RASPELLI BHAGYA KISTAIYA VS. GENERAL MANAGER, WESTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED

2026 INSC 841Page 1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7244 of 2026)

RASPELLI BHAGYA KISHAIYA & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GENERAL MANAGER, WESTERN

COALFIELDS LIMITED & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This is an appeal assailing the final judgment and order dated

26.11.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,

Nagpur Bench, in Writ Petition No. 2364 of 2024, whereby the writ

petition preferred by the appellants challenging the rejection of

compassionate appointment of appellant No. 2 was dismissed, on

the ground that appellant No. 2 had crossed the age of 35 years

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prescribed under Clause 9.3.4 of the National Coal Wage

Agreement - VI (for brevity “NCWA”) by the date his claim came to

be considered.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. The brief facts of the case are that appellant No. 2 is the son

of Late Ruspelli Kistaiya, who served as a Dozer Operator with the

respondent–Western Coalfields Limited for nearly 36 years and

died in harness on 17.12.2020. On the date of death of the

employee, appellant No. 2 was aged 34 years, 10 months and 12

days, his date of birth being 05.02.1986.

4. On 31.12.2020, the respondent–Western Coalfields Limited

issued the Standard Operating Procedure (for brevity “SOP”) /

Circular Reference No. 1416/2020-21, providing procedure for

on-boarding of the dependents of ex-employees under

compassionate grounds.

5. Appellant No. 1 (widow) approached the authorities on

03.01.2021 regarding the payment/dues and other service

benefits to be received after her husband’s death, on which date

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appellant No. 2 was aged 34 years, 10 months and 29 days.

Appellant No. 3 is the younger son of the deceased employee and

has furnished a No-Objection Certificate in favour of appellant No.

2. On 04.01.2021, respondent No. 4 issued a communication,

being Reference No. 1211/2020-21, directing appellant No. 2 to

undergo police verification for compassionate appointment.

6. Appellant No. 2 completed 35 years of age on 05.02.2021. The

police verification and document verification were completed on

11.02.2021 and 25.02.2021, respectively.

7. Thereafter, appellant No. 2 submitted the prescribed pro

forma application on 28.05.2021. The respondent-authorities

acknowledged the receipt of the submitted formal application on

14.06.2021 as the relevant date.

8. Ultimately on 03.02.2023, the respondent-authorities

rejected the claim of appellant No. 2 on the ground that appellant

No. 2 had crossed the age of 35 years prescribed under Clause

9.3.4 of the NCWA. The rejection order was communicated to

appellant No. 1 on 20.05.2023.

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9. Aggrieved thereby, appellant No. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 2364

of 2024 before the High Court.

10. Vide the impugned judgment dated 26.11.2025, the High

Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the rejection holding

that age had to be reckoned on the date on which the claim of

appellant No. 2 was considered, on which date appellant No. 2

had already crossed the age of 35 years prescribed under Clause

9.3.4 of the NCWA.

11. Aggrieved by the impugned final judgment and order of the

High Court, the appellants have filed the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

12. Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants, made the following submissions:

12.1. The impugned judgment proceeds on an erroneous premise

by determining the age eligibility of appellant No. 2 with reference

to the date of consideration of the claim, whereas Clause 9.3.4 of

the NCWA merely prescribes that the dependent should not be

more than 35 years of age and does not specify the relevant cut-

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off date. It was contended that, in the absence of any express

stipulation, the age has to be reckoned either from the date of

death of the employee or, at the latest, from the date of initiation

of the compassionate appointment process. On both these dates,

namely 17.12.2020 and 04.01.2021, appellant No. 2 was

admittedly within the prescribed age limit and, therefore, the

subsequent rejection on the ground that he had crossed the age

limit by the time the respondent-authorities considered the

application is legally unsustainable.

12.2. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the High

Court ignored the material contemporaneous document on

record, namely the communication dated 04.01.2021 issued by

respondent No. 4 directing appellant No. 2 to undergo police

verification. The issuance of such a communication establishes

that the process for compassionate appointment had already

commenced on 04.01.2021 and could not have preceded the

existence of a valid claim. The documents furnished on

14.06.2021 merely completed the procedural formalities and did

not constitute the initiation of the claim. By overlooking this

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contemporaneous evidence and accepting the contention of the

respondent-authorities that the application was first made only

on 14.06.2021, the High Court recorded a finding contrary to the

record.

12.3. It was further argued that the respondent-authorities

cannot be permitted to derive advantage from their own

administrative delay. Although the process commenced on

04.01.2021, the respondent-authorities took nearly 2 years to

reject the claim on 03.02.2023. The delay was compounded by the

unprecedented disruption caused by the second wave of the

COVID-19 pandemic during March to June 2021, when normal

administrative functioning stood severely affected. Appellant No.

