05.2014, the case property

was produced, together with both accused, before the

Illaqa Magistrate. The case property was re-deposited

with the Mohrir Head Constable the same day, and two

sample parcels, representing the two separate

recoveries, were forwarded to the office of the Chemical

Examiner, Kharar, where they were received on

20.05.2014. The reports of the Chemical Examiner,

Ex. D2 and Ex. PY, identified the material in each

parcel as poppy husk and recorded the seals intact

and as tallying with the specimen impressions borne

upon the Forms M-29. Upon completion of the

investigation the challan came to be presented, and

both accused were charge-sheeted under Section 15 of

the NDPS Act 1985, to which they pleaded not guilty

and claimed trial.

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10. The prosecution examined six witnesses, namely,

Constable Raman Kataria, sample carrier, as PW-01;

Charanjit Kaur, Junior Assistant in the office of the

District Transport Officer, Jalandhar, as PW-02; Head

Constable Parminder Singh, the then Mohrir Head

Constable, as PW-03; Inspector Shiv Kumar, the

Investigating Officer, as PW-04; Sub-Inspector

Surinder Singh, witness of recovery, as PW-05; and

Deputy Superintendent of Police (D) Ashwani Kumar

as PW-06. PW-02 proved, vide Ex. PW-2/A, that the

vehicle stood registered in the name of M/s Plasma

Records Entertainment and was thereafter transferred

to one Buta Singh. In their statements recorded under

Section 313 CrPC 1973 both accused denied the

incriminating circumstances and pleaded false

implication at the instance of the then Sarpanch of

their village. In defence, Darshan Ram, the sitting

Sarpanch of Village Saiffabad, was examined as DW-

01, who deposed to a prior quarrel in the year 2011

between the accused and the former Sarpanch, and to

the accused having been picked up from their home

and a false recovery having been planted upon them;

he admitted in cross-examination that no application

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complaining of the alleged false implication had been

moved before any higher officer.

11. The cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses

elicited certain admissions upon which the defence

founded its case. It is sufficient to notice in outline, at

this stage, as they are being examined in their proper

place hereinafter. PW-04 admitted that he had not

reduced the secret information into writing or sent the

same to a superior officer at any stage of the case, and

that PW-06 was holding current duty charge, the

regular Deputy Superintendent of Police not then

being available. PW-06 admitted that he had never

been informed of the secret information in writing and

had never seen it, and that he came to be confirmed in

the substantive rank only in the year 2016. Certain

divergences were also elicited as to the date upon

which the samples were deposited with the Chemical

Examiner, as to the number of parcels carried, and as

to whether the specimen seal impression had been

taken upon a piece of cloth.

12. Before the Special Court it was urged for the accused

that no effort had been made to reduce the secret

information into writing or to inform the higher

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authorities even after a reasonable delay, and that the

non-compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985

was fatal to the prosecution, reliance being placed

upon Darshan Singh v. State of Haryana1 and Rajender

Singh v. State of Haryana2. The Special Court set out

Section 42 in extenso, noticed Karnail Singh v. State of

Haryana3, wherein Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v.

State of Gujarat4 and Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala5

had been considered, and further placed reliance upon

Bahadur Singh v. State of Haryana6. Upon that footing

it held that PW-04, having received the information

while on the move, having sent the ruqa Ex. P-1 upon

the basis whereof the FIR came to be registered, and

having thereafter summoned the Deputy

Superintendent of Police to the spot, had substantially

complied with the provision, and that no prejudice was

shown to have been caused to the accused.

13. It was next urged that no independent witness had

been associated with either recovery and that Section

100(4) CrPC 1973 had not been complied with in

1 2016 (1) RCR (Criminal) 333 (SC)

2 2011 (3) RCR (Criminal) 856 (SC)

3 (2009) 8 SCC 539

4 (2000) 2 SCC 513

5 (2001) 6 SCC 692

6 (2010) 4 SCC 445

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respect of the search of the house. The Special Court

held that two independent and respectable inhabitants

of the locality had not been summoned before the

search of the house was conducted, and that the

recovery of eight bags therefrom stood vitiated on that

account. Apropos Section 50 of the NDPS Act 1985, it

was urged that PW-06 was not a Gazetted Officer on

04.05.2014 and was thus not in a capacity to search

the accused in terms of the consent given by them.

Relying upon State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan

Kumar7 and State of Haryana v. Ranbir alias Rana8,

the Special Court held the provision to have no

application, it being attracted only in the case of a

personal search of the accused and not where the

search is made of a vehicle which he was at the

relevant time using, and that it was accordingly of no

effect upon the prosecution case that the officer who

supervised the search was not a regular Deputy

Superintendent of Police.

14. The contention that the link evidence was missing was

rejected, the Special Court holding that the reports Ex.

