RAHUL VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2026 INSC 825Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 1 of 29

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.2939 OF 2026)

RAHUL … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

AND ANOTHER … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed

against the final judgment and order dated

12.12.2025 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred

to as the “High Court”) in Application under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 23788 of 2018,

whereby the High Court declined to quash the

Chargesheet dated 15.07.2017 as well as the

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entire criminal proceedings of Case No. 147 of

2018 (State v. Rahul), arising out of Case

Crime No. 227 of 2016, registered under

Sections 498-A, 304-B of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961, at Police Station

Inchauli, District Meerut, pending before the

Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut

(hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”).

3. The marriage between the appellant, Rahul,

and Anshul @ Payal, daughter of Respondent

No. 2 (Raj Kumar/complainant), was

solemnised on 21.04.2014 at Garden City,

Mawana. On 13.06.2016, Respondent No. 2

lodged First Information Report No. 227 of

2016 at Police Station Inchauli, District

Meerut, alleging that the appellant and his

family members namely, his mother Sheela,

father Ramnath, sister Parul, his father's

brother Surendra, and Surendra's son Ankur

had subjected his daughter Anshul (deceased)

to cruelty and harassment for dowry,

particularly for a Tata Safari motor car, and

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that on account of non-fulfilment of the said

demand, the deceased was done to death by

hanging on 13.06.2016.

4. On the same date, an inquest

(Panchayatnama) was conducted, during

which it was recorded that the room in which

the deceased was found hanging, as also the

main entrance of the house, were found locked

from inside, and had to be broken open by the

police in the presence of the Tehsildar. The

post-mortem examination conducted on

14.06.2016 recorded the cause of death as

asphyxia as a result of ante-mortem hanging,

with a ligature mark of 26 cm x 20 cm around

the neck.

5. The appellant, a member of the Border

Security Force (BSF), was on the relevant date

posted on the Indo-Bangladesh border. A

certificate dated 03.10.2016 issued by the

DC/ADJT for the Commandant, 141 Battalion,

BSF, records that the appellant was detained

on Dak-runner duty to carry official

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documents from Frontier Headquarters, BSF,

Meghalaya (Shillong) to New Delhi with effect

from 27.05.2016 to 22.06.2016, and that he

proceeded from Shillong to New Delhi on

14.06.2016 and remained stationed at Delhi

until 19.06.2016.

6. The appellant's earlier application under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Criminal Misc. Writ

Petition No. 24082 of 2016) came to be

disposed of on 24.11.2016, protecting him

from arrest till submission of the police report

under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. Thereafter,

Charge-sheet No. 09A/16 was submitted on

15.07.2017 under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC

and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

against the appellant.

7. The appellant thereafter filed Criminal Misc.

Application No. 23788 of 2018 under Section

482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court, seeking

quashing of the chargesheet dated 15.07.2017

and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case

No. 147 of 2018 (State v. Rahul). The High

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Court, vide order dated 20.07.2018, stayed

further proceedings pending disposal of the

application.

8. In the meanwhile, the trial against the

appellant's parents, Ramnath and Sheela,

proceeded independently before the Court of

the Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track

Court No. 1, Meerut, in Sessions Trial No. 653

of 2017, on charges under Sections 498-A,

304-B IPC (in the alternative, Section 302 read

with Section 34 IPC) and Sections 3/4 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act, arising out of the very

same F.I.R. No. 227 of 2016. Vide judgment

dated 17.10.2025, the court acquitted them

after a full-fledged trial, holding that the

prosecution had failed to establish allegations

of cruelty, dowry demand or homicidal

involvement beyond reasonable doubt.

9. Notwithstanding the acquittal of the co-

accused and the official documents relied upon

by the appellant, the High Court vide the

impugned judgment dated 12.12.2025,

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dismissed the appellant's application under

Section 482 Cr.P.C., placing reliance upon the

decision of this Court in Rajendra Singh v.

