ANAND ANEGUNDI VS. PRASHANT GOYAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION NO.261/2026

IN CIVIL APPEAL No.10737 OF 2013

ANAND ANEGUNDI ..... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

PRASHANT GOYAL ..... RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. We have heard Ms. Liz Mathew, learned senior counsel

for the appellant and Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, learned counsel

for the respondent.

4. Appellant takes exception to the Order dated 30.09.2020,

passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench (briefly

the ‘High Court’ hereinafter) allowing the Civil Revision

Petition filed by the respondent.

5. There was an arbitral proceeding between the parties.

While the learned Arbitrator has allowed the claim of the

respondent vide the award dated 12.06.2014, the counter claim

filed by the appellant was rejected.

6. Appellant filed an application under Section 33(4) of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (briefly the 1996

‘Act’ hereinafter) seeking correction in the award in as much

as his counter claim was not allowed by the learned

Arbitrator. By the Order dated 16.08.2014, the learned

Arbitrator rejected the said application by holding that there

is no ground to pass any additional award under Section 33(4)

of the 1996 Act.

7. After the Order dated 16.08.2014 was passed, appellant

filed an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before

the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, on

13.11.2014. Respondent filed Interlocutory Application

No.21/2018 before the Section 34 Court contending that the said

application was barred by limitation. However, by the order dated

20.12.2018, the said Interlocutory Application was rejected

holding that the application filed under Section 34 was within

time and maintainable.

8. It was this order which was challenged by the respondent

before the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.

100014/2019. By the impugned order dated 30.09.2020, the High

Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition and set aside the

order of the District Court dated 20.12.2018. Consequently, the

Section 34 application came to be dismissed on the ground of

limitation.

9. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that

issue raised in this appeal is no longer res integra. A

coordinate Bench of this Court in National Highway Authority

of India vs. T Younis, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1060, has held that

once proceedings under Section 33 are initiated and entertained

by the Arbitral Tribunal, the award remained subject to the

limited jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal for correction

etc. Therefore, the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3)

can start only from the date on which the proceedings under

Section 33 are concluded.

10. Per contra Mr. Kshirsagar, learned counsel for the

respondent submits that the aforesaid judgment of this Court

is distinguishable on the facts of this case. In the instant

case, it was a frivolous application filed by the appellant

before the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 33 clearly provides for

the limited scope within the contours of which correction etc.

of arbitral award can be sought for. Appellant could not have

sought for an Additional Award in the guise of an application

under Section 33(4); the appellant actually sought for review

of the award which is not permissible. Therefore, the appeal

may be dismissed.

11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties

have received the due consideration of this Court.

12. Facts are not in dispute. However, for a proper

perspective, we may, at the outset, advert to Section 33 of

the 1996 Act which provides for correction and interpretation

of award and additional award. Section 33 reads thus:

33. Correction and interpretation of award;

additional award.—(1) Within thirty days from

the receipt of the arbitral award, unless

another period of time has been agreed upon by

the parties—

(a) a party, with notice to the other party,

may request the arbitral tribunal to correct

any computation errors, any clerical or

typographical errors or any other errors of a

similar nature occurring in the award;

(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with

notice to the other party, may request the

arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of

a specific point or part of the award.

(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the

request made under sub-section (1) to be

justified, it shall make the correction or

give the interpretation within thirty days

from the receipt of the request and the

interpretation shall form part of the arbitral

award.

(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any

error of the type referred to in clause (a) of

sub-section (1), on its own initiative, within

thirty days from the date of the arbitral

award.

(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a

party with notice to the other party, may

request, within thirty days from the receipt

of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal

to make an additional arbitral award as to

claims presented in the arbitral proceedings

but omitted from the arbitral award.

(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the

request made under sub-section (4) to be

justified, it shall make the additional

arbitral award within sixty days from the

receipt of such request.

(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if

necessary, the period of time within which it

shall make a correction, give an

interpretation or make an additional arbitral

award under sub-section (2) or sub-section

(5).

(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or

interpretation of the arbitral award or to an

additional arbitral award made under this

section.

12.1. An analysis of Section 33 would show that it speaks of

two conditions for which the jurisdiction under Section 33 can

be invoked. Firstly, a party to the arbitration proceedings may

request the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computation

errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other

errors of a similar nature occurring in the award. The second

condition is that a party with the agreement of the other

party and with notice to it, may request the Arbitral Tribunal

to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the

award. The Arbitral Tribunal is also vested with suo moto

power to correct any error of the type contemplated as per the

first condition. In exercise of the aforesaid powers, an

Arbitral Tribunal has the power to make an additional award.