D2 and Ex. PY, read with the corresponding Forms M-

7 (2005) 4 SCC 350

8 AIR 2006 SC 1796

Page 11 of 46

29, established that two samples had been forwarded,

the one relating to bags 1 to 10 and the other to bags

11 to 18, that both reports recorded receipt on

20.05.2014, and that the divergences elicited in cross-

examination were inadvertent. The non-examination

of the Station House Officer was held not to be fatal,

he having proceeded on ex-India leave and having

thereafter remained absent from duty, and PW-04

having proved his seal impression upon all the parcels;

and the non-examination of the Chemical Analyst was

likewise held not to be fatal, his report standing

tendered under Section 293 CrPC 1973. In conclusion,

the Special Court held that the prosecution had failed

to prove its case in respect of the eight bags recovered

from the house but had proved it in respect of the ten

bags recovered from the vehicle, and convicted both

accused under Section 15(c) of the NDPS Act 1985.

Upon quantum, the plea that the convicts were poor

persons and first offenders was considered and

declined, the quantity being commercial.

15. In appeal, the High Court took up the contentions

issue-wise, namely, non-compliance with Sections 42

and 50; the non-examination of the Chemical Analyst

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and of the Station House Officer; the reliability of the

oral evidence, which it reserved to be taken up at the

end; and the absence of link evidence. As regards

Section 42, it reproduced paragraph 35 of Karnail

Singh case (supra) and held that the Investigating

Officer having received the information while not at the

Police Station but on the move, it was not necessary

that the same be immediately reduced into writing and

passed on to the immediate official superior; that he

had in fact informed the Police Station by sending a

communication; and that the Deputy Superintendent

of Police had thereafter been informed on telephone

and requested to reach the place of recovery. It

accordingly found substantive compliance.

16. Apropos Section 50, the High Court recorded that the

provision has no applicability where the vehicle is

searched and the recovery made therefrom. It noticed

the submission that a personal search had also been

conducted, as would be clear from the memo, and

rejected it upon State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh9

holding the search of the vehicle and the personal

search following upon it, to be two separate and

9 Criminal Appeal Nos. 1565-66 of 2019, decided on 15.10.2019

Page 13 of 46

independent steps, so that where no narcotics have

been recovered upon the latter while narcotics have

been recovered from the former, the entire search does

not stand vitiated; and it took the view that the

contention founded upon the current duty charge held

by PW-06 could not therefore be accepted. With regard

to the absence of link evidence, it held that the vehicle

was found in the possession and occupation of the

appellants and that the circumstance of its

registration in the name of a third party did not assist

them. Referring to Section 54 of the NDPS Act 1985

and observing that the principle of reverse onus is now

well established and recognised, it held that the onus

lay upon the appellants.

17. The High Court held further that the defence, having

sought to establish false implication at the behest of

the then Sarpanch by examining the subsequent

Sarpanch, had failed to create a dent in the case set

up by the prosecution. Observing that the recovery

was a large one and that the investigating agency was

required to be extra vigilant, cautious and meticulous,

and having prima facie found that police officials had

attempted to mislead the Court, it directed that a copy

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of the judgment be forwarded to the Director General

of Police, Punjab, for information and such further

action as might be found necessary against the police

officials concerned. The appeal was accordingly

dismissed.

18. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that what

the record discloses is not delayed but total non-

compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985, and

that the distinction is decisive. He places reliance upon

the admission of PW-04 that he had not reduced the

secret information into writing or sent the same to a

superior officer at any stage of the case, and upon that

of PW-06 that he was never informed of the secret

information in writing and had never seen it. It is

urged that the ruqa sent for registration of the FIR is

a step taken under the Code of Criminal Procedure and

cannot be pressed into service as compliance with a

distinct statutory obligation; that a telephonic

summons to an officer cannot supply the want of a

writing which the statute exacts; and that the Courts

below erred in treating either circumstance, or both

together, as substantial compliance. Reliance is placed

upon Karnail Singh case (supra) and upon State of

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Punjab v. Balbir Singh10, and in particular upon the

proposition that where a private conveyance in a

public place or in transit is sought to be searched and

seized, the requirements of Section 42 are to be

complied with.

19. It is contended further that Section 50 of the NDPS Act

1985 stood violated, a personal search of both accused

having admittedly been conducted vide memos Ex. P-

9 and Ex. P-10, and PW-06, before whom the accused

elected to be searched, having held the post of Deputy

Superintendent of Police only on current duty charge

on 04.05.2014 and having been confirmed in the

substantive rank as late as the year 2016. It is urged

that the offer and the search which follows upon it

constitute a composite transaction, and that a consent

given to an officer who did not hold the rank

represented to the accused is no consent in the eye of

law. Reliance is placed upon State of Punjab v. Baldev

Singh11.

