BALKU ORAM VS. STATE OF ODISHA

2026 INSC 852CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 1 OF 20

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026

BALKU ORAM …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF ODISHA …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

“A just society is that society in which ascending sense of reverence and

descending sense of contempt is dissolved into the creation of a

compassionate society.”

-Dr. B.R Ambedkar

1. This Appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated

29.09.2022 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Criminal Appeal

No.158/2003, whereby the High Court dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the

conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court convicting the appellant of

the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code, 18601 and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

life.

1 “IPC”

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 2 OF 20

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

2. The case of the prosecution is that on 17.02.1998 at around 5:00 p.m.

youngest daughter of Manobodha Naik of village Gundibali Luhakera, Police

Station Sector-15, Rourkela in District Sundergarh died. The family members

of Manobodha Naik claimed that she died on account of witchcraft practice by

the deceased Puni Naik. It was then that the appellant and co-accused Udai

Oram came to the house of Puni Naik, dragged her from her house and took her

near the house of Manobodha Naik where they assaulted her severely by means

of a lathi. The entire incident was witnessed by Sukra Naik (P.W.3), the daughter

of Puni Naik. As the result of the deadly assault, Puni Naik died during the early

hours of 18.02.1998.

3. On 18.02.1998, at 11:00 a.m., P.W.3 accompanied by her maternal uncle,

Hrudananda Ganda went to the Police Station and gave the written complaint,

based on the complaint, FIR No. 19 dated 18.02.1998 at Police Station Sector-

15, Rourkela, District Sundargarh came to be registered against the appellant

and the co-accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

4. On behalf of prosecution, as many as nine witnesses were examined;

however, none was examined on behalf of the defence. The Trial Court basing

its reliance on the eyewitness testimony of P.W.3, convicted the appellant and

the co-accused for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the

IPC and sentenced him for life imprisonment.

5. The High Court, in appeal preferred by the appellant, confirmed the order

of sentence passed by the Trial Court on the ground that the injuries were

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 3 OF 20

inflicted on the vital parts of the body of the deceased and the evidence of P.W.3

further corroborated the medical evidence. Holding that the case was one of

direct evidence, the High Court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

B. SUBMISSIONS

6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the

sole eyewitness, i.e., P.W.3, being the relative of the deceased, is an interested

witness and her testimony, in absence of corroboration by any independent

witness, cannot be relied upon to sustain the conviction.

7. Another contention raised is that the case of the appellant falls under the

ambit of Section 304, Part I or Part II of the IPC as the act was committed on

the account of grave and sudden provocation. Thus, lacking requisite intention

to constitute murder under Section 302 of the IPC

8. It was also submitted that there has been a delay in filing of the FIR

against the appellant since the incident occurred on 17.02.1998; however, the

FIR was lodged on 18.02.1998, the next day.

9. The appellant also disputes the testimony of P.W.3 primarily on the point

where in her cross-examination she stated the time of the death of her mother

to be around 12:00 p.m. or 1:00 a.m. during night. However, in the FIR the time

of the death of the deceased was recorded as 5:00 p.m. Further, in her cross

examination she stated that “Balku was holding axe and Udya was holding

Badi”, whereas in the post-mortem report of the deceased, the doctors have not

marked any injury which could be caused by an axe.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 4 OF 20

10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State submitted that the testimony

of P.W.3 cannot be discarded merely on the ground that she is related to the

deceased. Also, since the testimony of P.W.3 has been duly corroborated with

the medical evidence, it further negates any chance of falsely implicating the

appellant.

11. It was submitted that the conviction can be sustained on the basis of a

sole reliable witness testimony as quality of the witness matters more than the

quantity of the witness. For the same, the respondent-State has relied upon a

decision of this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras2 and Adalat

Yadav Etc. v. State of Bihar3.

12. Further, with respect to the delay in registration of the FIR, it is contended

that both the Courts below have rightly held that delay in lodging the FIR has

been sufficiently explained and, hence, a mere delay of few hours cannot be a

ground to discard otherwise credible case of the prosecution.

