SANT RAM Vs BIDHEY LAL ALIAS BIDHIYA LAL

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 1 of 14

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 11.08.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010296442026

+ RC.REV. 220/2026, CM APPL. 43796/2026 (Stay), CM APPL.

43797/2026 (Ex. From filing certified copy of impugned

judgment) & CM APPL. 43798/2026 (Delay of 39 days in filing

the petition)

SANT RAM .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Murtaza Husain, Advocate.

versus

BIDHEY LAL ALIAS BIDHIYA LAL .....Respondent

Through:

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition, filed under Section

25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, assails the Judgment

and Order dated 28.01.20262 passed by the learned SCJ-cum-RC,

Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, whereby the Eviction Petition

being RC ARC No.78936/2016 came to be dismissed on the ground

that the Petitioner herein had failed to establish either his ownership of

the tenanted premises or his status as a tenant therein and had also

failed to establish that there is a bona fide requirement in respect of

1 DRC Act

2 Impugned Judgment

3 learned ARC

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 2 of 14

the tenanted premises.

2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner assails the Impugned

Judgment primarily on three grounds. Firstly, he submits that for the

purposes of an Eviction Petition, the landlord is not required to

establish absolute ownership of the premises and is only required to

demonstrate a title better than that of the tenant. He submits that the

finding returned by the learned ARC to the effect that the Petitioner

had failed to establish his ownership proceeds on an erroneous

understanding.

3. The second limb of the submissions relates to the documents

placed on record by the Petitioner. Learned counsel submits that

sufficient documentary material was produced before the learned ARC

to establish that the Petitioner had a title better than that of the

Respondent. It is, therefore, contended that the finding of the learned

ARC to the contrary is unsustainable.

4. The third limb relates to bona fide requirement of the Petitioner.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the existing premises,

in their present condition, were insufficient for the requirement

projected by the Petitioner. It is contended that the possibility of

carrying out further construction upon the premises was also required

to be taken into consideration while examining the question of bona

fide requirement.

ANALYSIS:

5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and,

with his able assistance, perused the relevant documents placed on

record as well as the Impugned Judgment.

6. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 3 of 14

on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope

and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the

proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

7. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance

Co. Ltd.4, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar

Singh5, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua6, has

consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court

under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory

and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction.

8. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied

upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj

Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.7, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny

Grover8.

9. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while

elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the

DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and

deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,

therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,

including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the

High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent

Controller merely because another view on the material available on

4 (1998) 8 SCC 119

5 (2014) 9 SCC 78

6 (2022) 6 SCC 30

7 2024:DHC:9322

8 2025:DHC:11285

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 4 of 14

record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court read as under:

“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive

power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,

being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the

decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.

Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its

views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate

jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The

scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and

except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the

record, which would only mean that in the absence of any

adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb

such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in

such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the

power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,

totally forbidden by the legislature.”

10. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,

upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),

reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the

proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that

this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of

the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the

decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned

Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an

absence of adjudication warranting interference.

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges

is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section

25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to

undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to

arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.

Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order

suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 5 of 14

irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the

learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous

premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left

unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an

error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional

jurisdiction may be warranted.

12. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional

scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the

Impugned Judgment are required to be examined.

13. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to peruse the

findings rendered by the learned ARC while dealing with the aforesaid

contentions in the Impugned Judgement, which read as follows:

“23. In view of above discussion, what is deduced is that neither

the petitioner nor the respondent has been able to establish their

respective claim of ownership over the tenanted premises. Court is

cognizant of the well settled legal principle that in petitions based

on bonafide requirements, petitioner has to prove that he is a

person who is more than a tenant but is not required to prove

absolute ownership over the tenanted premises. As such, it would

suffice if petitioner is able to prove that he is the landlord of the

tenanted premises or that he had collected rent from the respondent

at any point of time. In that background, court now proceeds to

analyze the existence of landlord tenant relationship between the

parties to the present matter. Petitioner could have proved that he is

landlord of the respondent qua the tenanted premises by way of

rent agreement or rent receipt. But no such document has been

brought by the petitioner. Rather, it is an admitted case of the

petitioner that he had not executed any rent agreement with the

respondent while renting out the tenanted premises and that he had

never issued any rent receipt to the respondent. During his cross-

examination, petitioner/PW-1 categorically stated that he cannot

produce any material in the nature of rent agreement, rent receipt

or acknowledgment to show that respondent occupied the tenanted

premises in the capacity of a tenant. Be that as it may.