20. The remaining grounds urged are that the sample

parcels, drawn on 04.05.2014, reached the office of the

10 (1994) 3 SCC 299

11 (1999) 6 SCC 172

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Chemical Examiner only on 20.05.2014, in breach of

Standing Order 1/88 dated 15.03.1988 and of Section

52A of the NDPS Act 1985, reliance being placed upon

Union of India v. Mohanlal12; that the Chemical Analyst

was not examined and that the report tendered under

Section 293 CrPC 1973 could not, without more, be

made the foundation of a conviction, reliance being

placed upon Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of

Narcotics13; that no independent and respectable

witness of the locality was associated with either

recovery, so that the very infirmity which persuaded

the Special Court to discard the recovery from the

house ought to have persuaded it to discard the

recovery from the vehicle; and that no link evidence

connects the Appellant with the vehicle, PW-02 having

proved that it stood registered in the name of a third

party who was never examined, investigated or

proceeded against, the Appellant having in any event

been no more than a passenger seated adjoining the

driver. It is urged, as the culmination of these

submissions, that the High Court, having itself

recorded prima facie findings that three of the six

12 2016 SCC OnLine SC 606

13 (2013) 2 SCC 590

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prosecution witnesses had attempted to mislead the

Court or had deposed against the record, and having

gone to the length of directing a reference to the

Director General of Police, Punjab, could not

consistently have sustained the conviction upon the

testimony of those very witnesses.

21. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent-State

submits that no infirmity attaches to the concurrent

findings returned by the two Courts below and that

their appreciation of the evidence is not to be reopened

as though the present were a further appeal upon

facts. It is submitted that the order of the Sub-

Divisional Judicial Magistrate dated 05.05.2014

furnishes independent, contemporaneous and judicial

corroboration of the integrity of the seals within a day

of the recovery, which no infirmity in the testimony of

an individual police witness is capable of displacing;

that Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 stands satisfied

where the substance of the information is acted upon

with promptitude by an officer who receives it while on

patrol, as held in Karnail Singh case (supra), literal and

contemporaneous recording not being exacted in such

a situation; and that the requirement of dispatch

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within seventy-two hours under Standing Order 1/88

is directed against adulteration or substitution, so that

where the seals are shown to be intact and to tally, the

purpose of the requirement stands achieved and no

question of the delay vitiating the trial arises, reliance

being placed upon Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif14.

It is submitted finally that discrepancies which do not

touch the core of a prosecution case otherwise proved

do not discredit it, reliance being placed upon State of

Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh15; that the presumption

arising under Section 54 of the NDPS Act 1985 was

never rebutted, the evidence of DW-01 having been

considered and rejected by both the Courts below; and

that the sentence awarded is the minimum prescribed

for a commercial quantity, no material having been

placed to warrant any lesser punishment. He

accordingly prays for dismissal of the instant appeal.

22. We have heard learned Counsel for both the parties

and, gone through the record as well as the judgments

passed by the Special Court and by the High Court.

23. Before we delve into the factual analysis based upon

14 (2024) 11 SCC 372

15 (2011) 4 SCC 324

Page 19 of 46

the legal principles governing each of the contentions

raised, it is necessary to bear in mind the character of

the statute under consideration. The NDPS Act 1985

is a special law enacted to curtail the menace of illicit

traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,

and to that end it confers upon the authorities powers

of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant

which are comprehensive in their reach. Those powers

are matched by punishments which are stringent and

which, in the case of a commercial quantity, admit of

no sentence below the statutory minimum. It is

precisely because the powers conferred are wide and

the consequences of conviction severe that the

Legislature has hedged their exercise about with

safeguards, and it is well settled that those safeguards

are to be construed strictly and that their observance

is not to be treated as an empty formality. At the same

time, a safeguard is enacted to secure a purpose, and

the enquiry in a given case must be directed to whether

that purpose has in truth been served upon the facts

obtaining, and not merely to whether a prescribed

form has been faithfully reproduced. The harmonious

balance so struck, between the protection of the

individual against the hazards of an unregulated

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search and the protection of the community against a

traffic which the statute was enacted to suppress, lies

at the core of the provisions which fall for our

consideration. It is upon that approach that we have

examined each of the contentions urged before us.

24. We are conscious that the jurisdiction conferred upon

this Court by Article 136 of the Constitution of India,

1950 is discretionary and extraordinary, and that an

appeal by special leave is not a further appeal upon

facts. We have nevertheless considered it appropriate,

regard being had to the nature of the grounds urged

and to the sentence which the Appellant is presently

undergoing, to examine each of the contentions upon

its own merits and to record our findings thereon,

rather than to dispose of the appeal upon the limits of

that jurisdiction alone. The weight to be attached to

the circumstance that the findings assailed are

concurrent findings of two Courts is a matter to which

we shall return at the conclusion of this judgment.