13. On the defence of the appellant, if the present case falls under the

exception I to Section 300 of the IPC, the respondent-State contends that there

has been no attempt by the appellant to prove the said exception. Hence, the

same is liable to be rejected at this belated stage.

14. The rival submissions now fall for our consideration.

2 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13

3 2026 SCC OnLine SC 660

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C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

15. At the outset, we make it clear that as the appellant before us seeks

interference with the concurrent findings by two Courts below, this Court

generally should be slow in interfering with the concurrent findings. This

Court’s scope of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India was

explained in Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of

Maharashtra4 as follows:

“23. Again, in Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [Balak Ram v. State

of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837] , this Court

also held that the powers of the Supreme Court under Article

136 of the Constitution are wide but in criminal appeals this

Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact

save in exceptional circumstances. In Arunachalam v. P.S.R.

Sadhanantham [Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham,

(1979) 2 SCC 297 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 454] , this Court, while

agreeing with the views expressed on the aforesaid mentioned

decisions of this Court, has thus stated : (SCC p. 300, para

4)

“4. … The power is plenary in the sense that there are

no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power.

But, the very nature of the power has led the court to

set limits to itself within which to exercise such

power. It is now the well-established practice of

this Court to permit the invocation of the power

under Article 136 only in very exceptional

circumstances, as when a question of law of

general public importance arises or a decision

shocks the conscience of the court. But, within

the restrictions imposed by itself, this Court has

the undoubted power to interfere even with

findings of fact, making no distinction between

judgments of acquittal and conviction, if the High

Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted

“perversely or otherwise improperly”.”

24. In Nain Singh v. State of U.P. [Nain Singh v. State of U.P.,

(1991) 2 SCC 432 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 421] , in which all the

aforesaid decisions as referred to hereinabove were considered

4 (2023) 12 SCC 558

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 6 OF 20

and after considering the aforesaid decisions on the question of

exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution and after

agreeing with the views expressed in the aforesaid decisions, the

Court finally laid down the principle that the evidence adduced

by the prosecution in that decision fell short of the test of

reliability and acceptability and, therefore, was highly unsafe to

act upon it. In State of U.P. v. Babul Nath [State of U.P. v. Babul

Nath, (1994) 6 SCC 29 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1585] , this Court, while

considering the scope of Article 136 as to when this Court is

entitled to upset the findings of fact, observed as follows : (SCC

p. 33, para 5)

“5. At the very outset we may mention that in an

appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this

Court does not normally reappraise the evidence by

itself and go into the question of credibility of the

witnesses and the assessment of the evidence by the

High Court is accepted by the Supreme Court as final

unless, of course, the appreciation of evidence and

finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or

found contrary to the principles of natural justice,

errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or

where the conclusions of the High Court are

manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the

evidence on record.”

25. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court on the exercise

of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution, the following principles emerge:

25.1. The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this

Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of

fact save in exceptional circumstances.

25.2. It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact

recorded by the High Court if the High Court has acted

perversely or otherwise improperly.

25.3. It is open to this Court to invoke the power under

Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and

when a question of law of general public importance

arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

25.4. When the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short

of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly

unsafe to act upon it.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 7 OF 20

25.5. Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated

by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the

principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of

the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are

manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on

record.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. Thus, with the above caveat, we proceed with the evidence on record and

findings of the Courts below to ascertain whether the present case discloses any

exceptional circumstance justifying interference.

17. The case before us is of direct ocular evidence, wherein P.W.3 (daughter

of the deceased), being the only eyewitness, is said to have witnessed the entire

incident when her deceased mother was being killed by the appellant and the

co-accused. The relevant portion of the deposition of P.W.3 is reproduced below:

“1) I know the accused persons, about 2 to 3 years back, at

night, both the accused persons took my mother Kuni

Nayak from our house and beat her by ‘BADI’ in the front of

the house of both the accused persons. Both the accused

persons are brothers and live in one house. I protested but

accused Bulku also beat me. My mother died at the spot as

she was beaten, struggling in pain. I orally reported to police

regarding the incident. Police Officer wrote the report and

obtained my LTI thereon. Hrudanande Ganda was the

husband of my father's sister. He was present when I orally

reported to police, he also signed on the report.”

