SUSHILA Vs AFZAAL

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 1 of 8

$~60

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 11.08.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010367172026

+ RC.REV. 274/2026, CM APPL. 52748/2026 (Ex. From filing

the certified copies of annexures), CM APPL. 52749/2026 (Ex.

From filing the legible typed copy of annexure P-3) & CM

APPL. 52750/2026 (Delay of 107 days in Re-filing the petition)

SUSHILA .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Randhir Kumar Singh, Mr.

Durgesh Gupta and Mr. Amit

Kumar, Advocates.

versus

AFZAAL .....Respondent

Through:

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the

Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, challenging the Order dated

11.02.20262 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller,

Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition

being RC-ARC/124/20234, titled “Sushila v. Afzaal”, whereby the

application seeking leave to defend filed by the Respondent came to

be allowed.

1 DRC Act

2 Impugned Order

3 learned ARC

4 Eviction Petition

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 2 of 8

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits

that the learned ARC has erred in granting the leave to defend merely

on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the

parties has not been established.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner further

submits that the Affidavit dated 15.04.2023 filed by the Respondent in

support of the Application seeking leave to defend contains bald

assertions and vague denials and does not disclose any facts which

would disentitle the Petitioner from obtaining an order for recovery of

possession. He, therefore, submits that the conclusion arrived at by the

learned ARC, that the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship

gives rise to a triable issue, is contrary to the averments contained in

the Affidavit filed by the Respondent, which, according to him, does

not disclose any genuine or substantiated defence warranting a full-

fledged trial nd that the learned ARC has erred in allowing the said

Application.

4. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Petitioner and, with his able assistance, perused the material available

on record, including the Impugned Order.

5. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged

on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope

and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the

proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

6. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The

Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance

Co. Ltd.5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar

5 (1998) 8 SCC 119

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 3 of 8

Singh6, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua7, has

consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court

under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory

and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction.

7. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied

upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj

Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.8, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny

Grover9.

8. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while

elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the

DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and

deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,

therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,

including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the

High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent

Controller merely because another view on the material available on

record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court read as under:

“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive

power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,

being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the

decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.

Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its

views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate

jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The

scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and

6 (2014) 9 SCC 78

7 (2022) 6 SCC 30

8 2024:DHC:9322

9 2025:DHC:11285

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 4 of 8

except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the

record, which would only mean that in the absence of any

adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb

such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in

such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the

power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,

totally forbidden by the legislature.”

9. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,

upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),

reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the

proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that

this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of

the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the

decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned

Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an

absence of adjudication warranting interference.

10. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges

is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section

25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to

undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to

arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.

Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order

suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material

irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the

learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous

premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left

unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an

error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional

jurisdiction may be warranted.

11. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 5 of 8

scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the

Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.

12. In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, it

would be appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned

ARC on the issue of existence of the landlord-tenant relationship

between the parties. The relevant observations of the learned ARC in

the Impugned Order are extracted hereinbelow:

“26. To show existence of relationship between the parties of

landlord and tenant, the only document relied upon by the

petitioner is the rent agreement which allegedly bears the

signatures of the respondent. No rent receipt has been filed on

record by the petitioner and there is no other document to show

existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.

Hence, from such facts and circumstances, it becomes apparent

that petitioner is required to show existence of relationship of

landlord and tenant between the parties and the same cannot be

decided without putting the case on trial. Since the genuineness of

the rent agreement relied upon by the petitioner is the primary

issue between the parties, which cannot be adjudicated without a

comprehensive trial. In the considered opinion of this court, the

allegations of the applicant/respondent regarding the agreement

being forged and fabricated, cannot be brushed aside or dismissed

at this stage.

27. It cannot be ignored that the signatures of the respondent on

such rent agreement relied upon by the petitioner are quite distinct

from his admitted signatures at other places on record i.e. the

application seeking leave to defend and the accompanying

affidavit. In these circumstances, it cannot be presumed that the

respondent has deliberately affixed a different signatures for the

purpose of defending the present eviction petition. The petitioner

will have to establish through evidence that such rent agreement

relied upon by her is genuine as there is no other document

through which it can be ascertained that there exists a statutory

tenancy between the parties.