State of U.P. and Another1 that the plea of

alibi raised by the appellant was a question of

fact requiring proof at trial, that no finding on

alibi could be recorded for the first time in a

petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and that

whether the death was homicidal or suicidal,

and whether the appellant was present at the

place of occurrence, were disputed questions

of fact not amenable to adjudication in the

exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

10. Aggrieved, the appellant approached this

Court by way of the present appeal. Vide order

dated 27.02.2026, notice was issued and,

having regard to the order dated 17.10.2025

acquitting the appellant's parents and the

certificate dated 03.10.2016 issued by the

Commandant, 141 BN BSF, this Court

directed that no coercive action be taken

against the appellant and stayed further

1 (2007) 7 SCC 378

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proceedings in F.I.R./Crime No. 227 of 2016.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant submits

that the impugned judgment dated 12.12.2025

is erroneous inasmuch as it fails to accord due

weight to the appellant's plea, which rests not

on a bare denial but on official documentary

evidence. The F.I.R. itself is founded on

general, omnibus and unsubstantiated

allegations of dowry demand, without any

cogent evidence specifically attributable to the

appellant. The Inquest Report/

Panchayatnama dated 13.06.2016, prepared

in the presence of independent panchas,

records that both the main gate and the room

in which the deceased was found were locked

from inside and had to be broken open which

is prima facie inconsistent with the

prosecution's theory of a dowry death caused

by the family members acting in concert. The

Post-Mortem Report dated 14.06.2016 records

the cause of death as asphyxia due to ante-

mortem hanging with a single ligature mark

and no other ante-mortem injury indicative of

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homicidal violence, restraint or struggle,

consistent with the appellant's consistent

stand that the deceased died by suicide. The

appellant's absence is corroborated by the

certificate dated 03.10.2016 issued by the

Commandant, 141 Battalion, BSF showing

that he was detailed for Dak-runner duty from

Frontier Headquarters, BSF, Meghalaya

(Shillong) to Delhi for the period 27.05.2016 to

22.06.2016, remained at Shillong throughout

that period, and proceeded to Delhi only on

14.06.2016 i.e., a day after the incident,

remaining stationed there until 19.06.2016. It

was further submitted that the appellant's

parents stand acquitted by judgment dated

17.10.2025, the trial court having held that the

prosecution utterly failed to prove cruelty or

harassment for dowry beyond reasonable

doubt, which order erodes the very substratum

of the prosecution case.

12. The learned counsel further submits that the

High Court erred in treating the appellant's

defence as an ordinary disputed plea of alibi

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necessarily requiring trial, without

appreciating the distinction between (i) a

factual defence of alibi requiring evidentiary

appreciation, and (ii) a threshold legal

challenge founded on admitted,

unimpeachable official material which ex facie

demolishes the prosecution case, relying on

Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley

and Others2, and on State of Haryana and

Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others3, Yin

Cheng Hsiung v. Essem Chemical

Industries4 and Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v.

State of Bihar and Another5.

13. Further, learned counsel submits that the case

of Rajendra Singh (supra) as relied upon by

the High Court, is distinguishable on facts,

since the alibi in that case rested on affidavits

filed for the first time before the High Court,

whereas here the defence rests on an official,

contemporaneous BSF service record whose

2 (2011) 3 SCC 351

3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

4 (2011) 15 SCC 207

5 (2019) 13 SCC 350

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authenticity has never been questioned by the

respondents at any stage. Continuation of

proceedings in the teeth of this impeccable

material and the acquittal of the co-accused

parents was submitted to fall within the

Bhajan Lal (supra) categories and to amount

to an abuse of process, and, the appellant

having no criminal antecedents, to occasion a

violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the

Constitution.

14. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 1

(State of U.P.), opposes the petition principally

on the ground that a plea of alibi is a matter of

evidence, the burden of establishing which lies

squarely on the appellant. Further submits

that the post-mortem report dated 14.06.2016

records the cause of death as asphyxia due to

ante-mortem hanging, with a ligature mark of

26 cm x 20 cm and other associated findings,

as reaffirmed by the doctor who conducted the

post-mortem. Except for the certificate dated

03.10.2016 and certain affidavits, the

appellant has failed to place on record any

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cogent or independent corroborative material

such as travel records, tickets, movement

orders, leave records or transportation details

to conclusively establish that he could not

have left his place of posting and travelled to

Delhi during the relevant period, and that a

bare certificate, unsupported by such material,

cannot be given evidentiary weight at this

stage. Reliance was placed on Sections 11 and

103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(corresponding to Sections 9 and 105 of the

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), and on

Shaikh Sattar v. State of Maharashtra6,

for the proposition that a plea of alibi must be

proved with absolute certainty so as to

completely exclude the possibility of the

accused's presence at the relevant time and

place, as also on Rajendra Singh (supra) for

the proposition that no finding on a plea of alibi

can be recorded by a court for the first time in

a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the

burden being dischargeable only by leading

6 (2010) 8 SCC 430

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evidence at trial and not through affidavits or

documents filed before the Court. On this

basis, it was submitted that the appellant has

failed to make out any exceptional case

warranting interference, and that the petition

deserves to be dismissed.

15. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2

(complainant) submits that the chargesheet

has been filed after due investigation and cites

as many as 17 witnesses, whose veracity,

credibility and evidentiary value can only be

tested through examination and cross-

examination at a full-fledged trial, and cannot

be pre-judged or short-circuited at the

threshold. The appellant’s plea of absence is,

in substance, a plea of alibi within the meaning

of the exception under Section 11 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proving

which lies on the appellant. Mere production of

a movement order or duty certificate without

the same being proved and tested through

evidence at trial, cannot discharge this burden

or be appreciated at the stage of a quashing

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petition and that whether the duty in fact

covered the precise date, time and place of

occurrence, and conclusively excluded the

appellant's presence, are matters requiring

appreciation of evidence and are within the

exclusive domain of the trial court.

16. Having heard the submissions made by all the

parties the following questions fall for our

consideration: (i) whether the High Court was

justified in declining to examine, at the

threshold, the effect of the official service

certificate establishing the appellant's absence

from the place of occurrence; (ii) whether the

acquittal of the co-accused appellant’s

parents, on an identical set of allegations and

evidence arising from the very same F.I.R., has

a material bearing on the continuation of

proceedings against the appellant; and (iii)

whether, on a cumulative reading of the

record, the continuation of criminal

proceedings against the appellant amounts to

an abuse of the process of the court,

warranting exercise of jurisdiction under

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Article 136 read with the principles governing

Section 482 Cr.P.C.

17. The contours of the power to quash an F.I.R.

or criminal proceedings are well settled. In

Bhajan Lal (supra) case, this Court, while

cautioning that the power under Section 482

Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and in the

rarest of rare cases, laid down illustrative

categories in which such power may be

exercised. The relevant categories as relied

upon in the present case are as follows:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of

the various relevant provisions of the Code

under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of

decisions relating to the exercise of the

extraordinary power under Article 226 or the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code

which we have extracted and reproduced

above, we have given the following categories

of cases by way of illustration wherein such

power could be exercised either to prevent

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

to secure the ends of justice, though it may not

be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to

give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases

wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in

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their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the

accused.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made

in the FIR or complaint and the evidence

collected in support of the same do not disclose

the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) Where there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code

or the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where

there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.”

18. The power is undoubtedly to be exercised

sparingly, with circumspection, and never to

throttle a legitimate prosecution or to conduct

a mini trial at the threshold. These self-

imposed restraints, however, do not require

the court to shut its eyes to a proceeding that

is a manifest abuse. Where mala fide or an

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oblique motive is alleged, the court is not

confined to the four corners of the complaint.

In Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Others7 this Court held that in

such a situation the court owes a duty to

examine the complaint with care and a little

more closely, and, where necessary, to read in

between the lines.

19. In Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal

Kapoor8, this Court laid down a 4-step test to

determine if criminal proceedings can be

quashed on the basis of defense

material/official records prior to trial:

“30. Based on the factors canvassed in the

foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the

following steps to determine the veracity of a

prayer for quashment raised by an accused by

invoking the power vested in the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC:

30.1. Step one: whether the material relied

upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and

indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and

impeccable quality?

30.2. Step two: whether the material relied

upon by the accused would rule out the

7 (2023) 15 SCC 488

8 (2013) 3 SCC 330

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assertions contained in the charges levelled

against the accused i.e. the material is

sufficient to reject and overrule the factual

assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the

material is such as would persuade a

reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the

factual basis of the accusations as false?

30.3. Step three: whether the material relied

upon by the accused has not been refuted by

the prosecution/complainant; and/or the

material is such that it cannot be justifiably

refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the

trial would result in an abuse of process of the

court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the

affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High

Court should persuade it to quash such

criminal proceedings in exercise of power

vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such

exercise of power, besides doing justice to the

accused, would save precious court time,

which would otherwise be wasted in holding

such a trial (as well as proceedings arising

therefrom) specially when it is clear that the

same would not conclude in the conviction of

the accused.”

20. The first circumstance which assumes

considerable significance is the medical

evidence.

21. The post-mortem report unequivocally records

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that the deceased died due to "asphyxia as a

result of ante-mortem hanging." Apart from the

ligature mark around the neck, no other ante-

mortem injuries were found on the body. The

medical officer did not notice abrasions,

contusions, nail marks, defensive wounds or

any injury suggestive of resistance, restraint or

physical assault.

22. Medical evidence undoubtedly does not by

itself determine whether death is suicidal or

homicidal. Nevertheless, where the

prosecution alleges homicidal violence

involving several accused acting in concert, the

complete absence of injuries ordinarily

expected in a struggle assumes considerable

evidentiary significance.