Ordinarily, the limitation for invoking the jurisdiction of

the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 is 30 days, unless

another period of time is agreed upon by the parties.

13. This brings us to Section 34 of the 1996 award which

provides for filing of an application for setting aside an

arbitral award. For the present case, sub-section (3) of

Section 34 is relevant and the same is extracted hereunder:

(3) An application for setting aside may not

be made after three months have elapsed from

the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award

or, if a request had been made under Section

33, from the date on which that request had

been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that

the applicant was prevented by sufficient

cause from making the application within the

said period of three months it may entertain

the application within a further period of

thirty days, but not thereafter.

13.1. As per this provision, an application for setting

aside an arbitral award is required to be made within three

months from the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award or if a request

has been made under Section 33 of the 1996 Act from the date

on which the request has been disposed of by the Arbitral

Tribunal. As per the proviso, if the Section 34 court is

satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause

from making the application within the prescribed period of 03

months, it may entertain the application within a further

period of 30 days but not thereafter. What is relevant for the

present discourse is the main sub-section (3) itself. Though

the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 is

three months from the date of the receipt of a copy of the

arbitral award, the same is however subject to Section 33 if a

request has been made under that provision.

14. Insofar the present case is concerned, the arbitral

award is dated 12.06.2014. Appellant had sought correction in

the award under Section 33 (4) of the 1996 Act which was

rejected by the order of the learned Arbitrator dated

16.08.2014. It was thereafter that appellant filed the

application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act on 13.11.2014.

Therefore, the application under Section 34 was filed within a

period of 03 months from the date on which the Section 33 (4)

application was disposed of by the learned Arbitrator.

15. In T. Younis, this Court after adverting to Sections 33

and 34(3) of the 1996 Act held as follows:

14. Once proceedings under Section 33 are

initiated and entertained by the Arbitral

Tribunal, the award remains subject to the

limited jurisdiction of the tribunal for

correction, interpretation, or supplementation

as contemplated under the provision. So long

as such proceedings remain pending, the

parties cannot be compelled to institute

proceedings under Section 34 merely as a

matter of abundant caution. The parties can

effectively pursue their remedy under Section

34 only upon conclusion of the proceedings

under Section 33. Consequently, the limitation

prescribed under Section 34(3) can start only

from the date on which the proceedings under

Section 33 are disposed of.

15. In our view, the contention of the

Respondent that only an application which is

"maintainable" under Section 33 can defer the

commencement of limitation under Section 34(3),

cannot be accepted. Whether the application

under Section 33 ultimately succeeds or fails,

or whether the Arbitral Tribunal eventually

finds that no correction or modification of the

award is warranted, is not determinative for the

purpose of Section 34(3). What is relevant is

that whether the jurisdiction of the Arbitral

Tribunal under Section 33 had been formally

invoked and that such proceedings remained

pending consideration before the tribunal.

16. We have gone through the order passed by the Arbitral

Tribunal on 16.08.2014 rejecting the application filed by the

appellant under Section 33(4) of the 1996 Act. On going

through the same, it cannot be said that any view was taken by

the Arbitral Tribunal that the said application was frivolous.

We also do not think so. The Section 34 Court was right in

holding that the application filed under that provision is

within time. In our considered opinion, the decision in T.

Younis is squarely applicable to the facts of the present

case.

17. Accordingly, impugned order dated 30.09.2020 passed by

the High Court is hereby set aside.

18. The appeal is thus allowed.

19. Consequently, the Section 34 application filed by the

appellant being Arbitration Suit No.5 of 2014 pending in the

Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, shall

be heard and decided on its own merit in terms of the

provisions of the 1996 Act.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

......................J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

......................J.

(ATUL S. CHANDURKAR)

NEW DELHI;

August 05th, 2026.

ITEM NO.14 COURT NO.15 SECTION IV-A

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No.55818/2024

[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 30-09-2020

in CRP No. 100014/2019 06-08-2024 in RP No. 100086/2022 passed by

the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad]

ANAND ANEGUNDI Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

PRASHANT GOYAL Respondent(s)

IA No. 25800/2025 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING

IA No. 25801/2025 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN REFILING/CURING THE

DEFECTS

Date : 05-08-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ATUL S. CHANDURKAR

For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.

Ms. Pallavi Pratap, AOR

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, AOR

Mr. Dharam Das M. Shah, Adv.

Ms. Anamita Verma, Adv.

