KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITED VS. REKHA

2026 INSC 8471

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) No(s).24849 of 2025)

KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION

CORPORATION LIMITED …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

REKHA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

With

Civil Appeal No(s).________________ of 2026

(Arising out of SLP(C) No(s). 24854 of 2025)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation1 challenges the imputation of

liability upon itself, and the consequent order to pay compensation made by a

Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru2 and its

1 KPTC

2 In WP No. 1383 of 2020

2

subsequent confirmation by a Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeals

preferred thereagainst3.

3. It has to be noted, right at the outset, that the impugned judgement of the

Division Bench of the High Court disposed of three appeals out of which the

KPTC has chosen to file the present appeal against only two of the three. In the

present case, respondent No. 1, namely Rekha, is the widow of one N.

Subramanya who died due to an incident of electrocution on 22 February 2018.

A first information report was registered the same day, setting into motion the

law, the outcome thereof is not part of the record. Apparently, the respondent no.1

filed a writ petition, the subject matter of these appeals. The Appellant herein

opposed the petitions on the ground of inter alia maintainability; lack of fault on

the part of the Appellant; and the presence of disputed questions of fact. Rejecting

these objections, both the learned single Judge and Division Bench held the writ

petitions to be maintainable since what was sought by the writ petitioners is a

remedy for tortious act of the State and such a prayer not requiring exhausting of

private law remedy before the Civil Court. On merits the court held the appellant

liable, to grant compensation for which the framework of the Motor Vehicles Act,

19884 was adopted. Both the Courts awarded Rs. 25,52,500/- with interest

payable at the rate of 6% after three months of the date of judgment.

4. In Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) 24854 of 2025, the facts in brief were that the

Respondent therein, namely Muizz Ahmad Shariff, had jumped onto the roof of

a neighboring building to retrieve a cricket ball, when in the process of doing so,

he came in contact with a 66KV Line and was severely injured. The learned

Single Judge awarded Rs. 44,32,050/- which was upheld by the Division Bench.

5. The questions to be decided by us are the maintainability of the writ

petition and the yardstick that is to be used in determining compensation in cases

of electrocution.

3 WA No. 861 of 2022

4 MVA

3

We have heard the learned Solicitor General, learned senior counsel/counsel for

the parties.

6. The question of maintainability of the writ petition is no longer res-integra.

Numerous judgments of this Court have delineated on this question. We may refer

to one such judgment where the principles regarding maintainability have been

culled out. In Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P.5, it has been observed:

“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:

27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs

can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights,

but for any other purpose as well.

27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ

petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High

Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the

aggrieved person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the

writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental

right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a

violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or

proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a

legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of

its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate

case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when

an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.

27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the

remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must

be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the

discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule

of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience

and discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High

Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However,

if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the

controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view

would not readily be interfered with.”

These principles have been referred to with approval by a bench of three judges

in T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers6 where it further stood

clarified that:

“55. It has been well-settled through a legion of judicial

pronouncements of this Court that the writ courts, despite the

5 (2021) 6 SCC 771

6 (2025) 4 SCC 1.

4

availability of alternative remedies, may exercise writ jurisdiction at

least in three contingencies — (i) where there is a violation of

principles of natural justice or fundamental rights; (ii) where an order

in a proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction; or (iii) where the vires

of an Act is challenged… ”

7. Specifically in the context of cases of electrocution, whether or not a

petition under Article 226 is maintainable, is also in the realm of the well-settled

law. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das7, G.T.

Nanavati J. made observations directly relevant for us:

“6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the

writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power

under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in

proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of

electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped

live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that

“admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the

appellants”. The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were

actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the

claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line

belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in

contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding

compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had

snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which

circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of

the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they

deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were

taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped

because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised

intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner

stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided

properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that

where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226

of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and

could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake

of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court

should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it

was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.”

8. What is been held here is that if questions of fact are disputed, then Article

226 would not be an appropriate remedy in cases of electrocution.

7 (1999) 7 SCC 298

5

9. The record reveals the following facts to be disputed in respect of :

(A) Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 24849 of 2025:

(i) Whether using an aluminium ladder while working in a coffee

plantation, in such a manner that it came in contact with an 11 KV Line,

constitutes negligence on the part of the respondent?

