DINESH KUMAR VS. THE STATE OF HARYANA

2026 INSC 842Criminal Appeal No.64 of 2011 Page 1 of 18

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 64 OF 2011

DINESH KUMAR .... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA ... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ARAVIND KUMAR. J.

A. THE APPEAL

1. This Criminal Appeal arises from the common Judgment and

Order dated 18th September, 2009 of the High Court of Punjab

and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 62-DB of 2001,

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whereunder the High Court has dismissed the Appellant’s

appeal and affirmed the judgment of conviction dated 15th

September, 2000 and the order on sentence dated 18th

September, 2000 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,

Sonepat in Sessions Case No. 134 of 1998.

2. The Appellant, along with Manoj and Mukesh Kumar, was

convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read

with 34 and 392 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’). For the offence under Section

302/34 IPC, each accused was sentenced to imprisonment for

life and a fine of Rs.10,000/- with a default sentence of three

years' rigorous imprisonment. For the offence under Section

392/34 IPC, each was sentenced to seven years' rigorous

imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- with a default sentence of

two years' rigorous imprisonment. The substantive sentences

were directed to run concurrently.

3. During the pendency of the present appeal, the appellant placed

on record an order dated 12th October, 2012 of the Principal

Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat declaring that he

was a juvenile on the date of the offence and directing his

release, he having already undergone detention well beyond the

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maximum permissible period under the juvenile justice law. The

record of that inquiry has since been called for by this Court.

The appeal, therefore, requires determination both on the merits

of the conviction and on the legal consequences of the

appellant's juvenility.

B. PROSECUTION CASE

4. Hari Om, the deceased, worked as a driver of Ambassador car

No. DHE-3836 owned by Partap Singh (PW-18), and plied it as

a taxi from Bhiwani. On the morning of 10th August, 1998 Hari

Om and his brother Sumer Singh (PW-13) were at the taxi stand.

At about 9.00 to 9.30 a.m., the appellant Dinesh Kumar, Manoj

and Mukesh Kumar hired the taxi for Sonepat. PW-13 knew the

three accused from before and saw Hari Om leave with them.

Hari Om did not return. PW-13 made inquiries and, on 13th

August, 1998 went with the car owner to village Thana Kalan,

viz., the village of the accused. They were informed that the

three accused were not seen in the village for several days. On

13th August, 1998 Shibban, who cultivated a sugarcane field

near the Yamuna bandh in village Jaunpur, found a decomposed

male body in the field and informed the police. Inquest

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proceedings were conducted and the body was sent to PGIMS,

Rohtak because it was in an advanced stage of decomposition.

On 14th August, 1998 PW-13 and PW-18 reached the mortuary

and identified the body as that of Hari Om. The face and parts

of the body were mutilated, but the identification was made with

reference to the clothes and the remaining physical features

known to the witnesses. On the statement of PW-13, FIR No.

265 of 1998 was registered at Police Station Gannaur for

offences under Sections 302, 392 and 34 IPC. On 15th August,

1998 acting on secret information, a police party at Taraori

intercepted the three accused while they were allegedly

attempting to dispose of the Ambassador car. The accused were

apprehended with the car; its registration certificate and

insurance papers were seized. A country-made pistol was also

recovered from Mukesh in the separate case registered at Police

Station Butana.

5. During interrogation, separate disclosure statements were

recorded. The portions of those confessional statements were

not admissible. The prosecution, however, relied on the

discoveries said to have followed them. Manoj led the police to

a danda. The appellant and Mukesh led the police to a concealed

tiffin carrier bearing an identifying engraving and to Hari Om's

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driving licence in the sugarcane field. The prosecution examined

nineteen witnesses and tendered the forensic report and the

relevant seizure and disclosure memoranda.

6. Dr P.K. Paliwal (PW-9), who conducted the post-mortem

examination, found the body in a highly decomposed and partly

scavenged condition, with maggots present and several soft

tissues and structures missing. No bony injury was detected and

the precise cause of death could not be ascertained. His estimate

of the post-mortem interval ranged broadly from about five days

to two weeks, while also acknowledging the difficulty of

precision in the condition in which the body was received.

C. DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW

7. The Trial Court treated the case as one resting on circumstantial

evidence. It framed five principal issues: identification of the

body; the evidentiary value of the last-seen circumstance; the

effect of the medical evidence; the recoveries pursuant to

disclosure; and the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution

evidence.

8. The Trial Court accepted the identification by PW-13 and PW-

18, holding that facial identification was not the sole permissible

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mode where a close relative could identify the body from clothes

and remaining physical features. It further held that the last-seen

circumstance was materially reinforced by the recovery of the

deceased's taxi from the three accused shortly thereafter and by

their attempt to sell it. The Trial Court regarded the medical

opinion as approximate because the body had lain exposed in a

field, had been attacked by animals and insects, and was in an

advanced state of decomposition. It also accepted the recoveries

of the danda, tiffin carrier and driving licence, observing that the

articles were concealed within a large sugarcane field and were

discovered at places specifically indicated by the accused. As

such, the Trial Court concluded that the prosecution succeeded

to prove the case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

9. In Appeal, the High Court independently excluded the

inadmissible confessional portions of the disclosure statements

and relied only on the information distinctly connected with the

discoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It held

that the last-seen evidence of PW-13, the possession of the

deceased's taxi by the three accused within a few days, their

attempt to dispose of it, and the recovery of the deceased's

driving licence and tiffin carrier formed a complete chain. As

such, the appeals were accordingly dismissed.

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D. GROUNDS URGED IN THE APPEAL

10. We have heard Mrs. Prabhati Nayak, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the Appellant. The conviction is assailed principally

on the ground that the dead body was beyond recognition; the

medical officer could neither ascertain the cause of death nor

find a bony injury; the post-mortem interval was said to be

inconsistent with the prosecution timeline; PW-13 was a related

and solitary witness on the last-seen circumstance; the

recoveries were from an accessible field; and the prosecution

failed to prove motive or an unbroken chain of circumstances.

11. On the other hand, the State relies on the concurrent findings and

emphasizes that PW-13 knew the accused, the deceased left with

them in the taxi, all three were apprehended within five days in

possession of the same taxi while attempting to dispose of it, and

the appellant participated in the discovery of the deceased's

driving licence and tiffin carrier. It is also material that the

connected appeal of co-accused Manoj, arising out of the same

common judgments and the same evidentiary record, was

disposed of by this Court on 6th August, 2025 without

interference with the conviction.

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12. The subsequent declaration of juvenility does not, by itself, erase

a finding of guilt recorded on evidence. It principally affects the

forum and nature of the permissible disposition and renders the

adult sentence legally ineffective.

E. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION

13. Having perused the material on record, we are of the considered

view that the following questions arise: (i) whether the

concurrent conviction under Sections 302/34 and 392/34 IPC

calls for interference; (ii) whether the appellant was a juvenile

on the date of the offence; and (iii) if so, what order should

follow concerning the sentence and consequential

disqualifications.

F. CONVICTION ON MERITS

14. A conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence can be

sustained only when each circumstance relied upon is firmly

proved; the proved circumstances form a complete chain; and

the chain is consistent only with the guilt of the accused and

inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The five

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principles stated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra1, continue to govern the inquiry.

15. The circumstance of last seen cannot ordinarily, by itself, sustain

a conviction for murder. In the present case, however, it does not

stand alone. PW-13 was not a chance witness unfamiliar with

the accused. He was the deceased's brother, was present at the

taxi stand, knew the three accused and saw deceased Hari Om

depart with them in the taxi on the morning of 10th August, 1998.

The accused were thereafter found absent from their village and

Hari Om was never seen alive again.

16. The most significant corroborative circumstance is the recovery

of the very taxi from the joint possession of the three accused at

Taraori on 15th August, 1998 accompanied by its registration

and insurance papers, when they were said to be attempting to

dispose of it. This was not an innocuous or remote recovery. It

occurred within five days of the hiring and shortly after the body

was discovered. No explanation was offered by the accused in

their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to how

the taxi came into their possession.