23. Equally significant is the contemporaneous

inquest report. The Panchayatnama prepared

immediately after the occurrence records that

both the main entrance of the house and the

room where the deceased was found hanging

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and were locked from inside and had to be

opened from outside.

24. An inquest report is not substantive evidence

regarding guilt. Nevertheless, being a

contemporaneous official record prepared

immediately after the occurrence constitutes

an important surrounding circumstance. The

prosecution has offered no satisfactory

explanation as to how, if the deceased had

been murdered by the accused persons and

thereafter hanged, the room and even the main

gate came to be found bolted from inside. This

circumstance assumes even greater

importance when read conjointly with the

medical evidence.

25. The third circumstance relates to the

appellant's official service records. The

appellant has relied upon a certificate issued

by the Commandant, 141 Battalion, Border

Security Force certifying that he had been

detailed for official duty during the relevant

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period and was stationed in connection with

official assignments outside Meerut.

26. The certificate dated 03.10.2016 ascertains

that appellant remained present at Ftr HQ BSF

Meghalaya (Shillong) except on 14.06.2016

i.e., a day after the incident and remained in

Delhi up to 19.06.2016. The relevant extract is

as follows:

“2. Further above individual was detailed for Dak

runner duty to carry official documents from Ftr HQ BSF

Meghalaya (Shillong) to Delhi we.f. 27.05.16 to

22.06.2016. As ascertained from Ftr HQ Meghalaya, he

was remained present at Ftr HQ BSF Meghalaya

(Shillong) except on following dates:

a) 14.06.2016 at 0530 hrs

vide Ftr HQ Megh GD No.

162

- Individual proceeded to

FHQ BSF New Delhi

from Ftr HQ BSF Megh

(Shillong) and remained

stayed at Delhi up to

19.06.16.

b) 20.06.2016 at 1210 hrs

vide Ftr HQ Megh GD

No.237

- Individual returned

from FHQ BSF New

Delhi to Ftr HQ BSF

Megh (Shillong) and

remain stayed at

Shillong

Place: Dhanakgre (Meghalaya) sd/-

Dated the 3, Oct. 2016 (ARBIND KUMAR) DC/ADJT

FOR COMMANDANT

141 BN BSF”

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27. This Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT

of Delhi)9, while applying Rajiv Thapar

(supra) case held that where defence material

of sterling and unimpeachable quality is placed

on record, and such material completely

demolishes the prosecution case, the High

Court would be justified in quashing the

proceedings even at the pre-trial stage, since

no purpose is served in allowing a prosecution

to continue when the material produced

convincingly demonstrates that the allegations

are patently false. The Court further proceeded

to hold that to permit the prosecution to

proceed further in such circumstances would

itself be an abuse of the process of the court.

28. In Harshendra Kumar (surpa), this Court

reiterated that while exercising jurisdiction

under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court can

look into material that has a bearing on the

question whether continuance of the criminal

proceedings would amount to an abuse of the

9 (2013) 9 SCC 293

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process of court, and that if, on the face of

documents which are beyond suspicion or

doubt, no case is made out against the

accused, the High Court would be justified in

exercising its jurisdiction to quash the

proceedings.

29. In Mirza Iqbal alias Golu and Another v.

State of Uttar Pradesh and Another10, this

Court considered the quashing of proceedings

where the accused's official duty record

demonstrated his absence from the place of

occurrence.

30. This Court is mindful of the statement of law

in Rajendra Singh (supra) that the burden of

proving a plea of alibi lies upon the accused

and is ordinarily to be discharged by leading

evidence at trial, and that a finding on alibi

cannot be recorded by the High Court for the

first time in a petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C. on the strength of affidavits of

interested persons which the prosecution has

10 (2022) 16 SCC 697

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had no opportunity to test by cross-

examination.

31. However, that principle, was applied to a case

where the material relied upon consisted of

affidavits sworn by private individuals before

the police, whose veracity was inherently open

to challenge and required cross-examination.

It cannot be read as laying down an inflexible

rule that no species of documentary material

touching upon presence or absence of the

accused may ever be looked into at the

threshold, irrespective of its source, character,

and the absence of any dispute as to its

authenticity. Where the material in question is

an official record maintained in the ordinary

course of duty by a wing of the Armed Forces

of the Union, is placed on record from the

earliest stage of investigation itself, and has

never been impugned as forged, fabricated, or

otherwise unreliable by the prosecution at any

stage including before the IO, who himself

acknowledged that evidence emerged that

appellant was on his duty at the time of the

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incident such material partakes of the

character of unimpeachable material

contemplated in Prashant Bharti (supra) and

Harshendra Kumar (supra), and calls for

consideration even at the threshold. To hold

otherwise would be to elevate procedural

formalism over substantial justice and to

compel an undeniably absent accused to

undergo the ordeal of a full sessions trial

notwithstanding admitted and unimpeachable

proof to the contrary.