(emphasis supplied)

In her cross-examination, P.W.3 stated thus:

“5) Balku was holding axe and Udya was holding BADI.

6) It is not a fact that, I am falsely deposing that the accused

persons pulled but my mother from my house and beat her

in front of their house and as a result of beating she died.

7) On both the hands, legs, chest and head marks of injuries

were noticed. My mother was beaten in one place and died

in another place as the accused persons threw her after

beating.”

(emphasis supplied)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 8 OF 20

18. From the above testimony, it can be clearly made out that P.W.3 has

remained unshaken in both, her chief examination and cross-examination, on

the aspect that it was indeed the appellant and the co-accused who inflicted

such brutality on the deceased, which ultimately led to her death.

19. It is a well-established rule in criminal jurisprudence that direct ocular

evidence if found to be natural, cogent and trustworthy, constitutes the best

form of evidence and ordinarily prevails over all forms of evidence. This Court

in Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh (supra) held thus:

“30. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of

the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether,

in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe

their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such

situations as would make it possible for them to witness the

facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is

anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their

evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the

circumstances either elicited from those witnesses

themselves or established by other evidence tending to

improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of

their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which

a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases

where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the evidence

of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own

merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or puts forward

a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the

prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the

probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into

account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence.

31. There is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of the

two eyewitnesses on the basis of which we can take the view

that they are not true or reliable eyewitnesses. Few

contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not

sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the

eyewitnesses.”

(emphasis supplied)

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20. When there is a direct evidence in the form of a sole eyewitness testimony,

there exists no legal impediment on convicting solely on the basis of that since

what matters is the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses. The aforesaid

principle was authoritatively laid down in the case of Vadivelu Thevar (supra)

wherein it was held:

“16. It is not necessary specifically to notice the other decisions

of the different High Courts in India in which the Court insisted

on corroboration of the testimony of a single witness, not as a

proposition of law, but in view of the circumstances of those

cases. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the

provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may

be safely stated as firmly established:

16.1. As a general rule, a court can and may act on the

testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One

credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of

other witnesses of indifferent character.

16.2. Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts

should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the

nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a

rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon,

for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose

evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.

16.3. Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single

witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and

circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid

down in a matter like this and much depends upon the

judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case

comes.

17. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in

holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court

should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly

stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically

laid it down that “no particular number of witnesses shall, in

any case, be required for the proof of any fact”. The legislature

determined, as long ago as in 1872, presumably after due

consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary

for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of

witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 10 OF 20

statutes as set out in Sarkar's Law of Evidence, 9th Edn., at pp.

1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a

single witness. The Indian legislature has not insisted on laying

down any such exceptions to the general rule recognised in

Section 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well-

recognised maxim that “Evidence has to be weighed and not

counted”. Our legislature has given statutory recognition to the

fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a

particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is

not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of

only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of

uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends

entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the legislature were to

insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of

a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime,

would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the

presiding Judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend

upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the

evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either

accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court

to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the

conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the

guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony

of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may

be established on the testimony of a single witness, even

though a considerable number of witnesses may be

forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the

prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-

established rule of law that the court is concerned with the

quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary

for proving or disproving a fact.

*****

19. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of

witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of

a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of

witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly

encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise

and do arise where only a single person is available to give

evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally

has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that

the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to

render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to

act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many

precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the

testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution.

There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual

offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases

in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being

that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 11 OF 20

exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court

to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness

is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to

act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only

reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. This Court in the case of Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab

and Another5 held that the Courts are supposed to evaluate the evidence by

its reliability rather than its quantity, thus, the Court may convict on the basis

of the testimony of the sole witness or acquit despite several witnesses. In

Prithipal Singh (supra), this Court observed thus:

“49. This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the

court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness

provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in

convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness.

That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. But if there

are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on

corroboration. In fact, it is not the number or the quantity, but

the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that

evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is

whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible

and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid

emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence, rather

than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It

is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and

completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction.

Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of

several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of

evidence. [See Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [Vadivelu

Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000]

, Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [Sunil

Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 :

2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] , Namdeo v. State of

Maharashtra [Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC

150 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 773] and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State

of W.B. [Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC

91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150]]”

(emphasis supplied)

5 (2012) 1 SCC 10

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 12 OF 20

22. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the testimony of P.W.3

inspires complete confidence. Being the natural sole witness, her presence at

the scene of the occurrence is natural and unquestionable. The version of P.W.3

on the manner of assault and the weapons used has remained consistent,

credible enough to safely sustain conviction of the appellant.

23. During the hearings before this Court, it was contended that P.W.3 being

the daughter of the deceased, falls within the bracket of a related/interested

witness; hence, her sole testimony cannot be relied upon for sustaining the

conviction of the appellant.

24. This Court in the case of Shio Shankar Dubey and Others v. State of

Bihar6, while referring to its earlier decisions, clarified that a witness can be

regarded as an interested witness only when it can be shown that such witness

has direct motive, personal animosity or any other reason to falsely implicate

the accused person. Ultimately, the credibility of every witness has to be

determined keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. In Shio

Shankar Dubey (supra), this Court observed thus:

“10. PW 11, who is a brother of the deceased, has fully

corroborated the prosecution case in his evidence. In spite of

thorough cross-examination, the witnesses could not be

shaken. The submission of the appellant that witnesses PW 11

and PW 13 being related to the deceased are interested

witnesses and should not be relied upon does not commend us.

The mere fact that the deceased was brother of the informant

and PW 13 is the husband of the niece of the deceased does not

impeach their evidence in any manner. The mere fact that

witness is related does not lead to inference that such witness

is an interested witness. This Court has occasion to consider

such submission in a number of cases. In Kartik

6 (2019) 6 SCC 501

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 13 OF 20

Malhar v. State of Bihar [Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar,

(1996) 1 SCC 614 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 188] , this Court held that

a close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be

regarded as an interested witness. In paras 15 and 16, the

following was laid down: (SCC pp. 621-22)

“15. As to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant

that the witness was the widow of the deceased and was,

therefore, highly interested and her statement be discarded,

we may observe that a close relative who is a natural witness

cannot be regarded as an interested witness. The term

“interested” postulates that the witness must have some

direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other

convicted for some animus or for some other reason.

In Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab [Dalbir Kaur v. State of

Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 527] , it has been

observed as under: (SCC pp. 167-68, para 11)

‘11. … Moreover, a close relative who is a very

natural witness cannot be regarded as an

interested witness. The term “interested”

postulates that the person concerned must have

some direct interest in seeing that the accused

person is somehow or the other convicted either

because he had some animus with the accused or

for some other reason. Such is not the case here.’

16. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [Dalip Singh v. State of

Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ

1465] it has been laid down as under: (AIR p. 366, para 26)

‘26. A witness is normally to be considered

independent unless he or she springs from

sources which are likely to be tainted and that

usually means unless the witness has cause,

such as enmity against the accused, to wish to

implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close

relative would be the last to screen the real

culprit and falsely implicate an innocent

person. It is true, when feelings run high and there

is personal cause for enmity, that there is a

tendency to drag in an innocent person against

whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty,

but foundation must be laid for such a criticism

and the mere fact of relationship far from being a

foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth.

However, we are not attempting any sweeping

generalisation. Each case must be judged on its

own facts. Our observations are only made to

combat what is so often put forward in cases

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 14 OF 20

before us as a general rule of prudence. There

is no such general rule. Each case must be

limited to and be governed by its own facts.’”