1 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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17. The absence of an explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot

fill a gap in the prosecution case or relieve the prosecution of its

primary burden. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872

“106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.

–– When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any

person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

Illustrations

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other

than that which the character and circumstances of the act

suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a

ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”

Once the foundational facts of last seen and recent, unexplained

possession of the taxi belonging to deceased were independently

proved, and the failure to furnish any plausible account became

an additional link and not a substitute for proof.

18. The discoveries of the driving licence and the tiffin carrier of the

deceased at the instance of the appellant and Mukesh provide

further corroboration. The admissible circumstance is not the

narrative of the crime contained in the police statement, but the

fact that information supplied by persons in custody led to the

discovery of articles connected specifically with Hari Om at the

indicated place. The fact that the field was not owned by the

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accused does not make the discovery valueless where the articles

were concealed in a large standing crop and the precise location

was demonstrably within their special knowledge. At the same

time, we treat this circumstance as corroborative rather than as

the sole foundation of guilt.

19. The challenge to the identification of the body must be evaluated

in the context of the complete record. The decomposition

prevented facial recognition, but PW-13 and PW-18 identified

the clothes and such remaining features as were available. More

importantly, the identity was objectively reinforced by the

disappearance of Hari Om with the taxi, the recovery of that taxi

from the accused, and the subsequent discovery of his driving

licence. The dead body retrieved cannot be treated as wholly

unconnected merely because decomposition had made ordinary

visual identification difficult.

20. The medical evidence deserves careful treatment. The post-

mortem doctor – PW 9 could not ascertain the precise cause of

death and found no bone injury. That unquestionably limits the

medical corroboration available to the prosecution. Yet it is not

affirmative evidence that Hari Om died naturally, accidentally,

or before he left Bhiwani. The body had lain exposed, partly

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scavenged and in an advanced state of decomposition; relevant

soft tissues and neck structures were missing. An estimate of the

post-mortem interval in such circumstances is necessarily

approximate. The marginal variation between the prosecution

date and the broad medical estimate is insufficient to override

the proved surrounding circumstances.

21. Pertinently, motive is not an indispensable element where the

circumstantial chain is complete. In any event, the immediate

appropriation and attempted sale of the taxi supplies a

discernible pecuniary motive. The minor variations concerning

the description of the vehicle used by the police, the exact

position of the body, or the names conveyed second-hand to

PW-18 do not affect the core circumstances proved by direct

evidence.

22. We have also borne in mind that the appellant's case arises from

the same occurrence, common trial and common High Court

judgment as the appeal of Manoj. By order dated 6th August,

2025 this Court examined the connected record and found no

ground to interfere with Manoj's conviction, modifying the

consequence only because he had been found to be a juvenile.

Consistency of judicial treatment is not a substitute for

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independent scrutiny, but the appellant has shown no

distinguishing feature in the common evidentiary chain that

would justify a contrary merits conclusion.

23. The circumstances, taken cumulatively, therefore establish:

(a) Hari Om's departure with the appellant and the two co-

accused in the taxi;

(b) his disappearance and the recovery of his body along the

route within days;

(c) the accused's recent and unexplained possession of the taxi

belonging to deceased and its papers while attempting to dispose

of it; and

(d) the discovery of the deceased's personal articles at the

instance of the appellant and Mukesh.

The chain excludes a reasonable hypothesis consistent with

innocence. As such, we find no ground to disturb the conviction

under Sections 302/34 and 392/34 IPC.

G. DETERMINATION OF JUVENILITY

24. Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Act, 2000 permits a claim of juvenility to be raised

before any court at any stage, even after final disposal. Where

the person is found to have been a juvenile on the date of the

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offence, the court is required to forward the matter for an

appropriate order under the Act and the sentence imposed by the

regular criminal court is deemed to have no effect.

25. Section 20 specifically addresses proceedings pending before a

regular court. It authorises the court to record or maintain a

finding that the juvenile committed the offence, but prohibits an

adult sentence and requires the matter to be dealt with under the

juvenile justice framework. The Explanation, introduced by the

2006 amendment, makes the benefit applicable to pending trials,

appeals, revisions and other criminal proceedings even where

the person has crossed the age of eighteen. The saving provision

in Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Act, 2015 preserves the application of the earlier law

to proceedings already pending.