(ii) Whether the owner of the coffee plantation was himself negligent for

having provided the respondent with the aluminium ladder, in the first

instance?

(iii) Whether the backup relays, which according to the report of the

Assistant Executive Engineer, were in satisfactory condition, were

actually so or not?

(iv) Whether the appellant escapes liability because it was responsible for

maintenance of electric lines only above a certain voltage and as such,

if at all, liability would be on the Respondent No. 2 in the present case?

(B) Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 24854 of 2025 :

(i) Whether the statutorily mandated distance between the electric line and

the building, at 4 metres, was complied with or not;

(ii) In terms of the undertaking dated 19th April 2000, would make the

building owner solely liable for payment of compensation;

(iii) Whether negligence can be imputed to the appellant since it provided

connection to the building in question, if it indeed was the case that the

statutorily mandated minimum distance was complied with or not;

10. The High Court had, in effect, held the disputed facts to not be of much

relevance because, according to it, it is the standard of absolute liability that is

applicable and not strict liability. Since absolute liability obviously has no

exceptions, the presence of disputed facts, if at all, would not absolve the

6

appellant herein. In deciding the correctness of this finding, we must then go to

the meaning of absolute liability and strict liability.

11. Absolute liability, as the name itself suggests, is a kind of liability that

leaves no scope for exception from such liability. To put it simply, the person

who has been deemed to be absolutely liable shall be so liable irrespective of the

facts and circumstances in which such imputation has been made upon them. It

is applied only to enterprises and comes into play when the activity in which the

enterprise is engaged, is inherently dangerous or hazardous and someone has

been harmed as a result of the accident that has taken place in performing such

activity. The classic case in this regard is the Constitution Bench decision in

Oleum Gas Leak Case (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram - Oleum Gas)8

where an industrial unit of Shriram Foods and Fertilisers, located in Delhi,

suffered a leak of Oleum Gas leading to danger to the lives of the people in the

area. Bhagwati C.J. held thus:

“31. …We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are

certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but

we have to build our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an

argument that merely because the law in England does not recognise

the rule of strict and absolute liability in cases of hazardous or

inherently dangerous activities or the rule laid down

in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All

ER Rep 1] as developed in England recognises certain limitations and

exceptions, we in India must hold back our hands and not venture to

evolve a new principle of liability since English courts have not done

so. We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary

to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation

which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of

hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant

to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to

evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done

in England. We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a

hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential

threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and

residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable

duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on

account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity

which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an

8 (1987) 1 SCC 395

7

obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity

in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of

safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise

must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be

no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care

and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part… We

would therefore hold that where in enterprise is engaged in a hazardous

or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account

of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently

dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the

enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who

are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of

the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict

liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19

LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1]”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Now let us look to the concept of strict liability. The general rule is that

when a person collects or brings upon his land anything that is likely to cause

mischief and if such thing escapes, then this person is liable for all natural

consequences that follow. (See Rylands v. Fletcher9 ; Rajkot Municipal Corpn.

v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum10,). Relevant observations of the Privy Council

in this regard made in Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v.

Vandry11, are reproduced as under:

“25. Two decisions which were pressed on their Lordships attention

require particular examination namely Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Roy

[[1902] A.C. 220.] and Dumphy v. Montreal Light Heat and Power Co.

[[1907] A.C. 454.] . The former is a case of damage by the escape of

sparks from a locomotive engine and the decision in terms is in line

with the well-known authorities of Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co. [[1860]

5 H. & N. 679.] and Hammersmith and City Ry. Co. v. Brand [L.R. 4

H.L. 171.] it is case of “plain words authorizing the doing of the very

thing complained of”. Dumphy v. Montreal Light Heat and Power Co.

[[1907] A.C. 454.] is a case of high-tension electricity released by the

act of a third party's workman whom the jury acquitted of negligence.

No specific article of the Code is mentioned and the presence of high

tension current in the cable was only the causa sine qua nonand the

human action which released it was the causa causans of the accident.