(emphasis supplied)

25. In the light of the aforesaid precedents, the contention of the appellant in

our view is devoid of any merit since it is well settled that a mere relationship

with the deceased does not render a witness interested or unreliable. A close

relative, who is a natural witness, cannot be equated with an interested witness

merely because of such relationship. In the facts of the present case, the direct

testimony of P.W.3 has been duly corroborated with medical evidence which

further establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

26. The appellant side has also raised the defence that this case falls within

the realm of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder

punishable under Section 304 Part I or Part II of the IPC. In the present case,

P.W.6, who conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased on

18.02.1998, found the following external injuries:

“One bruise of 2"x1" on the right temporal area scalp. One

bruise of 1½” x 1” on the vertex of head of left side. One

mark roll 4"x1" present on the left thigh laterally. One mark

of roll 6"x1" size present in the right thigh anteriorly. One

lacerated wound of 1"x¼" in skin deep in the middle portion

of left neck anteriorly. One lacerated wound of 1"x¼" in skin

deep in the anterior aspect of left thigh. One bruise of 3"x1”

over the lower part of abdominal. One bruise of 1"x2" over

the lower part of chest. One bruise of 1"x1" on the right

shoulder. One bruise of ½"x1" in the middle of the eye.

All the above injuries were red in colour and ante-mortem

in nature.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 15 OF 20

Blood clots present on the skull bone beneath the wound

No.1 and 2. Brain edematous and congested. Blood clots

present over the right temporal parietal area of the brain.”

(emphasis supplied)

27. This Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy

v. State of A.P7 held that the distinction between Section 302 and Section 304

of the IPC depends on the intention of the accused person, which has to be

gathered from the overall circumstances including the nature of the weapon

used, part of the body targeted, whether the act was in the course of sudden

quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight, whether the incident occurs by

chance or whether there was any premeditation, etc. In Pulicherla Nagaraju

alias Nagaraja Reddy (supra), this Court held as under:

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal

question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide

whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304

Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit,

straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word

or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and

group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like

revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in

such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no

premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the

other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where

the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by

attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to

cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of

murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into

offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as

murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause

death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few

or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i)

nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was

carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii)

whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv)

the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether

the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight

7 (2006) 11 SCC 444

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 16 OF 20

or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by

chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii)

whether there was any prior enmity or whether the

deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave

and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such

provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x)

whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue

advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi)

whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.

The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and

there may be several other special circumstances with reference

to individual cases which may throw light on the question of

intention. Be that as it may.”

(emphasis supplied)

28. In the case before us, looking at the nature of the injuries inflicted on the

body of the deceased including grievous injuries on head, neck, chest and other

vital parts of the body, manifests a clear intention on the part of the appellant

to cause the death of the deceased. There is nothing to prove on record that the

case attracts any of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. The plea of

conversion of the conviction to one under section 304 Part I or Part II of the IPC,

is, therefore, liable to be rejected.

29. Another contention of the appellant is that there has been a delay of a day

in lodging the FIR, which further casts a doubt on the case of the prosecution.

This Court in the case of Om Pal and Others v. State of U.P (Now State of

Uttarakhand)8 speaking through one of us (Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.) held

that where the delay in lodging of the FIR is explained to the satisfaction of the

Court, the delay cannot itself be regarded as fatal to the case of the prosecution.

8 2025 INSC 1262

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 17 OF 20

Further in the case of Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra9, it was

held as under:

“24. Counsel for the State submitted that the delay in lodging the

first information report in such cases is immaterial. The

proposition is too broadly stated to merit acceptance. It is no

doubt true that mere delay in lodging the first information report

is not necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. However,

the fact that the report was lodged belatedly is a relevant fact of

which the court must take notice. This fact has to be considered

in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case, and in a

given case the court may be satisfied that the delay in lodging the

report has been sufficiently explained. In the light of the totality

of the evidence, the court of fact has to consider whether the delay

in lodging the report adversely affects the case of the prosecution.