2 could not be penalised for circumstances beyond his control and

any interpretation that makes eligibility dependent upon the pace

of administrative processing would be arbitrary and violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

12.4. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Malaya

Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2024) 15 SCC 766, to

contend that the authorities cannot be allowed to benefit from

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their own delay and that applications for compassionate

appointment ought to be decided expeditiously, preferably within

six months. It was submitted that the High Court’s finding that

there was “no delay” is factually incorrect, as the record

demonstrates that the respondent-authorities took more than 2

years to reject the claim of appellant No. 2.

12.5. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the issuance

of the police verification letter created a legitimate expectation that

the claim of appellant No. 2 had been accepted for processing and

that his eligibility stood recognised and acting on such

representation, appellant No. 2 completed all the required

formalities. Thereafter, The respondent-authorities cannot resile

from their own conduct and contend that the claim had not

commenced until 14.06.2021. In this regard, reliance was placed

upon Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed

Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71.

12.6. Reliance was also placed on the recent decision of this Court

in Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 INSC 184, wherein it

was observed that a dependent who otherwise satisfies the

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requirements of the compassionate appointment scheme should

not be denied consideration solely on the ground of age,

particularly where the delay is attributable to the employer.

12.7. Finally, it was contended that compassionate appointment

is a beneficial welfare measure intended to provide immediate

financial succour to the family of a deceased employee and must

receive a liberal and purposive construction. The High Court failed

to consider the constitutional challenge based on arbitrariness

under Article 14, ignored binding precedents and material

evidence and disposed of the writ petition without examining the

substantial questions of law involved. The impugned judgment,

therefore, warrants interference by this Court.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

13. Per contra, Mr. Ashwani Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing

for the respondent-authorities, submitted as under:

13.1. The present appeal is wholly devoid of merit and does not

warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India, as it merely seeks re-appreciation of findings of fact

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concurrently considered by the respondent-authorities and

affirmed by the High Court.

13.2. Learned counsel submitted that compassionate

appointment is not a vested or enforceable right but only a

concession governed entirely by the NCWA. The scheme

constitutes a complete code prescribing the eligibility conditions,

including the upper age limit of 35 years, which must be strictly

complied with and cannot be relaxed on equitable or sympathetic

considerations in the absence of any enabling provision.

13.3. It was further contended that the entire case of the

appellants rests upon an artificial concept of “initiation of the

compassionate appointment process”, which finds no place in the

governing scheme. According to the respondent-authorities, the

communication dated 04.01.2021 directing police verification was

merely a preliminary administrative step undertaken for

background verification and did not amount to initiation or

consideration of the claim. The claim became ripe for

consideration only upon submission of the prescribed application

together with all requisite documents, which was completed and

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acknowledged on 14.06.2021. It is only thereafter that the

competent authority could examine the eligibility of appellant No.

2 under the scheme.

13.4. Learned counsel submitted that appellant No. 2 had

admittedly crossed the prescribed upper age limit by the time the

application became complete and was taken up for consideration.

The respondent-authorities were, therefore, legally bound to reject

the claim, as they possessed no authority to relax or waive the

mandatory eligibility criteria prescribed under the NCWA. Any

direction to grant compassionate appointment contrary to the

scheme would amount to rewriting the policy and compelling the

employer to act contrary to its own regulations.

13.5. It was argued that the appellants have wrongly attributed

administrative delay to the respondent-authorities without

placing any material to establish deliberate or mala fide inaction.

The process necessarily involved scrutiny of dependency,

verification of documents and compliance with the policy

requirements. Even assuming there was some delay in processing,

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equitable considerations cannot override the express provisions of

the scheme, nor can delay confer eligibility where none exists.

13.6. Learned counsel further submitted that the plea founded on

Article 14 of the Constitution is misconceived, as the scheme has

been uniformly applied to all similarly situated candidates and no

case of discrimination or differential treatment has been

established. Likewise, the doctrine of legitimate expectation has

no application, since no representation or assurance was ever

given that appellant No. 2 would be considered on the basis of any

preliminary administrative step such as police verification.

13.7. It was also contended that acceptance of the interpretation

of the appellants would introduce uncertainty and administrative

chaos, as different applicants could rely upon different

preliminary stages to contend that their cases had been

“initiated”, thereby rendering the eligibility criteria unworkable

and defeating the uniform application of the scheme. The relevant

date, according to the respondent-authorities, is necessarily the

date on which the application is complete in all respects and is

taken up for consideration by the competent authority.