26. The statutory position is settled by Hari Ram v. State of

Rajasthan2; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)3; and Jitendra

Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P.4, whereby this Court

recognized that a person below eighteen on the date of an

offence committed even before 1st April, 2001 receives the

2 (2009) 13 SCC 211

3 (2010) 5 SCC 344

4 (2013) 11 SCC 193

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benefit of the 2000 Act; This Court further held that a conviction

on merits need not be annulled merely because the person was

tried by a regular court; and however the adult sentence cannot

survive.

27. The Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat

conducted an inquiry and, by order dated 12th October, 2012

accepted the appellant’s date of birth as 3rd February, 1981. The

Board calculated his age as seventeen years, six months and

eleven days by reference to 14th August, 1998, the date on which

the FIR was registered. The occurrence, however, is consistently

alleged to have taken place on 10th August, 1998. On that date,

the appellant was seventeen years, six months and seven days

old. The four-day difference in calculation is immaterial: since

on either date he had not completed eighteen years.

28. The record further shows that the Juvenile Justice Board directed

the appellant's immediate release after noting that he had already

undergone custody for more than three years. The maximum

period for which a juvenile could be sent to a special home under

Section 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act was three years. The order of

juvenility has not been displaced, and this Court's order dated 9th

October, 2025 records that the proceedings culminated in a

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declaration that Dinesh Kumar was a juvenile on the date of the

offence i.e., 10.08.1998.

29. We accordingly accept the declaration of juvenility. The

sentence of life imprisonment and the sentence of seven years'

rigorous imprisonment, together with the fine and default

stipulations imposed by the Trial Court, cannot operate against

the appellant. Ordinarily, the matter would be forwarded to the

Board for the appropriate disposition. That exercise has already

been completed: the Board has passed an order, found that the

appellant had undergone more than the statutory maximum and

directed his release. A fresh remand would be empty formality

and contrary to the rehabilitative object of the enactment.

30. The connected case furnishes direct parity. In Manoj v. State of

Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 768 of 2011, decided on 6th

August, 2025 this Court maintained the conviction arising from

the same trial but held that the juvenile appellant, having already

undergone more than the permissible maximum, need not

surrender and discharged his bail bonds. The same consequence

must follow here. Section 19 of the 2000 Act further provides

that a juvenile dealt with under the Act shall not suffer any

disqualification attached to a conviction under another law. The

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appellant shall therefore receive the statutory protection against

such disqualification, and the competent Board/authority shall

take the consequential steps regarding the records in accordance

with Section 19 and the applicable rules.

31. As such, Interlocutory Application No. 27571 of 2024 is allowed

and the Order dated 12th October, 2012 of the Juvenile Justice

Board, Sonepat, together with the connected inquiry record, is

taken on record. The finding that the appellant Dinesh Kumar

was a juvenile on the date of the offence, 10th August, 1998 is

accepted.

32. The conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable

under Sections 302 read with 34 and 392 read with 34 IPC is

affirmed. The sentences imposed by the Additional Sessions

Judge, Sonepat on 18 September 2000 and affirmed by the High

Court on 18 September 2009, including the substantive

imprisonment, fine and default stipulations, are set aside and

shall be treated as having no effect against the appellant in view

of Section 7A(2) read with Sections 15 and 20 of the Juvenile

Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. As the

appellant has already undergone detention exceeding the

maximum period permissible under the 2000 Act and has been

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released pursuant to the order of the Juvenile Justice Board/

interim orders of this Court, he shall not be required to surrender.

His bail bonds, if subsisting, shall stand discharged.

33. The Appellant shall not suffer any disqualification attached to

the conviction, in terms of Section 19 of the 2000 Act. The

Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat shall ensure compliance with

the consequential statutory requirements concerning the records.

In the above terms, the Appeal is partly allowed.

34. Pending applications, if any, stands consigned to record.

...........................................................J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR]

............................................................J.

[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12th , 2026.