SHATRUGHN YADAV VS. THE FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICALS TRAVANCORE LTD (F.A.C.T),

2026 INSC 829Page 1 of 18

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.________OF 2026

[ @ SLP(CIVIL) NO. 7197 OF 2026 ]

SHATRUGHN YADAV …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICALS

TRAVANCORE LTD. (F.A.C.T.)

AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises from the judgment and

order dated 04.07.2025 of the High Court of Kerala at

Ernakulam in Writ Appeal No.414 of 2025 whereby the

High Court upheld the judgment and order of the Single

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Judge and dismissed the appellant’s challenge to the

termination order.

3. The brief factual matrix is that the appellant was

appointed to the post of Technician(Process) by the

Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. on

05.05.2021 on consolidated pay for an initial tenure of

two years. At the time of joining, he submitted an

attestation form declaring that there was no criminal

case pending against him.

4. Six months later, a letter was forwarded by the

respondent to the District Magistrate for verification of

the appellant’s criminal antecedents. In response, vide

letter dated 22.03.2022, the District Magistrate

disclosed that a Non-Cognizable Report (hereinafter,

‘NCR’) dated 03.04.2019 had been registered against the

appellant under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC.

Consequently, a show cause notice was issued to the

appellant on 30.04.2022, directing him to furnish

reasons as to why his services should not be terminated

on the ground of furnishing false information.

5. The appellant submitted his reply to the aforesaid

notice stating that he had acted in a bona fide manner

and had not suppressed or given false information as he

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was not aware of the registration of the NCR. He had not

received any summons, nor was he arrested with respect

to the said report, and therefore, he had no means to

know that the said case was registered against him. To

support his case, he enclosed with his reply a photocopy

of a certificate dated 09.07.2020 issued by the

Superintendent of Police, District Maharajganj which

stated that there was no entry against the candidate as

per the information received from the concerned police

station, local intelligence unit and the District Crime

Records Bureau.

6. A further representation dated 06.06.2023 was

submitted by the appellant enclosing the final report

which recorded that the police had found no evidence

against him and therefore his name had been deleted

from the array of the accused persons. This, he pleaded,

fortified his stand of not being aware of the registration

of the report.

7. However, the respondents were dissatisfied with

the reply. After granting a few more opportunities to

substantiate his claim, a termination letter was issued

to the appellant on 05.08.2023 cancelling his

appointment.

Page 4 of 18

8. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the High

Court by filing Writ Petition No.37484 of 2023

challenging the order of termination. The learned Single

Judge declined to interfere, holding that the appellant's

claim of being unaware of the NCR involved a disputed

question of fact requiring proof. By the impugned order,

the Division Bench concurred with the Single Judge and

dismissed the appeal. The appellant is therefore now

before this Court by way of the present appeal.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that

the High Court has erred in not appreciating the facts

and circumstances of the case. He places reliance on the

judgments in Ravindra Kumar v State of UP1 and Avtar

Singh v Union of India2 to contend that the question to

be examined is not whether there is non-disclosure

simplicitor, but whether there was deliberate

suppression or supply of false information on the part of

the candidate. Each case has to be examined on its own

merits and termination cannot be an automatic

consequence of existence of criminal antecedents.

10. It is submitted that such an exercise has not been

undertaken in the appellant’s case. The appellant’s

1 (2024) INSC 131

2 (2016) 8 SCC 471

Page 5 of 18

consistent stand has been that he had no knowledge of

the existence of the NCR, therefore his declaration was

bona fide.

11. It is contended that this stand is further

strengthened by the character certificate issued by the

Police on 09.07.2020, and the subsequent certificate

stating that the appellant’s name was deleted from the

array of accused persons as no evidence was found

against him. Since he was never called to the police

station or associated in the investigation, nor was he

arrested, he had no knowledge of the proceedings and

answered the question on the form truthfully, to the best

of his knowledge.