Petitioner/PW-1 stated during his cross-examination that

respondent had paid him rent only once and that said rent was

received by his son on his behalf. In that scenario, petitioner could

have produced his aforesaid son as a witness, to prove the factum

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 6 of 14

of receipt of rent by the said son from the respondent. However, no

such step was taken. In nutshell, there is no material on record,

whether documentary evidence or oral testimony, to show that

petitioner had rented out the tenanted premises to the respondent or

that any rent was collected by him or on his behalf from the

respondent. Since it is the petitioner who has approached the court

seeking relief, the burden to establish his case was on the

petitioner. It is correct that respondent has also failed to

substantiate his claim of ownership but same would not go to

strengthen the case of the petitioner, which had to stand on its own

legs. In absence of any material to prove that petitioner was indeed

the owner or landlord of the tenanted premises at any point of time,

court is of the considered finding that petitioner has failed to

establish existence of landlord-tenant relationship between him and

the respondent. It is pertinent to mention here that vide order dated

16.05.2019, respondent was given leave to contest the present

petition inter alia on the ground that title of the petitioner over the

tenanted premises had to be proved on the basis of evidence. As

such, petitioner ought to have brought some material on record to

substantiate his claim of ownership over the tenanted premises but

he failed to lead any such evidence. Consequently, petitioner failed

to probabilize his case that he is the owner of the tenanted

premises.

24. Having said that, court now proceeds to analyze the bonafide

need of the petitioner. In the eviction petition, petitioner has

averred that he alongwith his family consisting of two sons and two

daughters are residing in property bearing no. B-95, Gali No-6,

Balmiki Mandir, Jharoda Mazra, Burari, Delhi, admeasuring 50 sq.

yds. and comprising of total four rooms, kitchen, latrine and

bathroom, which is owned by his son, namely, Ajit. Stating that the

same is insufficient for residence of himself and his family,

petitioner has sought possession of the tenanted premises so that he

and his family may reside there. At the very outset, it is noticed

that nowhere in the eviction petition, petitioner mentions the area

of the tenanted premises, wherein he and his family intends to

reside. Even the site plan in Ex PW-1/1 is bereft of any

measurement. It is pertinent to mention here that one of the

grounds for which respondent was granted leave to defend the

present petition was that the area of the tenanted premises is not

specified in the eviction petition and in such scenario, no

executable order could be passed. Despite that, petitioner has

neither specified the area of the tenanted premises nor brought any

material to show the size of the same. As a necessary corollary of

the above, court is not in a position to reach a finding that the

tenanted premises is adequate or sufficient to meet the residential

requirement of the petitioner and his family members.

25. Further, as per the eviction petition, petitioner requires seven

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 7 of 14

rooms, one for himself, one for drawing room, one room for his

married daughter to stay when she visits him and one room each

for his four unmarried children. Again, as per the petitioner

himself, the tenanted premises consists of only two rooms. As

such, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to explain as to how he

plans to have six rooms in the tenanted premises and also how he

plans to accommodate all his aforesaid family members in the

same. No such explanation has come forth from the petitioner.

26. Proceeding further, a contradiction has been noticed in the case

of the petitioner concerning his bonafide requirement. As per the

eviction petition, petitioner is currently residing in property bearing

no. B-95, Gali No-6, Balmiki Mandir, Jharoda Mazra, Burari,

Delhi, which is stated to be owned by his son/Ajit. However,

during his cross-examination conducted on 21.11.2022,

petitioner/PW-1 stated that the house in which he is residing is a

tenanted property. The relevant extract of the cross-examination of

PW-1 reads as under :

"It is wrong to suggest that the house in which I am

residing is owned by me. The same is a tenanted property.

I have not filed on record any documentary record to show

that the same is a tenanted property."

27. What is deduced from the above is that the petitioner has been

inconsistent regarding the capacity in which he is occupying the

house wherein he is currently residing. There is no doubt that

petitioner is well within his rights to seek vacant possession of his

own property, irrespective of the fact whether his current residence

is owned by his son or whether the same is taken on rent. However,

the inconsistent stands taken by the petitioner in his eviction

petition and during his cross-examination raises doubt regarding

the genuineness of the projected need of the petitioner. Hence, in

view of above discussion, court is of the finding that petitioner has

failed to establish the bonafide of his projected need.