25. The first issue that falls for our consideration, and that

upon which the appeal principally turns, is the

compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985. For

the said purpose, an analysis of the bare text of the

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provision is undertaken hereinafter. Section 42,

insofar as it is material, is worded as follows:

“42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without

warrant or authorisation.—

(l) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a

peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central

excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any

other department of the Central Government including

para-military forces or armed forces as is empowered in

this behalf by general or special order by the Central

Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior

in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue,

drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a

State Government as is empowered in this behalf by

general or special order of the State Government, if he has

reason to believe from personal knowledge or information

given by any person and taken down in writing that any

narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled

substance in respect of which an offence punishable

under this Act has been committed … is kept or concealed

in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may

between sunrise and sunset,—

(a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance

or place;

(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove

any obstacle to such entry;

(c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in

the manufacture thereof and any other article and any

animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to

be liable to confiscation under this Act …; and

(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any

person whom he has reason to believe to have committed

any offence punishable under this Act:

Provided that … if such officer has reason to believe that

a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained

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without affording opportunity for the concealment of

evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may

enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed

place at any time between sunset and sunrise after

recording the grounds of his belief.

(2) Where an officer takes down any information in

writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his

belief under the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-

two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official

superior.”

26. From the perusal of the provision it is evident that

where the empowered officer proceeds upon prior

information given by any person, that information is

necessarily to be taken down in writing, whereas where

he proceeds upon his personal knowledge no recording

of the reasons of his belief is exacted, save that under

the proviso the grounds of belief must be recorded if the

search is to be conducted between sunset and sunrise;

and that sub-section (2) obliges the officer, wherever he

has taken down information in writing or recorded

grounds of belief under the proviso, to send a copy

thereof to his immediate official superior within

seventy-two hours. To the extent so indicated the

provisions are mandatory, and their contravention

would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial,

as was held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in

paragraph 25(2-C) of Balbir Singh case (supra), relied

Page 23 of 46

upon by the Appellant:

“Under Section 42(1) the empowered officer if has a

prior information given by any person, that should

necessarily be taken down in writing. But if he has

reason to believe from personal knowledge that

offences under Chapter IV have been committed or

materials which may furnish evidence of commission

of such offences are concealed in any building etc. he

may carry out the arrest or search without a warrant

between sunrise and sunset and this provision does

not mandate that he should record his reasons of

belief. But under the proviso to Section 42(1) if such

officer has to carry out such search between sunset

and sunrise, he must record the grounds of his belief.

To this extent these provisions are mandatory and

contravention of the same would affect the prosecution

case and vitiate the trial.”

27. The content of the obligation so cast, and the

consequences of a departure from it, were thereafter

settled by the Constitution Bench in Karnail Singh

case (supra), which considered Abdul Rashid Ibrahim

Mansuri case (supra) and Sajan Abraham case (supra)

and stated the resulting position in paragraph 35 in

the following terms:

“35. (a) The officer on receiving the information [of the

nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 42] from any

person had to record it in writing in the register concerned

and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official

superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of

clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1).

(b) But if the information was received when the officer

was not in the police station, but while he was on the move

Page 24 of 46

either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone,

or other means, and the information calls for immediate

action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or

evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be

feasible or practical to take down in writing the information

given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as

per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as

soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and

forthwith inform the same to the official superior.

(c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of

Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the

information received and sending a copy thereof to the

superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search

and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances

involving emergent situations, the recording of the

information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the

official superior may get postponed by a reasonable

period, that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The

question is one of urgency and expediency.

(d) While total non-compliance with requirements of sub-

sections (1) and (2) of Section 42 is impermissible, delayed

compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay

will be acceptable compliance with Section 42 … Similarly,

where the police officer does not record the information at

all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then

also it will be a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act.

Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with

Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each

case. The above position got strengthened with the

amendment to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.”

28. The submission of the Appellant, put at its highest, is

that the present case answers to the concluding limb

of clause (d) above, being that of an officer who does

not record the information at all and does not inform

his official superior at all, and that the concurrent

Page 25 of 46

finding of substantial compliance is therefore not

merely erroneous but one which no Court could

reasonably have reached upon the material. In

support of that construction reliance was placed,

before the Special Court, upon Darshan Singh case

(supra), wherein this Court held in paragraph 13 that

the mandate of Section 42(1) requiring the recording

in writing of the details pertaining to the receipt of

secret information, as also the communication of the

same to the superior officer, is separate and distinct

from the procedure stipulated under the provisions of

the Code of Criminal Procedure; that the two

procedures are exclusive of one another; that

compliance with one would not infer compliance with

the other; and that compliance with Section 42 —

“… will not be assumed, merely because the Station

House Officer concerned had registered a first

information report, which was also dispatched to the

Superintendent of Police, in compliance with the

provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.”

29. The proposition so laid down in Darshan Singh case

(supra) is unexceptionable and we respectfully affirm

it. The registration of an FIR and its onward

transmission through the ordinary channels of the

Code of Criminal Procedure are no substitute for the

Page 26 of 46

distinct obligation which Section 42 casts, and

compliance with the latter is not to be assumed from

the former. It is nevertheless necessary to notice the

precise vice at which that proposition is directed. It is

directed against an assumption, and against the

practice of treating the registration of an FIR, without

more, as discharging an obligation which the statute

casts separately and independently. It does not enact

a rule of exclusion, whereby the circumstance that an

FIR came to be registered upon a writing emanating

from the empowered officer himself is to be shut out

from consideration altogether when the Court comes

to determine, upon the totality of the material, whether

the statutory purpose has in fact been served. The

distinction is one between assuming compliance from

a single circumstance and weighing that circumstance

along with others, and it is a distinction which the

Courts below did not overlook.