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13.8. Finally, learned counsel submitted that the High Court

correctly appreciated both the factual matrix and the governing

legal principles in holding that appellant No. 2 was overage on the

date of consideration of the application and that no arbitrariness

or illegality could be attributed to the decision of the respondent-

authorities. The impugned judgment, therefore, calls for no

interference under Article 136 of the Constitution and the present

appeal deserves to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

14. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and have

perused the material placed on record.

15. The issue that arises for consideration is whether, in the

absence of any express stipulation in Clause 9.3.4 of the NCWA,

the age eligibility for compassionate appointment is to be

determined with reference to the date of consideration of the

application, as held by the High Court and contended by the

respondent-authorities, or with reference to the date on which the

right to seek compassionate appointment accrued and the process

stood initiated, as urged by the appellants.

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16. At the outset, it is well settled that compassionate

appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, but at the

same time, it is a welfare measure intended to provide immediate

financial assistance to the family of a deceased employee.

Therefore, the scheme should be interpreted in a fair and

reasonable manner so that its object is achieved and not defeated.

17. In the present case, it is important to note that certain facts

are undisputed. Clause 9.3.4 of the NCWA provides that a

dependent seeking compassionate appointment should not be

more than 35 years of age. The deceased employee died on

17.12.2020. On that date, appellant No. 2 was below 35 years of

age. On 03.01.2021, appellant No. 1 (widow) approached the

authorities regarding the post-death service benefits and on

04.01.2021, the respondent-authorities themselves directed

appellant No. 2 to undergo police verification. Appellant No. 2

completed 35 years of age on 05.02.2021 and police verification

and document verification were completed on 11.02.2021 and

25.02.2021 respectively. Thereafter, appellant No. 2 submitted

the prescribed pro forma application on 28.05.2021 and the

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respondent-authorities acknowledged the receipt of the formal

application on 14.06.2021 as the relevant date. However, the

claim was rejected only on 03.02.2023 on the ground that

appellant No. 2 had crossed the age of 35 years.

18. At this stage, it is also pertinent to note that the police

verification and document verification of appellant No. 2 had

already been completed on 11.02.2021 and 25.02.2021,

respectively. However, immediately thereafter, the second wave of

the COVID-19 pandemic hit the country from March 2021 until

the end of June 2021, causing unprecedented disruption to

normal administrative functioning. It is not in dispute that

appellant No. 2 submitted the prescribed pro forma application on

28.05.2021, which was acknowledged by the respondent-

authorities on 14.06.2021. In these circumstances, any delay

during this period cannot fairly be attributed to appellant No. 2

and he cannot be made to suffer on account of circumstances

beyond his control.

19. We are unable to accept the submission of the respondent-

authorities that the communication dated 04.01.2021 was merely

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a routine administrative exercise and has no bearing on the

initiation of the compassionate appointment process. The SOP

issued by the respondent-authorities themselves provides that

antecedent and police verification shall be obtained before

processing a claim for compassionate employment. Therefore,

police verification is an important part of the process and cannot

take place unless a claim has already been initiated. Hence, if no

claim had been made, there was no reason for the respondent-

authorities to direct appellant No. 2 to undergo police verification.

Thus, their own conduct clearly shows that the process had

already begun on 04.01.2021.

20. We also find no merit in the contention of the respondent-

authorities that the claim became complete for consideration only

upon submission of the prescribed application form and

supporting documents. Admittedly, the formal application

submitted by appellant No. 2 was received by the respondent-

authorities on 14.06.2021 and according to the respondent-

authorities, appellant No. 2 was over the prescribed age limit on

that date. However, the interpretation advanced by the

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respondent-authorities cannot be accepted, because a dependent

who was fully eligible on the date of death and who submitted the

application within a reasonable period of 6 months cannot be

considered ineligible merely because the requisite procedural

formalities took time, as such an interpretation would defeat the

very purpose of the scheme.

21. At this stage, it is important to note the recent decision of this

Court in the case of Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa &

Ors. (supra), wherein this Court held that an otherwise eligible

applicant cannot be made to suffer on account of delay/inaction

attributable to the employer and further directed that applications

seeking compassionate appointment should be considered

expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the

date of submission of the completed application. The relevant

paragraphs read as under:

“12. Thus, from the aforesaid, it can be seen that there was no fault

and/or delay and/or negligence on the part of the appellant at all. He

was fulfilling all the conditions for appointment on compassionate

grounds under the 1990 Rules. For no reason, his application was

kept pending and/or no order was passed on one ground or the other.

Therefore, when there was no fault and/or delay on the part of the

appellant and all throughout there was a delay on the part of the

department/authorities, the appellant should not be made to suffer.