There was statutory authority to circulate high-tension electricity

overhead but on the simple issue, whether the damage caused by the

9 (1868) LR 3 HL 330

10 (1997) 9 SCC 552

11 1920 SCC OnLine PC 10

8

escape of that electricity was caused by the company's negligence it was

held that no negligence had been proved and indeed but for the act of a

stranger who himself was not careless, the company's electricity would

have done no harm to anybody.

26. Whether in the present cases the evidence established affirmatively

a case of negligence against the defendants is a question on which the

Supreme Court arrived at no definite conclusion. Had it been necessary

the respondents would have been entitled to claim before their

Lordships' Board that this issue should be decided now, since the terms

imposed on the appellants under the special leave to appeal bound them

to rely on points of law only, but did not preclude the respondents from

meeting those points upon the facts in any way which the evidence

warranted. In the view, however, above taken of the case no decision on

this question is needed.”

A subsequent decision in 2008 titled Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya

Kumar12, discussed this rule in the following terms:

“22. Strict liability focuses on the nature of the defendant's

activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in which it is carried on

(vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 247). There are many

activities which are so hazardous that they may constitute a danger to

the person or property of another. The principle of strict liability states

that the undertakers of these activities have to compensate for the

damage caused by them irrespective of any fault on their part. As

Fleming says “permission to conduct such activity is in effect made

conditional on its absorbing the cost of the accidents it causes, as an

appropriate item of its overheads” (see Fleming on Torts, 6th Edn., p.

302).

…

24. The basis of the doctrine of strict liability is twofold: (i) The people

who engage in particularly hazardous activities should bear the burden

of the risk of damage that their activities generate, and (ii) it operates as

a loss distribution mechanism, the person who does such hazardous

activity (usually a corporation) being in the best position to spread the

loss via insurance and higher prices for its products (vide Torts by

Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 267).

…

27. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : (1861-73)

All ER Rep 1] was subsequently interpreted to cover a variety of things

likely to do mischief on escape, irrespective of whether they were

dangerous per se e.g. water, electricity, explosions, oil, noxious fumes,

colliery spoil, poisonous vegetation, a flagpole, etc. (see Winfield and

Jolowicz on Tort, 13th Edn., p. 425) vide National Telephone Co. v.

Baker [(1893) 2 Ch 186] , Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. Ltd.

v. Cape Town Tramways Co. Ltd. [(1902) AC 381 : (1900-03) All ER

12 (2008) 9 SCC 527

9

Rep Ext 1316 (PC)] , Hillier v. Air Ministry [(1962) CLY 2084] , etc. In

America, the rule was adapted and expressed in the following words

“one who carried on an ultra-hazardous activity is liable to another

whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognise as likely to be

harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm

resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultra-hazardous,

although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm” (vide

Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, p. 41).

…

35. However, we are now witnessing a swing once again in favour of

the principle of strict liability. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the Chernobyl

nuclear disaster, the crude oil spill in 1988 on to the Alaska coastline

from the oil tanker Exxon Valdez, and other similar incidents have

shocked the conscience of people all over the world and have aroused

thinkers to the dangers in industrial and other activities in modern

society.

…

39. The decision in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC

(L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] related to a concern working for private

profit. However, in our opinion the same principle will also apply to

statutory authorities (like the Railways), public corporations or local

bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for private

profit.

40. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher

against public bodies have not on the whole succeeded vide

Administrative Law by P.P. Craig, 2nd Edn., p. 446, mainly because of

the idea that a body which acts not for its own profit but for the benefit

of the community should not be liable. However, in our opinion, this

idea is based on a misconception. Strict liability has no element of moral

censure. It is because such public bodies benefit the community that it

is unfair to leave the result of a non-negligent accident to lie fortuitously

on a particular individual rather than to spread it among the community

generally.”

It has to be noted that the judgment in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari13;

which arose from a suit for damages filed in a case of electrocution, this court

held the exception to the principle of strict liability not to be applicable. Since the

present case is also dealing with a matter concerning electrocution, the discussion

made therein is relevant for our purposes and accordingly reproduced below:

“7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy

in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the

energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets

unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the

sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the

13 (2002) 2 SCC 162

10

voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of

dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to

take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that

the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such

road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the

management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by

siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution

was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the

supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices.

At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the

electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted.

Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to

chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps.