30. Having so understood the law, we may turn to what

the Courts below in fact did. Upon a fair reading of

both judgments, the finding of substantial compliance

rests not upon the registration of the FIR alone but

upon three matters taken together. The first is that the

Page 27 of 46

information reached PW-04 at 11:00 AM while he was

at a nakabandi upon a public road and not at the

Police Station, and that it related to a vehicle then in

transit and expected imminently, which is a situation

answering precisely to clause (b) of paragraph 35 of

Karnail Singh case (supra), where the exigency is such

that the taking down of the information in writing

before acting upon it is neither feasible nor practical.

The second is that PW-04 did not merely proceed to

act upon the information; he scribed the ruqa, Ex. P-

1, and dispatched it to the Police Station through

Constable Nirbhai Singh No. 1106 before the

interception was effected, so that a writing emanating

from him, recording the substance of what he had

learnt, was brought into existence contemporaneously

with the receipt of the information and preceded the

search. The third is that he thereupon telephoned the

Deputy Superintendent of Police (D), communicated to

him the receipt of the secret information as well as the

apprehension of the vehicle and the accused, and

summoned him to the spot, the search having been

carried out under his supervision upon his arrival.

31. It was upon a factual matrix of precisely that character

Page 28 of 46

that this Court held in Bahadur Singh case (supra),

relied upon by the Special Court, that there had been

substantial compliance, a wireless message having

been sent to the immediate higher officer and a ruqa

containing the facts and circumstances of the case

having been sent from the spot to the Police Station,

upon the basis whereof the FIR came to be registered,

and no prejudice having been shown to have been

caused to the accused by the non-reduction of the

secret information into writing. We do not find that the

Special Court erred in applying it, nor that the High

Court erred in affirming the conclusion so reached.

32. The admission of PW-04 in his cross-examination,

upon which the Appellant rests the whole of his case

under this head, is therefore not to be read in isolation

from the circumstances aforesaid. Read along with

them, what the admission establishes is that no entry

was made in the register concerned and that no copy

was separately transmitted to the immediate official

superior, and not that the officer proceeded in secrecy

or that the substance of the information was withheld

altogether from the record and from every superior.

That is a materially different case from the one

Page 29 of 46

contemplated by the concluding limb of clause (d) of

paragraph 35 of Karnail Singh case (supra), and

equally a materially different case from Darshan Singh

case (supra), where nothing beyond the registration of

the FIR and its routine onward dispatch was placed

before the Court. We are accordingly not persuaded

that the concurrent finding can be characterised as

one of total non-compliance.

33. Upon a consideration of the circumstances as a whole,

we hold that there was substantial compliance with

the requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985.

The information, received upon a public road and

relating to a vehicle then in transit and expected

imminently, called for immediate action of the kind

contemplated by clause (b) of paragraph 35 of Karnail

Singh case (supra); its substance was reduced into

writing in the ruqa, Ex. P-1, and dispatched before the

search was undertaken; the officer superior in rank

was informed of its receipt, was summoned to the spot,

and the search was conducted in his presence and

under his supervision; and no prejudice of any

description has been shown to have been occasioned

to the Appellant by the manner in which the officer

Page 30 of 46

proceeded. The case is thus not one of a total absence

of compliance, and the delayed and imperfect

character of what was done stands sufficiently

explained by the exigency which the situation

presented.

34. That conclusion is fortified, and independently

supported, by the circumstance that the finding

assailed is a concurrent one. Whether there is

adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42 is,

upon the express terms of Karnail Singh case (supra),

a question of fact to be decided in each case. That

question was raised before the Special Court, was

argued upon the very judgements now pressed before

us and was answered against the Appellant; it was

raised again before the High Court and was answered

against him a second time, each Court having

addressed itself to the material upon the record. Even

if we had entertained a doubt in the matter, which we

do not, it would not have been open to this Court, in

the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 136

of the Constitution of India, to substitute for a view

reasonably taken upon the record on a different

appreciation of the same material. The ground pressed

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into service, as mentioned above, consequently fails.

35. The next issue that falls for our consideration is with

respect to Section 50 of the NDPS Act 1985. The

safeguard there enacted operates upon the search of

the person of an individual, its object being to protect

a person against the hazards of an unwitnessed

personal search, and it does not extend to the search

of a bag, an article, a container or a conveyance. That

is the effect of Pawan Kumar case (supra), applied by

the Special Court, and of Ranbir alias Rana case

(supra). Baldev Singh case (supra), upon which the

Appellant places reliance, is a decision of a

Constitution Bench and declares the provision to be

mandatory; but what it declares mandatory is the

safeguard attending the search of the person from

which the incriminating recovery is made, and it does

not convert every personal search which may

incidentally be conducted in the course of an

investigation into the search upon which a conviction

founded elsewhere must stand or fall.