That is a matter of appreciation of evidence. There may be cases

where there is direct evidence to explain the delay. Even in the

absence of direct explanation there may be circumstances

appearing on record which provide a reasonable explanation for

the delay. There are cases where much time is consumed in

taking the injured to the hospital for medical aid and, therefore,

the witnesses find no time to lodge the report promptly. There

may also be cases where on account of fear and threats,

witnesses may avoid going to the police station immediately. The

time of occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode

of conveyance available, are all factors which have a bearing

on the question of delay in lodging of the report. It is also

possible to conceive of cases where the victim and the

members of his or her family belong to such a strata of

society that they may not even be aware of their right to

report the matter to the police and seek legal action, nor was

any such advice available to them. In the case of sexual

offences there is another consideration which may weigh in the

mind of the court i.e. the initial hesitation of the victim to report

the matter to the police which may affect her family life and

family's reputation. Very often in such cases only after

considerable persuasion the prosecutrix may be persuaded to

disclose the true facts. There are also cases where the victim may

choose to suffer the ignominy rather than to disclose the true

facts which may cast a stigma on her for the rest of her life. These

are cases where the initial hesitation of the prosecutrix to disclose

the true facts may provide a good explanation for the delay in

lodging the report. In the ultimate analysis, what is the effect

of delay in lodging the report with the police is a matter of

appreciation of evidence, and the court must consider the

delay in the background of the facts and circumstances of

9 (2007) 2 SCC 170

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 18 OF 20

each case. Different cases have different facts and it is the

totality of evidence and the impact that it has on the mind

of the court that is important. No straitjacket formula can be

evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on its own

facts. It is settled law that however similar the

circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a

precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in

another. (See Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad [(1955) 1 SCR

1083 : AIR 1955 SC 216] .) Thus mere delay in lodging of the

report may not by itself be fatal to the case of the prosecution,

but the delay has to be considered in the background of the facts

and circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation

of evidence by the court of fact.”

(emphasis supplied)

30. The incident before us is said to have occurred at 7:00 p.m. on 17.02.1998

and the matter was reported in the Police Station at about 11:00 a.m. on

18.02.1998. It is a matter of record that at the time of the incident, P.W.3 was

of 15-16 years of age. It is but natural that after witnessing the brutal assault

and murder of her deceased mother, P.W.3 would have been under shock and

despair. It was only when the maternal uncle of P.W.3 came to their house, she

somehow mustered the courage to go to the Police Station to get the FIR lodged.

Thus, it would not have been expected from the daughter to run to the

concerned Police Station in the night itself. Keeping in view these

circumstances, the delay in lodging the FIR has been well-explained.

D. WITCH-HUNTING: AN ANATHEMA TO HUMAN DIGNITY

31. While parting with the case, we would just like to say that the facts of the

present case has deeply disturbed the conscience of this Court, wherein a

defenseless women was branded as a practitioner of witch-craft and what effect

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 19 OF 20

it must have had on the daughter of the deceased who had to witness her mother

being killed in the most brutal way.

32. It is true that the malady of witch hunting still plagues sections of our

society, where prejudice, superstition and irrational fear supersedes the rule of

law, constitutional morality. The brutality associated with witch hunting

extends far beyond the act of killing; where victims mostly women are subjected

to torture, beatings, sexual violence and social ostracization. In such a

situation, superstitious beliefs or fears are given precedence leading to

vulnerable women becoming victims of collective hostility.

33. Sometimes in the most difficult situations, it often becomes an easy

escape to blame a woman for the acts she did not commit, thus reflecting a

deeply rooted social prejudice that often seeks scapegoats rather than solutions.

In such situations, what can be given an ascendency is ‘reason’ for reason is

the only virtue that stands as a bulwark against collective irrationality.

34. The Constitution of India envisioned a society founded on the principles

of equality, fraternity, scientific temperament, wherein any practice derogatory

to women was to be discarded. Despite this, practices such as witch-hunting

continue to persist within few sections of our society. A Constitutional

democracy such as ours cannot survive; wherein such derogatory practices

continue to elude the principles of rule of law and Constitutional morality.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2026 PAGE 20 OF 20

E. CONCLUSION

35. Keeping in view the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the

nature of the direct evidence appearing against the appellant is compelling,

which clearly establishes that the appellant with the co-accused brutally

murdered the deceased on the allegation of her causing death of the youngest

daughter of Manobodha Naik by practicing witchcraft.

36. Both, the Trial Court and the High Court, have correctly held on the

culpability of the appellant in the said crime. Thus, the conviction and the

sentence against the appellant deserve to be affirmed.

37. The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

38. This Court fervently hopes that the present case serves as a solemn

reminder that justice must always prevail over superstition and irrational

beliefs.

………………………………………J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

………………………………………J.

(N.V ANJARIA)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 13, 2026.