Ms. Paulavi Verma, Adv. (not legible)

Mr. Akhilesh Yadav, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. Appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

4. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(IRAMNAZ) (CHETNA BALOONI)

COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)

(signed order is placed on the file)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION NO.261/2026

IN CIVIL APPEAL No.10737 OF 2013

ANAND ANEGUNDI ..... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

PRASHANT GOYAL ..... RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. We have heard Ms. Liz Mathew, learned senior counsel

for the appellant and Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, learned counsel

for the respondent.

4. Appellant takes exception to the Order dated 30.09.2020,

passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench (briefly

the ‘High Court’ hereinafter) allowing the Civil Revision

Petition filed by the respondent.

5. There was an arbitral proceeding between the parties.

While the learned Arbitrator has allowed the claim of the

respondent vide the award dated 12.06.2014, the counter claim

filed by the appellant was rejected.

6. Appellant filed an application under Section 33(4) of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (briefly the 1996

‘Act’ hereinafter) seeking correction in the award in as much

as his counter claim was not allowed by the learned

Arbitrator. By the Order dated 16.08.2014, the learned

Arbitrator rejected the said application by holding that there

is no ground to pass any additional award under Section 33(4)

of the 1996 Act.

7. After the Order dated 16.08.2014 was passed, appellant

filed an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before

the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, on

13.11.2014. Respondent filed Interlocutory Application

No.21/2018 before the Section 34 Court contending that the said

application was barred by limitation. However, by the order dated

20.12.2018, the said Interlocutory Application was rejected

holding that the application filed under Section 34 was within

time and maintainable.

8. It was this order which was challenged by the respondent

before the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.

100014/2019. By the impugned order dated 30.09.2020, the High

Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition and set aside the

order of the District Court dated 20.12.2018. Consequently, the

Section 34 application came to be dismissed on the ground of

limitation.

9. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that

issue raised in this appeal is no longer res integra. A

coordinate Bench of this Court in National Highway Authority

of India vs. T Younis, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1060, has held that

once proceedings under Section 33 are initiated and entertained

by the Arbitral Tribunal, the award remained subject to the

limited jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal for correction

etc. Therefore, the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3)

can start only from the date on which the proceedings under

Section 33 are concluded.

10. Per contra Mr. Kshirsagar, learned counsel for the

respondent submits that the aforesaid judgment of this Court

is distinguishable on the facts of this case. In the instant

case, it was a frivolous application filed by the appellant

before the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 33 clearly provides for

the limited scope within the contours of which correction etc.

of arbitral award can be sought for. Appellant could not have

sought for an Additional Award in the guise of an application

under Section 33(4); the appellant actually sought for review

of the award which is not permissible. Therefore, the appeal

may be dismissed.

11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties

have received the due consideration of this Court.

12. Facts are not in dispute. However, for a proper

perspective, we may, at the outset, advert to Section 33 of

the 1996 Act which provides for correction and interpretation

of award and additional award. Section 33 reads thus:

33. Correction and interpretation of award;

additional award.—(1) Within thirty days from

the receipt of the arbitral award, unless

another period of time has been agreed upon by

the parties—

(a) a party, with notice to the other party,

may request the arbitral tribunal to correct

any computation errors, any clerical or

typographical errors or any other errors of a

similar nature occurring in the award;

(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with

notice to the other party, may request the

arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of

a specific point or part of the award.

(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the

request made under sub-section (1) to be

justified, it shall make the correction or

give the interpretation within thirty days

from the receipt of the request and the

interpretation shall form part of the arbitral

award.

(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any

error of the type referred to in clause (a) of

sub-section (1), on its own initiative, within

thirty days from the date of the arbitral

award.

(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a

party with notice to the other party, may

request, within thirty days from the receipt

of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal

to make an additional arbitral award as to

claims presented in the arbitral proceedings

but omitted from the arbitral award.

(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the

request made under sub-section (4) to be

justified, it shall make the additional

arbitral award within sixty days from the

receipt of such request.

(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if

necessary, the period of time within which it

shall make a correction, give an

interpretation or make an additional arbitral

award under sub-section (2) or sub-section

(5).

(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or

interpretation of the arbitral award or to an

additional arbitral award made under this

section.

12.1. An analysis of Section 33 would show that it speaks of

two conditions for which the jurisdiction under Section 33 can

be invoked. Firstly, a party to the arbitration proceedings may

request the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computation

errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other

errors of a similar nature occurring in the award. The second

condition is that a party with the agreement of the other

party and with notice to it, may request the Arbitral Tribunal

to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the

award. The Arbitral Tribunal is also vested with suo moto

power to correct any error of the type contemplated as per the

first condition. In exercise of the aforesaid powers, an

Arbitral Tribunal has the power to make an additional award.