36. Upon the record before us, it is not in dispute that a

personal search of both accused was conducted vide

memos Ex. P-9 and Ex. P-10; the fact is recited in the

Page 32 of 46

evidence of PW-04, PW-05 and PW-06 in materially

identical terms and was noticed by the Special Court

in its narration of the evidence. It is equally not in

dispute that nothing whatsoever was recovered upon

that personal search, and that the conviction rests

wholly and exclusively upon the ten bags of poppy

husk recovered from beneath the tarpaulin at the rear

of the Tata Safari. The High Court addressed this

aspect precisely, and did so upon a formulation more

careful than that adopted by the Special Court, which

at one place in its reasoning observed that no personal

search had been conducted at all. The High Court did

not deny the personal search; it recorded the

submission that such a search had been conducted as

would be clear from the memo, and answered it upon

Baljinder Singh case (supra), holding the search of the

vehicle and the personal search following upon it to be

two separate and independent steps, so that where

nothing is recovered upon the latter while the

narcotics are recovered from the former, the entire

search does not stand vitiated. That, in our considered

view, is the correct approach, and we adopt it. We hold,

accordingly, that Section 50 of the NDPS Act 1985 was

not attracted to the search which yielded the recovery

Page 33 of 46

beneath the tarpaulin at the rear of TATA Safari

vehicle upon which the conviction rests, and that no

question of its breach arises in the facts present in the

case in hand.

37. It follows that the further contention as to the rank

held by PW-06 on 04.05.2014 does not arise for our

determination, Section 50 of the NDPS Act 1985 not

being attracted to the search which yielded the

recovery, the status of the officer before whom the

accused elected to be searched cannot affect the

validity of that recovery.

38. We come next to the interval between the drawing of

the samples on 04.05.2014 and their deposit with the

Chemical Examiner on 20.05.2014, said to offend

Standing Order 1/88 dated 15.03.1988 as well as

Section 52A of the NDPS Act 1985. The object of a

prescription requiring prompt dispatch is to foreclose

the possibility of tampering, substitution or

adulteration during the period for which the samples

remain outside judicial control; and where that

possibility stands independently foreclosed, the object

of the prescription is served notwithstanding the

interval. In the present case, it stands foreclosed upon

Page 34 of 46

two independent footings. On the day following the

recovery the entire case property and the sample

parcels were produced before the Sub-Divisional

Judicial Magistrate, whose order records the seals

“SK”, “AK” and “PSS” as intact, records the inventory

report as correct, and records the drawing of four

further representative samples under her own seal

“PS” a judicial act, contemporaneous, and recorded by

an authority wholly independent of the investigating

agency. And upon receipt at the Laboratory, the

reports Ex. D2 and Ex. PY record the seals as intact

and as tallying with the specimen impressions borne

upon the Forms M-29, Ex. DB and Ex. DC. Nothing

has been placed before us, as nothing was placed

before either Court below, to suggest

interference/tampering with the parcels during the

intervening period.

39. In such circumstances, the interval is a procedural

irregularity which does not, of itself, vitiate the trial.

The position was stated by this Court in Kashif case

(supra), in paragraph 41, in the following terms:

“41. From the above decisions, the position that emerges

is that this Court in a catena of decisions, has approved

the procedure of spot searches and seizures in

Page 35 of 46

compliance with the Standing Orders and the

notifications issued by the NCB and the Central

Government, and upheld the convictions on being

satisfied about the search and seizure made by the

officers as per the provisions of the Act and being

satisfied about the scientific evidence of FSL reports, etc.

Even otherwise, in view of the law laid down by the

Constitution Benches in Pooran Mal and in Baldev Singh,

any procedural illegality in conducting the search and

seizure by itself, would not make the entire evidence

collected thereby inadmissible. The court would have to

decide the admissibility of evidence in the context and the

manner in which the evidence was collected and was

sought to be used during the course of trial. The evidence

collected during the course of investigation in legal and

proper manner and sought to be used in the course of trial

with regard to the seized contraband substance could not

be simply brushed aside, on the ground of procedural

irregularity if any, committed by the officer concerned

authorised in making application to the Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 52-A of the Act.”

40. Mohanlal case (supra), upon which the Appellant

places reliance, is concerned principally with the

machinery for the sampling, certification and disposal

of seized narcotic substances and with the directions

issued for securing the working of that machinery. It

does not carry the Appellant's case beyond the point

already considered, no material having been placed to

suggest that the integrity of the samples was in fact

compromised during the interval complained of.

Apropos the non-examination of the Chemical Analyst,

the report of the Chemical Examiner stood tendered

Page 36 of 46

under Section 293 CrPC 1973, which provides:

“(1) Any document purporting to be a report under the

hand of a Government scientific expert to whom this

section applies, upon any matter or thing duly submitted

to him for examination or analysis and report in the

course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used

as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under

this Code.

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine

any such expert as to the subject-matter of his report.”