12. It is further submitted that the High Court also

erred in holding that it lacked the jurisdiction to examine

the appellant's case on the ground that it involved

disputed questions of fact, since the real issue was the

legality of the termination of the appellant's

appointment.

13. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other

hand, supports the impugned judgment and submits

that the suppression of information regarding the NCR

rendered the appellant unfit for employment. The offer

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of appointment had been issued to the appellant

contingent upon clearance of antecedents. The

appellant, despite being aware of the NCR, did not reveal

its pendency to the respondents.

14. It is also submitted that the discharge of the

appellant from the NCR has no bearing on the falsity of

the declaration given in the attestation form. Moreover,

it is unlikely that he had no knowledge of the NCR since

his parents were also charged.

15. On the question of jurisdiction, it is submitted

that the appellant ought to have exhausted the remedy

available under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The

matter, being one involving disputed questions of fact,

ought not to have been entertained in writ jurisdiction.

16. Lastly, it is urged that since the appellant was on

probation when his services were terminated, in the

event this Court is of the opinion that the appellant

ought to be reinstated, his reinstatement ought to be

made in the capacity of a consolidated pay period

appointee.

17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties

and have perused the material on record.

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18. Before proceeding, we must first address the

objection raised on behalf of the respondents as to the

maintainability of the writ petition, it being contended

that the appellant ought to have availed of the remedy

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the

matter, involving disputed questions of fact, was not

amenable to writ jurisdiction. We are unable to accept

this submission. It is settled law that the existence of an

alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar

to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly where the

challenge is to the legality of the order of termination

itself.

19. Now coming to the merits of the case, the issue to

be considered by us is whether the action of the

respondents in terminating the employment of the

appellant, in the given facts and circumstances, was

permissible in law.

20. The legal position on the issue of suppression of

information in verification forms with regard to criminal

antecedents has been settled and summarised in a

three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Avtar Singh

(supra). The relevant paragraphs are reproduced

hereinbelow:

Page 8 of 18

“38. We have noticed various decisions and

tried to explain and reconcile them as far as

possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion,

we summarise our conclusion thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by a

candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest,

or pendency of a criminal case, whether before

or after entering into service must be true and

there should be no suppression or false

mention of required information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of

services or cancellation of candidature for

giving false information, the employer may take

notice of special circumstances of the case, if

any, while giving such information.

38.3. The employer shall take into

consideration the government

orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the

employee, at the time of taking the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false

information of involvement in a criminal case

where conviction or acquittal had already been

recorded before filling of the

application/verification form and such fact

later comes to knowledge of employer, any of

the following recourses appropriate to the case

may be adopted:

38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which

conviction had been recorded, such as shouting

slogans at young age or for a petty offence

which if disclosed would not have rendered an

incumbent unfit for post in question, the

employer may, in its discretion, ignore such

suppression of fact or false information by

condoning the lapse.

Page 9 of 18

38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in

case which is not trivial in nature, employer

may cancel candidature or terminate services

of the employee.

38.5. In a case where the employee has made

declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal

case, the employer still has the right to consider

antecedents, and cannot be compelled to

appoint the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully

declared in character verification form

regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial

nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of

the case, in its discretion, may appoint the

candidate subject to decision of such case.

38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded

in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of

heinous/serious nature, on technical ground

and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit

of reasonable doubt has been given, the

employer may consider all relevant facts

available as to antecedents, and may take

appropriate decision as to the continuance of

the employee.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact

with respect to multiple pending cases such

false information by itself will assume

significance and an employer may pass

appropriate order cancelling candidature or

terminating services as appointment of a

person against whom multiple criminal cases

were pending may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not

known to the candidate at the time of filling the

form, still it may have adverse impact and the

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appointing authority would take decision after

considering the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in

service, holding departmental enquiry would

be necessary before passing order of

termination/removal or dismissal on the

ground of suppression or submitting false

information in verification form.