32. The offence under Section 304-B IPC requires

the prosecution to establish, inter alia, that the

deceased was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or his relatives

for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry,

"soon before" her death. It is true, as urged on

behalf of the respondents, that physical

presence at the precise moment of death is not,

by itself, an ingredient of the offence, and that

cruelty or harassment "soon before" death may

be established through conduct, including

telephonic threats occurring even while the

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accused is stationed elsewhere. The

appellant's absence from place of occurrence

on date of incident does not, therefore, by

itself, exonerate him of the charge. However, no

call-detail records were ever obtained to

independently verify, establish or assert, even

this solitary telephonic thread that said to

connect the appellant to the alleged demand.

33. The fourth and last circumstance relates to the

effect of acquittal of appellant’s parents. An

order of acquittal of co-accused, rendered on

an identical body of evidence, does not

automatically bind or exonerate a differently

situated co-accused whose case may rest on

distinct material. That principle, however,

presupposes that the case of the co-accused

sought to be proceeded against is, in fact,

distinguishable on the evidence. Here, no such

distinguishing evidence exists. The evidence

relied upon by the prosecution against the

appellant is not merely similar to, but is the

very same evidence that was found

insufficient, on trial, to sustain a conviction of

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his parents and the solitary additional element

said to distinguish the appellant's role viz, the

telephonic demand attributed to him alone

stands substantially neutralised by the

complete absence of any call-detail record to

verify even that solitary allegation and by the

unimpeached and, indeed, prosecution-

corroborated proof of his absence from the

State at the relevant time.

34. In these circumstances, continuing a full

sessions trial against the appellant alone,

while his co-accused stand acquitted on the

self-same evidence, would not further the

cause of justice but would subject the

appellant to the ordeal and stigma of a criminal

trial whose substratum has already collapsed.

The High Court, in the impugned judgment,

proceeded on the premise that the appellant's

reliance on the service certificate was a bare

plea of alibi of the kind considered in Rajendra

Singh (supra), and declined to examine

corroborating circumstances. This, in the

considered view of this Court, constituted a

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failure to appreciate unimpeachable material

bearing directly on the question of abuse of

process, and calls for interference.

35. In light of the foregoing facts and

circumstances, and the analysis of the legal

precedents referred to above, this Court is of

the view that the four-steps as laid down in the

case of Rajiv Thapar (supra) are satisfied in

the present case. The service certificate is not

disputed as a document, its issuing authority

is not questioned, nor are its contents

disputed. Where the unimpeached

documentary record and the result of a

connected trial on identical evidence, taken

together, demonstrate that the continuation of

the prosecution against the appellant would be

a legal exercise in futility, the High Court, and

now this Court, would be failing in their duty

if they permitted the criminal process to

continue merely because a technical prima

facie case can be spelt out from the bare

averments of the F.I.R. The categories

identified in Bhajan Lal (supra) are

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illustrative and not exhaustive, and the

present case falls squarely within the rationale

of categories 1, 3 and 6 concerning inherent

improbability of the allegations and abuse of

the process of the court.

36. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is

satisfied that the continuation of criminal

proceedings against the appellant amounts to

an abuse of the process of the court and

requires to be quashed qua the appellant

alone.

37. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The

impugned judgment and order dated

12.12.2025 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Application under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 23788 of 2018 is set

aside. F.I.R./Case Crime No. 227 of 2016

registered at Police Station Inchauli, District

Meerut, together with Charge-sheet No.

09A/16 dated 15.07.2017 and all consequent

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 147 of 2018

(State v. Rahul) pending before the Court of the

Crl.A. @ SLP (C) No.2939/2026 Page 29 of 29

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, are hereby

quashed insofar as they concern the appellant.

38. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that

this order does not, in any manner, disturb the

judgment dated 17.10.2025 passed by the

Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court

No. 1, Meerut in Sessions Trial No. 653 of

2017, nor does it affect the status or rights of

any other person.

39. Pending interlocutory applications, if any,

stand disposed of.

…….……..………..………………..J.

[ SANJAY KAROL ]

…….……..………..………………..J.

[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 11, 2026.