Not appointing the appellant under the 1990 Rules would be giving a

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premium to the delay and/or inaction on the part of the

department/authorities. There was an absolute callousness on the

part of the department/authorities. The facts are conspicuous and

manifest the grave delay in entertaining the application submitted by

the appellant in seeking employment which is indisputably

attributable to the department/authorities. In fact, the appellant has

been deprived of seeking compassionate appointment, which he was

otherwise entitled to under the 1990 Rules. The appellant has become

a victim of the delay and/or inaction on the part of the

department/authorities which may be deliberate or for reasons best

known to the authorities concerned. Therefore, in the peculiar facts

and circumstances of the case, keeping the larger question open and

aside, as observed hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the

appellant herein shall not be denied appointment under the 1990

Rules.

…

14. Before parting with the present order, we are constrained to

observe that considering the object and purpose of appointment on

compassionate grounds i.e. a family of a deceased employee may be

placed in a position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of

the employee while in service and the basis or policy is immediacy in

rendering of financial assistance to the family of the deceased

consequent upon his untimely death, the authorities must consider

and decide such applications for appointment on compassionate

grounds as per the policy prevalent, at the earliest, but not beyond a

period of six months from the date of submission of such completed

applications.

15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have found that in

several cases, applications for appointment on compassionate

grounds are not attended in time and are kept pending for years

together. As a result, the applicants in several cases have to approach

the High Courts concerned seeking a writ of mandamus for the

consideration of their applications. Even after such a direction is

issued, frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting the

applications. Once again, the applicants have to challenge the order

of rejection before the High Court which leads to pendency of litigation

and passage of time, leaving the family of the employee who died in

harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further, for reasons

best known to the authorities and on irrelevant considerations,

applications made for compassionate appointment are rejected. After

several years or are not considered at all as in the instant case.

16. If the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate

grounds as envisaged under the relevant policies or the rules have to

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be achieved then it is just and necessary that such applications are

considered well in time and not in a tardy way. We have come across

cases where for nearly two decades the controversy regarding the

application made for compassionate appointment is not resolved. This

consequently leads to the frustration of the very policy of granting

compassionate appointment on the death of the employee while in

service. We have, therefore, directed that such applications must be

considered at an earliest point of time. The consideration must be fair,

reasonable and based on relevant consideration. The application

cannot be rejected on the basis of frivolous and for reasons extraneous

to the facts of the case. Then and then only the object and purpose of

appointment on compassionate grounds can be achieved.”

22. Keeping in view the aforesaid decision rendered by this Court

and examining the facts of the present case, we are of the view

that appellant No. 2 cannot be denied compassionate

appointment merely because the respondent-authorities took an

unduly long time to process and decide his claim. As noted

hereinabove, the process for compassionate appointment had

already commenced on 04.01.2021 when appellant No. 2 was

admittedly within the prescribed age limit. Even if the date of

receipt of the formal application, i.e. 14.06.2021, is taken as the

relevant date, the respondent-authorities rejected the claim only

on 03.02.2023, which is after an inordinate delay of about 19

months. The respondent-authorities cannot be permitted to defeat

the claim of an otherwise eligible dependent by taking advantage

of their own delay in processing the application.

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23. We are also of the considered opinion that the High Court

committed an error in accepting the stand of the respondent-

authorities that the claim for compassionate appointment came

into existence only upon submission of the formal application on

14.06.2021 and it also failed to consider the communication dated

04.01.2021 issued by the respondent-authorities directing

appellant No. 2 to undergo police verification, which clearly

demonstrates that the compassionate appointment process had

already commenced when appellant No. 2 was still within the

prescribed age limit. The High Court further proceeded on the

premise that there was no delay on the part of the respondent-

authorities. However, even assuming that 14.06.2021 was the

relevant date, the claim was rejected only on 03.02.2023, about

19 months thereafter. Thus, the finding of the High Court that the

claim of appellant No. 2 was considered within a period of 4 to 5

months is contrary to the facts and material on record and,

therefore, cannot be sustained.

24. In these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that

the respondent-authorities were not justified in rejecting the claim

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of appellant No. 2 on the ground that he had crossed the age limit

by the time the application was considered. The High Court also

erred in affirming that decision. The impugned judgment,

therefore, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

CONCLUSION

25. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and the

judgment dated 26.11.2025 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in Writ Petition No. 2364

of 2024 is set aside.

26. The respondent-authorities are directed to reconsider the

claim of appellant No. 2 for compassionate appointment by

treating him as eligible in age and by examining only the

remaining conditions under the applicable scheme. Such exercise

shall be completed within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of a

copy of this judgment. If appellant No. 2 is otherwise found

eligible, appointment shall be offered within 4 weeks thereafter.

27. Before parting, we clarify that this judgment is rendered in

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.

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28. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of, along with

pending applications, if any.

………………………………J.

ARAVIND KUMAR

………………………………J.

VIPUL M. PANCHOLI

NEW DELHI

AUGUST 12, 2026