38.10. For determining suppression or false

information attestation/verification form has to

be specific, not vague. Only such information

which was required to be specifically

mentioned has to be disclosed. If information

not asked for but is relevant comes to

knowledge of the employer the same can be

considered in an objective manner while

addressing the question of fitness. However, in

such cases action cannot be taken on basis of

suppression or submitting false information as

to a fact which was not even asked for.

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of

suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of

the fact must be attributable to him.”

21. What emerges from the above is that the relevant

facts and circumstances must be considered in each

case. The order of termination must not be mechanical

but must have regard to the form of suppression, the

outcome of the criminal case, the nature of the

employment and of the offence, and any special

circumstances. Termination is therefore not an

automatic consequence of the disclosure of criminal

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antecedents; rather, the specific case of the employee

must be considered, and the employer must apply its

mind before arriving at a decision.

22. In a recent decision of this Court in Ravindra

Kumar(supra) involving non-disclosure of a criminal case

in the verification form, this Court granted relief to the

appellant therein, having regard to the fact that on the

date of the application, no criminal case was pending as

he had been acquitted. Due regard was also given to the

character certificate by the SHO certifying that the

candidate was excellent, and that the appellant’s general

reputation was good. This Court also noted that the

selection had been mechanically treated as irregular

merely because the affidavit contained incorrect facts,

instead of considering the appellant's suitability for

appointment, which was an impermissible approach.

23. Similarly, in Umesh Chandra Yadav v Inspector

General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway

Protection Force, Northern Railway, New Delhi and

others3, where the appellant had failed to furnish

information regarding a criminal case wherein he had

been discharged as a juvenile, this Court, while granting

relief, noted that in the facts and circumstances, such

3 (2022) 14 SCC 244

Page 12 of 18

action could not be considered suppression of material

information. It was reiterated that termination must not

be done arbitrarily and the yardstick to be applied

depends on the nature of the post, the impact of

suppression and suitability. The relevant paragraph is

reproduced hereinbelow:

“14. This cannot be disputed that the

candidate who intend to participate in the

selection process is required to furnish correct

information relating to his character and

antecedents in the verification/attestation form

before or after his induction into service. At the

same time, it is also true that the person who

has suppressed the material information,

cannot claim unfettered right of seeking

appointment or continuity in service but, at the

same time, he has a right not to be dealt with

arbitrarily and power has to be exercised in

reasonable manner with objectivity having due

regard to the facts of the case on hand. The

yardstick which has to be applied always

depends upon the nature of post, nature of

duties, impact of suppression on suitability has

to be considered by the competent authority

considering post/nature of duties/services and

power has to be exercised on due diligence of

various aspects at the given time and no hard-

and-fast rule of thumb can be laid down in this

regard.”

24. To summarise, the enquiry to be undertaken by

the employer, before proceeding to terminate the

services of an employee on the ground of suppression of

information regarding criminal antecedents, is

essentially two-pronged. The first is one of fact: whether

Page 13 of 18

there has, in truth, been any suppression or furnishing

of false information by the candidate, having regard to

the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the

circumstances in which the declaration came to be

made. The second prong of enquiry requires the

authorities to apply their mind to the specific facts and

circumstances of the case including the type of the

suppression, the nature of allegations, role and gravity

of the offence, the nature of the post and the duties

attached to it and wherever relevant the effect thereof,

and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings, if

concluded, in order to arrive at a considered conclusion

as to whether the continuation of the employee in service

would not be feasible and the only option available is

termination from service. It is only where both these

stages of enquiries are undertaken and not otherwise,

that an order of termination on this ground can be said

to be sustainable in law.

25. Having elaborated upon the settled law on the

issue before us, we now proceed to apply the same to the

facts and circumstances at hand.

26. Looking at the first prong, whether there has been

any suppression or supply of false information on the

part of the appellant, we observe that the consistent

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stand of the appellant is that he had no knowledge of the

NCR involving him. Therefore, to the best of his

knowledge and in a bona fide manner, he stated in his

verification form that there was no criminal case pending

against him.