28. The net result is that the petitioner failed to prove that he is

owner of the tenanted premises. He also failed to establish himself

as landlord of respondent qua the tenanted premises. Further, the

bonafide need of the petitioner as projected by him has also come

under cloud. In crux, petitioner failed to meet the triable issues

raised by this court vide its order dated 16.05.2019, namely, terms

and conditions on which tenanted premises were allotted to the

petitioner, meaning and significance of the term "token",

ownership of the petitioner over the tenanted premises as well as

area or measurement of the tenanted premises. After the grant of

leave to contest the present eviction petition, petitioner should have

removed the aforesaid doubts and shortcomings in his case, but he

failed to do so. He should have utilized the opportunity to prove his

case based on evidence but same was not done. Rather, petitioner

rested his case on bald averments, which did not inspire confidence

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 8 of 14

of the court.”

14. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the

Petitioner and upon a perusal of the findings rendered by the learned

ARC in the Impugned Judgement, this Court is unable to find any

jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or

perversity in the approach adopted by the learned ARC. On the

contrary, the Impugned Judgment demonstrates that the learned ARC

has considered each of the material aspects of the case, including the

Petitioner’s claim of ownership, the alleged landlord-tenant

relationship, the documentary material relied upon by the Petitioner,

and the bona fide requirement projected by him. The conclusions

arrived at are founded upon the evidence led by the parties and the

admissions emerging from the cross-examination of the Petitioner

himself.

15. The first contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner is

that, in proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the

landlord is not required to establish absolute ownership and that it

would suffice if the landlord demonstrates a title better than that of the

tenant. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law.

It is well settled that the expression “owner” occurring in Section

14(1)(e) of the DRC Act does not necessarily contemplate proof of

absolute or perfect title in the strict sense in which such title may be

required to be established in a title suit. The landlord is required to

establish a title better than that of the tenant and the existence of the

requisite landlord-tenant relationship.

16. However, the aforesaid proposition does not come to the

assistance of the Petitioner in the facts of the present case.

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 9 of 14

Significantly, the learned ARC has itself noticed and accepted the

aforesaid legal position. The finding returned by the learned ARC is

not that the Petitioner was required to establish an indefeasible or

absolute title in the property. Rather, the learned ARC has specifically

observed that it would be sufficient if the Petitioner were able to

establish that he was the landlord of the Respondent or had collected

rent from the Respondent at any point of time. Thus, the very legal

proposition now sought to be urged before this Court was duly taken

into consideration by the learned ARC.

17. The difficulty faced by the Petitioner is factual and not legal.

Despite being conscious of the limited requirement of establishing a

title better than that of the tenant, the Petitioner failed to place before

the learned ARC any cogent material demonstrating that he was the

landlord of the Respondent or that the Respondent had entered into

possession of the premises as his tenant.

18. The learned ARC has specifically noticed that there was

admittedly no rent agreement executed between the parties and that

the Petitioner had never issued any rent receipt to the Respondent.

More importantly, during his cross-examination, the Petitioner himself

categorically stated that he was unable to produce any rent agreement,

rent receipt or acknowledgment demonstrating that the Respondent

occupied the premises in the capacity of a tenant. The Petitioner

further claimed that rent had been paid to him on one occasion

through his son. Even in respect of this assertion, the Petitioner did not

examine his son, who was admittedly the person through whom the

alleged rent payment had been received.

19. Thus, the finding of the learned ARC cannot be characterised as

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 10 of 14

one which proceeds upon an erroneous requirement of proving

absolute ownership. The learned ARC has, in fact, proceeded on the

premise most favourable to the Petitioner, namely, that it would be

sufficient to establish that he was the landlord or that he had received

rent from the Respondent. The Petitioner failed even to cross that

threshold.

20. The second submission, namely, that the documentary material

produced by the Petitioner was sufficient to establish a title better than

that of the Respondent, also does not disclose any ground warranting

interference in revision. The learned ARC has considered the material

placed before it and has returned a categorical finding that the

Petitioner failed to probabilise his claim of ownership or establish his

status as landlord. The mere assertion that certain documents were

available on record cannot, by itself, warrant interference under

Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

21. It is also material that the Respondent’s failure to establish his

own title does not automatically establish the Petitioner’s case. The

learned ARC has correctly observed that the Petitioner, being the

person who approached the Court seeking eviction, was required to

establish the foundational facts necessary for the relief sought. The

weakness, if any, in the Respondent’s claim cannot be converted into

proof of the Petitioner’s title or landlord-ship.

22. In this regard, the observation of the learned ARC that the

Petitioner’s case “had to stand on its own legs” assumes significance.

The Petitioner cannot derive a positive finding in his favour merely

from the fact that the Respondent was also unable to substantiate his

claim of ownership. The burden of establishing the essential

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 11 of 14

ingredients of the eviction petition remained upon the Petitioner.