41. The report was thus admissible in evidence without

formal proof, sub-section (2) preserving the power of

the Special Court to summon and examine the person

by whom it was made an authority which exists to be

invoked. The record placed before us does not disclose

that any application for the examination of the

Chemical Analyst was made on behalf of the accused

at any stage of the trial and came to be declined, nor

is it suggested that the reports Ex. D2 and Ex. PY are

unreliable upon their face or that the material

analysed was other than the material seized. In the

absence of any such request and of any such

foundation, the contention founded upon Thana Singh

case (supra) does not carry the matter any further.

42. We turn now to the two related contentions upon

which the Appellant placed his principal reliance

Page 37 of 46

before us, namely, the absence of independent

witnesses, and the asserted inconsistency in

convicting upon the one recovery while disbelieving the

other. The absence of independent and respectable

inhabitants of the locality was the very circumstance

upon which the Special Court declined to act upon the

recovery of eight bags from the house. That the same

Court acted upon the recovery of ten bags from the

vehicle does not, upon analysis, disclose any

inconsistency. The two recoveries were effected at

different places, at different hours of the day, and

under different statutory requirements. The search of

a dwelling house attracts Section 100(4) CrPC 1973,

which reads:

“(4) Before making a search under this Chapter, the

officer or other person about to make it shall call upon

two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of

the locality in which the place to be searched is situate

or of any other locality if no such inhabitant of the said

locality is available or is willing to be a witness to the

search, to attend and witness the search and may issue

an order in writing to them or any of them so to do.”

43. The search of a vehicle intercepted upon a public road

does not attract that provision. The Special Court

applied the requirement where the statute imposed it,

and declined to apply it where the statute did not; and

Page 38 of 46

in doing so it drew a distinction which the law itself

draws, rather than falling into inconsistency. Nor is it

correct to contend that the disbelief of one limb of a

prosecution case must necessarily entail the rejection

of the other. What is required of a Court is that it

separate the acceptable from the unacceptable and act

upon the former wherever the former is capable of

standing upon its own feet. Adopting the words of this

Court in paragraph 49 of Arvind Kumar alias

Nemichand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan16, referred to

in Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah & Anr. v. State of

Karnataka17:

“49. The principle that when a witness deposes

falsehood, the evidence in its entirety has to be

eschewed may not have strict application to the

criminal jurisprudence in our country. The principle

governing sifting the chaff from the grain has to be

applied. However, when the evidence is inseparable

and such an attempt would either be impossible or

would make the evidence unacceptable, the natural

consequence would be one of avoidance … When the

discrepancies are very material shaking the very

credibility of the witness leading to a conclusion in the

mind of the court that is neither possible to separate it

nor to rely upon, it is for the said court to either accept

or reject.”

44. Applying that principle to the present factual matrix,

16 (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099

17 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996

Page 39 of 46

we find the recovery from the vehicle to be separable

from the recovery from the house in every material

respect. It preceded the disclosure statements; it rests

upon a distinct recovery memo, Ex. P-6; it produced a

distinct Form M-29, Ex. DC, and a distinct sample

which yielded a distinct report, Ex. PY, relating to bags

1 to 10; and it stands independently vouched by the

order of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate dated

05.05.2014. The evidence is not inseparable, and the

exercise of sifting was neither impossible nor

productive of an unacceptable residue.

45. The findings recorded by the High Court against PW-

01, PW-03 and PW-06 fall to be considered upon the

very same principle, and we are unable to read them

as the Appellant would have us read them. Those

findings are directed to the credit of the witnesses

upon three identified particulars, namely, whether the

specimen seal impression was taken upon a piece of

cloth, whether Form M-29 bore the signature of the

Magistrate, and whether the Laboratories at Mohali

and Kharar are distinct institutions. It is instructive

that upon each of those three partic ulars the

witnesses were found to be in error precisely because

Page 40 of 46

the documentary record showed them to be in error;

the very material which exposed the infirmity is the

material upon which the conviction rests. Even

further, none of those particulars touches the fact of

the interception, the presence of the Appellant within

the vehicle, the recovery of the ten bags, the drawing

and sealing of the samples in the presence of PW-06,

the production of the case property before the

Magistrate on the following day, the intactness of the

seals as judicially recorded, or the identity of the

material as poppy husk as established by the reports

of the Chemical Examiner. Upon each of those matters

the prosecution case rests not upon the credit of any

individual police witness but upon a contemporaneous

judicial order and upon forensic material which no

party has impeached.

46. It was upon this footing that the High Court, while

recording in terms that there was some substance in

the argument addressed to it, declined to hold the

statutory presumption in favour of the prosecution to

have been rebutted; and upon our own examination of

the material we are of the same view, and hold that the

infirmities found do not displace the case which the

Page 41 of 46

prosecution has otherwise proved. A witness

disbelieved upon a collateral particular is not, for that

reason alone, to be discarded upon every particular;

and where the core of the prosecution case stands

independently established by material aliunde,

discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter

do not entitle an accused to an acquittal, as was held

in Naresh case (supra). The direction issued by the

High Court that a copy of its judgment be forwarded to

the Director General of Police, Punjab, was a direction

addressed to the conduct of the officers concerned and

to the standards expected of the investigating agency

in a case of large recovery; it was not, and was never

intended to be, a finding that the recovery had not

taken place.