27. The appellant has also relied upon a character

certificate dated 09.07.2020 by the Senior

Superintendent of Police, Maharajganj, that stated that

there were no adverse entries against the appellant in

the police records. Pertinently, this certificate was given

subsequent to the date of the lodging of the NCR i.e.

03.04.2019.

28. The appellant has also brought on record a

subsequent certificate dated 09.08.2023 issued by the

Sub-Inspector of Police, Nichlaul, Maharajganj, Uttar

Pradesh, disclosing that although the appellant was

initially arrayed in the NCR, his name was later removed

after investigation as no evidence was found against

him. It was also certified that he was neither called to

the police station nor was he arrested during the

relevant period.

29. From the above, the claim of the appellant stands

substantiated that, in the absence of any summons, and

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having never been called to the police station, arrested,

or questioned, the appellant had no means of knowing

about the NCR.

30. We are also not persuaded by the submission of

the respondents that the appellant could not have been

unaware of the NCR since his parents were also named

therein. No material has been placed on record to show

that the appellant was in fact informed by his parents of

the registration of the NCR, or that he was otherwise put

to notice of the same. In the absence of any such

evidence, the respondents' submission remains a matter

of surmise and cannot displace the documentary

material relied upon and placed on record by the

appellant, particularly the certificate dated 09.07.2020

and the subsequent confirmation of deletion of his name

from the array of accused.

31. Needless to say, knowledge of a fact is a necessary

pre-requisite for its non-disclosure. The very concept of

suppression presupposes an awareness of that which is

suppressed; one cannot be said to have withheld or

concealed something of which one had no knowledge in

the first place. It would be both illogical and unjust to

hold a candidate liable for suppression of information

that was never within his knowledge to begin with.

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Therefore, where the very existence of a criminal

antecedent is not shown to have been within the

candidate's knowledge at the relevant time, he cannot be

held to have suppressed or furnished false information

in that regard, there being no suppression of a fact that

was, to him, non-existent.

32. We hasten to add that such lack of awareness of

the existence of a criminal antecedent is itself a fact that

must be established by the candidate, the onus being

upon him to substantiate the claim before the employer.

A bare plea of ignorance, without cogent and reliable

material to assert such claim, will not suffice to escape

liability. Were it otherwise, the requirement of disclosure

in verification forms would be rendered illusory, open to

circumvention by simply pleading ignorance. In the

present case, as discussed above, we find that the

appellant's consistent claim of bona fide ignorance of the

NCR stands duly established by documentary evidence

on record.

33. The second prong of the enquiry to be undertaken

is whether the criminal antecedent, and the

suppression, if any, is of such nature that merits

termination of employment. In the present case, we

observe that although sufficient opportunity was

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granted to the appellant to put forth his case, the

authorities have not undertaken such enquiry. They

have not considered the specific facts and circumstances

and have proceeded under the presumption that

existence of the criminal antecedent would

automatically render the appellant ineligible for the post.

There have been no specific findings regarding the

specific nature of the offence and its impact on the

nature of the post held by the appellant, and the

subsequent discharge of the appellant has not been

given due consideration.

34. In light of the above, we answer the issue framed

by us in the negative, and hold that the termination of

the appellant was not permissible in law, as it fails on

both the prongs, the order being illegal as well as without

application of mind.

35. In the facts and circumstances, since there is

nothing on record to indicate that the appellant was

otherwise unfit for the post in terms of qualifications,

and nothing has been brought on record regarding his

work being unsatisfactory, we set aside the order of

termination of the appellant and direct reinstatement in

service forthwith with all consequential benefits, except

for backwages which will be restricted to 50% to be paid

Page 18 of 18

within a period of eight weeks from today failing which

interest @6% per annum will be payable from the date

the amount became due till disbursal.

36. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

37. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

.……..………..……………………..J.

[ SANJAY KAROL ]

……..………..……………………..J.

[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 11, 2026.