23. It is further significant that the Respondent had been granted

leave to contest vide order dated 16.05.2019, inter alia, on the specific

issue as to whether the Petitioner had title over the premises. Once the

Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to establish his case by leading

evidence, it was incumbent upon him to place the necessary material

on record to substantiate the foundational assertions contained in the

eviction petition. The learned ARC has found that the Petitioner failed

to do so. This is a finding based upon the evidence and the conduct of

the Petitioner during trial and cannot be said to suffer from any error

apparent on the face of the record.

24. The learned ARC rightly rejected the Petitioner’s claim of bona

fide requirement as the Petitioner failed to establish that the tenanted

premises were capable of satisfying the residential requirement

pleaded by him. The Petitioner neither disclosed the area or

dimensions of the tenanted premises nor provided a measurable site

plan, despite the issue having been specifically raised at the stage of

grant of leave to defend. Further, while claiming a requirement of

seven rooms for himself and his family, the Petitioner admittedly

sought possession of premises comprising only two rooms and failed

to explain how the stated requirement could be accommodated therein.

25. The Petitioner also took contradictory stands regarding his

existing residence, describing it in the eviction petition as being

owned by his son, while stating during cross-examination that it was a

tenanted property, without producing any documentary evidence in

support thereof. These inconsistencies were relevant to assessing the

genuineness of the projected requirement. The plea that the possibility

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 12 of 14

of future construction ought to have been considered is also untenable,

as no concrete material was produced regarding the feasibility, extent

or manner of such construction or how it would enable the two-room

premises to meet the requirement of seven rooms. Thus, the findings

of the learned ARC were based on the pleadings and evidence on

record and do not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction.

26. The present case is, therefore, not one where the learned ARC

has ignored a material plea or applied an incorrect test of law. On the

contrary, the Impugned Judgment shows that the learned ARC

examined the very issues for which leave to contest had been granted,

namely, the terms and conditions under which the premises were

allegedly allotted to the Petitioner, the meaning and significance of the

term “token”, the ownership of the Petitioner, and the area or

measurement of the premises. After trial, the learned ARC found that

the Petitioner had failed to satisfactorily establish these foundational

aspects.

27. The fact that the learned ARC has arrived at a conclusion

adverse to the Petitioner, despite the Respondent also having failed to

establish his own claim of ownership, cannot furnish a ground for

interference under Section 25B(8). The jurisdiction of this Court is not

intended to permit re-appreciation of evidence merely because another

view may conceivably be taken on the same material. The Supreme

Court has expressly cautioned that such an exercise would amount to

converting the revisional jurisdiction into a regular first appeal, which

is impermissible.

28. Tested on the aforesaid parameters and the law laid down in

various precedents, the present Revision Petition does not disclose any

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 13 of 14

error apparent on the face of the record. The learned ARC has

considered the relevant pleadings, the evidence led by the Petitioner,

his cross-examination and the circumstances emerging from the

record. The findings returned are neither based on a legally erroneous

test nor so unreasonable that they can be characterised as perverse. At

best, the Petitioner seeks a reappraisal of the evidence and a different

conclusion on the questions of ownership, landlord-tenant relationship

and bona fide requirement. Such an exercise falls outside the limited

revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

29. It is also pertinent that the findings recorded by the learned

ARC are not isolated findings. They operate cumulatively. The

Petitioner failed to establish his status as landlord; failed to

satisfactorily substantiate his claim of ownership; failed to produce

material establishing the alleged receipt of rent; failed to examine the

son through whom the alleged rent was received; failed to disclose the

dimensions of the premises despite the issue having been specifically

raised; failed to explain how two rooms would answer the requirement

of seven rooms pleaded by him; and took inconsistent stands

regarding the nature of his existing residence. These circumstances,

considered together, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the

conclusion reached by the learned ARC.

30. The Impugned Judgment, therefore, cannot be said to suffer

from any jurisdictional infirmity, material irregularity, manifest

illegality or perversity warranting the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction. The findings returned by the learned ARC are findings

arising from appreciation of the evidence and the material placed

before it after the parties had been afforded an opportunity to lead

RC.REV. 220/2026 Page 14 of 14

evidence. There is consequently no justification for this Court to

substitute its own assessment for that of the learned ARC.

31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no merit in

the present Revision Petition. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that the Impugned Judgment dated 28.01.2026 suffers from any error

apparent on the face of the record or any other infirmity warranting

interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. The

revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to secure a second

appreciation of the evidence or to substitute a possible alternative

view for the considered findings of the learned ARC. The principles

governing the restricted scope of interference under Section 25B(8)

have consistently been applied by this Court in cases where no such

jurisdictional or manifest error is demonstrated.

32. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending

Application(s), if any, stands dismissed.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J

AUGUST 11, 2026/rk/va