28. On consideration of the documents filed by the parties, it is

quite apparent that the petitioner has been able to show that she

can be construed as an „owner‟ of the tenanted premises for the

purposes of the present petition and the respondent has failed to

raise any meritorious triable issue, challenging such aspect of the

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 6 of 8

eviction petition. At the cost of reiteration, it is stated that the

petitioner may not show her absolute ownership over the tenanted

property and may simply show that she has better rights over the

property than a tenant, however, there is not enough material on

record to believe that respondent is a tenant of the petitioner.

29. As regards the relationship of landlord and tenant between the

parties, the respondent has successfully raised a triable issue

which merits a comprehensive trial as Section 14 of the DRC Act

would only be applicable once the petitioner shows that there

exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to

the petition.

30. In the considered opinion of this court, such issues regarding

existence or non-existence of a statutory tenancy between the

parties, cannot be decided without a trial in light of the aforesaid

facts and circumstances. It is very well settled that while deciding

the application seeking leave to defend, the court is not expected

to examine the merits or demerits of the respondent's contentions

and where prima facie, a ground is shown in the application

seeking leave which if accepted, may result in dismissal of the

eviction petition, the application must be allowed, in favour of the

respondent and the matter shall be put for trial. It is well settled

that if there are such facts in the affidavit filed by the respondent

which if ultimately proved to the satisfaction of the Court, would

disentitle the landlord from recovering the possession, that per se

makes it obligatory upon the Court to grant leave to the

applicant/respondent.”

13. Having considered the submissions advanced before this Court,

this Court finds that the grievance of the Petitioner essentially pertains

to the manner in which the learned ARC has appreciated the existence

of landlord-tenant relationship and, consequently, the maintainability

of the Application seeking leave to defend. The principal contention

advanced by the learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner is that the

learned ARC has erred in granting leave to defend on the ground that

the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has not

been established, despite the fact that possession of the subject

premises was admittedly with the Respondent herein. The said

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 7 of 8

contention, however, does not merit acceptance.

14. The learned ARC has specifically noticed that the Rent

Agreement relied upon by the Petitioner, which is the principal

document relied upon to establish the tenancy, has been disputed by

the Respondent on the ground that the signatures appearing thereon

are not his signatures. The learned ARC has also noticed that no rent

receipt or other document evidencing the alleged tenancy has been

placed on record. In these circumstances, the issue regarding the

genuineness and execution of the Rent Agreement gives rise to a

question requiring consideration on the basis of evidence. Since the

existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is foundational to the

maintainability of the Eviction Petition, the learned ARC was justified

in treating the said issue as a triable issue at the stage of consideration

of the application for leave to defend.

15. At the stage of consideration of an Application seeking leave to

defend, the Court is not required to conclusively adjudicate upon

disputed questions of fact. The learned ARC, having considered the

material placed on record, found the issue regarding the existence of

the landlord-tenant relationship to be a triable issue. Such a finding

cannot be said to be perverse, unreasonable or contrary to the material

on record.

16. More importantly, what is sought by the Petitioner is, in

substance, a re-appreciation of the factual material and substitution of

the view taken by the learned ARC with another possible view. Such

an exercise is impermissible in the limited revisional jurisdiction

under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. No jurisdictional

error, material irregularity, manifest illegality or perversity has been

RC.REV. 274/2026 Page 8 of 8

demonstrated warranting interference with the Impugned Order.

17. In view of the aforesaid factual position, this Court is unable to

discern any jurisdictional infirmity, perversity or material irregularity

in the Impugned Order. The learned ARC has applied the correct test

while considering the Application seeking leave to defend and has

recorded reasons for concluding that the dispute regarding the

existence of the landlord-tenant relationship could not be conclusively

adjudicated at that stage.

18. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has also not been able to

demonstrate any circumstance which would warrant interference with

the findings returned by the learned ARC, particularly when the very

same objections and material were placed before, and duly considered

by, the learned ARC.

19. For the reasons as aforesaid, this Court finds no merit in the

present Petition. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

20. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,

stands disposed of in the above terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

AUGUST 11, 2026/tk/ma