Ordinarily, the limitation for invoking the jurisdiction of

the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 is 30 days, unless

another period of time is agreed upon by the parties.

13. This brings us to Section 34 of the 1996 award which

provides for filing of an application for setting aside an

arbitral award. For the present case, sub-section (3) of

Section 34 is relevant and the same is extracted hereunder:

(3) An application for setting aside may not

be made after three months have elapsed from

the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award

or, if a request had been made under Section

33, from the date on which that request had

been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that

the applicant was prevented by sufficient

cause from making the application within the

said period of three months it may entertain

the application within a further period of

thirty days, but not thereafter.

13.1. As per this provision, an application for setting

aside an arbitral award is required to be made within three

months from the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award or if a request

has been made under Section 33 of the 1996 Act from the date

on which the request has been disposed of by the Arbitral

Tribunal. As per the proviso, if the Section 34 court is

satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause

from making the application within the prescribed period of 03

months, it may entertain the application within a further

period of 30 days but not thereafter. What is relevant for the

present discourse is the main sub-section (3) itself. Though

the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 is

three months from the date of the receipt of a copy of the

arbitral award, the same is however subject to Section 33 if a

request has been made under that provision.

14. Insofar the present case is concerned, the arbitral

award is dated 12.06.2014. Appellant had sought correction in

the award under Section 33 (4) of the 1996 Act which was

rejected by the order of the learned Arbitrator dated

16.08.2014. It was thereafter that appellant filed the

application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act on 13.11.2014.

Therefore, the application under Section 34 was filed within a

period of 03 months from the date on which the Section 33 (4)

application was disposed of by the learned Arbitrator.

15. In T. Younis, this Court after adverting to Sections 33

and 34(3) of the 1996 Act held as follows:

14. Once proceedings under Section 33 are

initiated and entertained by the Arbitral

Tribunal, the award remains subject to the

limited jurisdiction of the tribunal for

correction, interpretation, or supplementation

as contemplated under the provision. So long

as such proceedings remain pending, the

parties cannot be compelled to institute

proceedings under Section 34 merely as a

matter of abundant caution. The parties can

effectively pursue their remedy under Section

34 only upon conclusion of the proceedings

under Section 33. Consequently, the limitation

prescribed under Section 34(3) can start only

from the date on which the proceedings under

Section 33 are disposed of.

15. In our view, the contention of the

Respondent that only an application which is

"maintainable" under Section 33 can defer the

commencement of limitation under Section 34(3),

cannot be accepted. Whether the application

under Section 33 ultimately succeeds or fails,

or whether the Arbitral Tribunal eventually

finds that no correction or modification of the

award is warranted, is not determinative for the

purpose of Section 34(3). What is relevant is

that whether the jurisdiction of the Arbitral

Tribunal under Section 33 had been formally

invoked and that such proceedings remained

pending consideration before the tribunal.

16. We have gone through the order passed by the Arbitral

Tribunal on 16.08.2014 rejecting the application filed by the

appellant under Section 33(4) of the 1996 Act. On going

through the same, it cannot be said that any view was taken by

the Arbitral Tribunal that the said application was frivolous.

We also do not think so. The Section 34 Court was right in

holding that the application filed under that provision is

within time. In our considered opinion, the decision in T.

Younis is squarely applicable to the facts of the present

case.

17. Accordingly, impugned order dated 30.09.2020 passed by

the High Court is hereby set aside.

18. The appeal is thus allowed.

19. Consequently, the Section 34 application filed by the

appellant being Arbitration Suit No.5 of 2014 pending in the

Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, shall

be heard and decided on its own merit in terms of the

provisions of the 1996 Act.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

......................J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

......................J.

(ATUL S. CHANDURKAR)

NEW DELHI;

August 05th, 2026.

ITEM NO.14 COURT NO.15 SECTION IV-A

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No.55818/2024

[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 30-09-2020

in CRP No. 100014/2019 06-08-2024 in RP No. 100086/2022 passed by

the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad]

ANAND ANEGUNDI Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

PRASHANT GOYAL Respondent(s)

IA No. 25800/2025 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING

IA No. 25801/2025 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN REFILING/CURING THE

DEFECTS

Date : 05-08-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ATUL S. CHANDURKAR

For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.

Ms. Pallavi Pratap, AOR

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, AOR

Mr. Dharam Das M. Shah, Adv.

Ms. Anamita Verma, Adv.

Ms. Paulavi Verma, Adv. (not legible)

Mr. Akhilesh Yadav, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. Appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

4. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(IRAMNAZ) (CHETNA BALOONI)

COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)

(signed order is placed on the file)