47. Relating to the submissions that the vehicle was never

connected with the Appellant, it is sufficient to observe

that what is material for the purposes of Section 15 of

the NDPS Act 1985 is possession and not title. PW-02

established that the vehicle stood registered first in the

name of M/s Plasma Records Entertainment and

thereafter in the name of Buta Singh; that establishes

who owned the vehicle, but it does not establish who

Page 42 of 46

was in possession of it, or of its contents, at 11:30 AM

on 04.05.2014. Upon that question the evidence upon

the record is that both accused were within the vehicle,

that the driver attempted to turn it around upon being

signalled to stop, and that ten bags of poppy husk lay

beneath a tarpaulin immediately behind them. That

the Appellant was seated adjoining the driver rather

than at the wheel does not avail him, regard being had

to Section 54 of the NDPS Act 1985, which provides:

“54. Presumption from possession of illicit articles. In

trials under this Act, it may be presumed, unless and

until the contrary is proved, that the accused has

committed an offence under this Act in respect of (a) any

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled

substance … for the possession of which he fails to

account satisfactorily.”

48. The presumption having thus been attracted, the onus

lay upon the Appellant to account satisfactorily for the

presence of the contraband. The only account

tendered was that of false implication at the instance

of the former Sarpanch, spoken to by DW-01, and that

version was considered and rejected by both the

Courts below, the High Court holding that the defence

had failed to create a dent in the case set up by the

prosecution. DW-01 himself admitted that he had

moved no application before any higher officer

Page 43 of 46

complaining of the alleged false implication and did

not know of any such application having been moved

by anyone else. Upon our own consideration of that

evidence we are satisfied that it falls short of

discharging the onus which the statute casts, and we

hold that the presumption arising under Section 54 of

the NDPS Act 1985 stood unrebutted. The rejection of

that version by the Courts below is, in any event,

neither perverse nor unsupported by the record, and

thus, we decline to disturb it.

49. The sentence as imposed, when seen in relation to the

quantity recovered from the vehicle, being

approximately 200 kilograms of poppy husk, a

commercial quantity, the sentence of ten years of

rigorous imprisonment and fine of INR 1,00,000/-

(Rupees One Lakh only) awarded under Section 15(c)

of the NDPS Act 1985 is the minimum prescribed by

that provision. The plea that the convicts were poor

persons and first offenders was placed before the

Special Court at the stage of quantum, which was

considered by it, leading to awarding of minimum

sentence. No material has been placed before us upon

which any interference with the sentence could be

Page 44 of 46

founded.

50. Taking the grounds together, as we are bound to do,

our conclusions upon the merits are these. There was

substantial compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS

Act 1985, and no prejudice was occasioned to the

Appellant. Section 50 was not attracted to the search

which produced the recovery, and the consent given

by the accused was in any event not procured by any

concealment as to the rank of the officer before whom

it was given. The interval preceding the dispatch of the

samples is a procedural irregularity which is answered

by a contemporaneous judicial order recording the

seals to be intact, and no material suggests that the

integrity of the samples was in fact compromised. The

report of the Chemical Examiner was admissible

without formal proof and its author was never sought

to be examined. The requirement of associating

independent witnesses was given effect to wherever the

statute imposed it, and the recovery from the vehicle

is separable in every material respect from that which

was discarded. The infirmities in the oral evidence as

noticed by the High Court, do not touch, the

documentary and forensic material upon which the

Page 45 of 46

conviction rests. And the presumption arising under

Section 54 of the NDPS Act 1985 was never displaced.

Each of the grounds urged accordingly fails upon its

own merits.

51. We would add, as an independent and sufficient

reason for the same result, that every one of the

findings so assailed is a concurrent finding of fact

returned by the Special Court and affirmed by the High

Court. It is well settled that such findings are not

ordinarily to be interfered with in the exercise of the

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India unless a prima facie perversity or absurdity is

made out, as was observed in the decision of this Court

in Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh18. Neither

perversity nor absurdity has been demonstrated before

us upon any of the heads canvassed. Upon that state

of the record, and upon our findings recorded

hereinabove, no case for interference is made out.

52. In the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is

dismissed. The conviction of the Appellant under

Section 15(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985, and the sentence of ten years'

18 (1975) 3 SCC 219, Paragraph 26

Page 46 of 46

rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of INR

1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), and in default of

payment thereof, rigorous imprisonment for a further

period of one year, as recorded by the Special Court,

Jalandhar, vide judgment dated 26.03.2018 and

affirmed by the High Court vide the impugned

judgment dated 30.10.2019, are upheld.

53. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

.……..………..……………………..J.

[ SANJAY KAROL ]

.……..………..……………………..J.

[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12, 2026.