8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person

undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human

life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by

any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the

part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is

the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The

liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It

differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or

fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the

foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If

the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he

cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence

attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict

liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he

could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.”

13. Exceptions to this rule have been recognised in numerous judgments.

Among others, reference can be made to Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. vs New

India Assurance Co. Ltd.14 where the principles of the exception were reiterated.

The relevant portion of Para 14 thereof is extracted hereunder:

“14. … They are:

(1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria.

(2) Common benefit i.e. where the source of the danger is maintained

for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant

is not liable for its escape.

(3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act

of a stranger, the rule does not apply.

(4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand excluded either

when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides

otherwise.

14 (2001) 2 SCC 9

11

(5) Act of God or vis major i.e. circumstances which no human foresight

can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to

recognise the possibility.

(6) Default of the plaintiff i.e. if the damage is caused solely by the act

or default of the plaintiff himself, the rule will not apply.

(7) Remoteness of consequences i.e. the rule cannot be applied ad

infinitum, because even according to the formulation of the rule made

by Blackburn, J., the defendant is answerable only for all the damage

“which is the natural consequence of its escape”.”

14. Now the question is whether in cases such as these i.e. electrocution of an

individual, the standard of liability upon bodies such as the appellant is strict or

absolute. We are of the considered view that to impose strict liability would be

more appropriate, for not in all cases can it be said that the electricity boards are

liable. The transmission of electricity is undoubtedly inherently dangerous. Those

who carry out the inherently dangerous activity should bear the burden, and the

State is no exception to that rule. Such enterprises operate on a loss distribution

mechanism i.e. they are in the best position to spread the loss incurred through

insurance or higher prices, as the case may be. It can also be said that they are

expected to factor in these possibilities. It is for these reasons that they are liable

to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part,

provided that none of the exceptions to the rule of strict liability apply to the case

at hand. Granted that they would have taken all reasonable care to protect

individuals from electrocution. We are supported in this view by the observations

made in Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, where it has been categorically held that

the rule in Rylands (supra) applies to a number of different categories of cases

inter alia, electricity also.

15. On the question of yardstick of compensation, we find this Court to have

observed in a two-Judge Bench decision in Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran

Nigam Ltd.15, that the multiplier method cannot be applied to determine

compensation in cases of electrocution. Since the calculation paradigm as

15 (2014) 15 SCC 1

12

provided for in connection with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is dependent on the

multiplier, the scenario thereunder could not have been applied mutatis mutandis

to electrocution cases, as done by the High Court in the impugned judgment. It is

a matter of law that the Electricity Act 2003 does not provide for the method to

calculate compensation. What it does provide is the liability of the licensee to pay

compensation in certain scenarios under Section 57 thereof but does not say

anything regarding the method applicable to calculating the same. This holding

in Raman (supra) relies on Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha16. Be that as it may,

the overarching principle of just and reasonable, fair compensation would govern

the calculation here as well, based on the income of the person and other related

claims.

16. Having held as above that there are disputed questions of facts involved,

we are of the view that the Writ Petition seeking compensation filed by the

respondent was not maintainable. While issuing notice, we had stayed the

operation of the impugned judgment and by a subsequent order dated 18.12.2025,

had ordered the payment of interim compensation to the tune of Rs. 5 Lakhs. The

impugned judgment of the Learned Division Bench as also the Single Judge are

quashed and set aside. However, the end result here would be of no consequence

to the remedy available to the respondent to take recourse to such alternate

remedies as are available against the appellant before the concerned forum. As

and when filed, the same shall be decided in accordance with law, on an

expeditious basis, uninfluenced by any observations made herein. It is further

clarified that the amount of compensation paid in these proceedings shall not be

recovered from the respondents and neither will it influence the total

compensation as may be awarded in the appropriate proceedings, should it arrive

at such a conclusion.

16 (2014) 1 SCC 384

13

Civil Appeal @ Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24854 of 2025

17. In view of the conclusion arrived at in the Civil Appeal @ arising out of

SLP(C) No(s).24849 of 2025, the Respondents herein are also at liberty to take

appropriate action in the above terms.

18. Both the Appeals are allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of. Parties will bear their own costs.

.……………………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………………………………..……….J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

August 12, 2026