SHRUTI MANAV SHARMA VS. SUNANINA SINGH

2026 INSC 8431

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2026

(@ SLP (C) NOS. 12592–12597 OF 2026)

SHRUTI MANAV SHARMA & ANR. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

SUNANINA SINGH & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals present a question regarding the nature

of interlocutory jurisdiction and limits of appellate

interference with exercise of judicial discretion in

granting temporary injunctions. The controversy

requires this Court to examine whether the Division

Bench of the High Court while exercising jurisdiction

under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (the ‘Code’), was justified in

substituting its own view for that of the learned Single

Judge notwithstanding the settled principles governing

appellate review of discretionary orders.

I. THE APPEALS

3. These appeals arise from the final judgment and order

dated 20.03.2026 passed by a Division Bench of the

High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO (OS) No.96 of

2022, FAO(OS) NO.97 OF 2022, FAO(OS) No. 98 of 2022,

FAO(OS) NO.99 OF 2022, FAO(OS) NO.33 OF 2024 and

FAO(OS) NO.49 OF 2024, whereby the Division Bench,

in exercise of its jurisdiction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r)

of the Code, set aside the order dated 29.07.2022 passed

by the learned Single Judge granting an interim

injunction in favour of Mrs. Sita Chaudhary (the ‘original

plaintiff’), and allowed the appeals preferred by the

defendants. These appeals, by the original plaintiff’s

legal representatives and other family members

aggrieved by the reversal, seek restoration of the

injunction granted by the learned Single Judge.

II. THE FACTS

4. Shri Devinder Singh Chaudhary (the ‘testator’) had, over

his lifetime, established various companies,

partnerships and trusts, in which the capital or

shareholding held principally by the testator and his

wife, the original plaintiff, with a minuscule

shareholding held by third parties. These entities were

asset-holding entities. The testator died on 05.12.2009.

According to the original plaintiff, the testator had

executed a Will on 26.03.2004 governing the succession

of his shares in the family assets. According to one of his

sons, Mr. Deepinder Singh, the testator had instead

executed a subsequent Will dated 04.10.2008; whereas

according to another son, Mr. Virender Singh, the

testator died intestate.

5. After the testator’s death, his granddaughter, Ms.

Sunanina Singh (defendant No.4), and her family moved

to Chandigarh and began residing with the original

plaintiff. Between 19.12.2018 and 06.06.2019, the

original plaintiff executed a series of gift deeds and

Limited Liability Partnership (“LLP”) transfer

agreements, transferring capital and shareholding in the

family entities, effecting sales of property, and advancing

interest-free loans, particulars of which are set out

below:

Date Corporate

Entity

Transferor Transferee Shares/Capital

19.12.2018 Amba

Promoters &

Developers

Pvt. Ltd.

(Defendant

No.16)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

6000 shares

19.12.2018 P.E.

Manning

(Consultants)

Pvt. Ltd.

(Defendant

No.15)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

18,012 shares

14.03.2019 Ruchi

Towers LLP

(Defendant

No.14)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

62% LLP

Capital

14.03.2019 Rama

Packing &

Wires

Industries

LLP

(Defendant

No.17)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

47% LLP

Capital

24.04.2019 Ruchi

Towers LLP

(Defendant

No.14)

Rajpura

Steel

Tubes Pvt.

Ltd.

Ajay

Kadyan

38% LLP

Capital

06.06.2019 Industrial

Cables

(India) Ltd.

(Defendant

No.13)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

21,21,240

6. In addition, during the period of her residence with the

original plaintiff, the defendant no.4 caused a farmhouse

at ‘The Green’, Village Rajokri, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New

Delhi, to be sold through the original plaintiff for a sum

of Rs.4.72 crores, and obtained a further sum of Rs.50

crores by way of loans and advances. With the funds so

obtained, the defendant No.4 and Mr. Ajay Kadyan

(defendant No.9) purchased flats at DLF Magnolias and

Magnum Towers, Gurgaon, a factory at Laksar,

Uttarakhand, and sports and luxury cars.

7. Mr. Virender Singh, one of the sons of the original

plaintiff and the testator, filed CS (OS) No.382 of 2020

on 20.11.2020, challenging the transfers made by the

original plaintiff. The original plaintiff filed a written

statement opposing prayers in the suit. She

subsequently moved out of Chandigarh and began

residing with her other granddaughter, Mrs. Shruti

Manav Sharma who is the sister of defendant No.4.

8. On 21.10.2021, the original plaintiff instituted the suit,

namely, CS (OS) No.589 of 2021, pleading that she was

an elderly widow in poor health; and that defendant

Nos.1 to 12 were members of her family while defendant

Nos. 13 to 17 and 19 held the testator’s estate; and that

defendant Nos. 4 to 9, taking advantage of her old age,

had procured the execution of the gift deeds and were

disposing of properties held in the names of various

companies. The plaint averred that defendant Nos. 4 and

9 had systematically procured transfer of her

shareholding and LLP interests in their own names by

illegal and fraudulent means, particulars of which were

set out in paragraph 16 of the plaint. She sought, among

other reliefs, (i) declaration that the transfers in favour

of defendant Nos.4 and 9 were null and void; (ii)

permanent and mandatory injunction restraining

defendant Nos. 4 and 9 from exercising any right or

authority founded on those transfers, including in

respect of defendant Nos.13 (Industrial Cables (India)

Ltd.), 15 (P.E. Manning Consultants Pvt. Ltd.) and 16

(Amba Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd.), and in

respect of the transferred interests in defendant No.14

(Ruchi Towers LLP) and defendant No.17 (Rama

Packaging and Wire Industries LLP); (iii) a mandatory

injunction directing restoration of the shareholding and

LLP interests to their position as on the date of the

testator’s death; and (iv) an injunction restraining

alienation of the subject properties. Along with the

plaint, she filed I.A. No.14829 of 2021 under Order

XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, seeking an interim

injunction.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LEARNED SINGLE

JUDGE

9. By an ad interim order dated 12.11.2021, the learned

Single Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo

with regard to the alienation of the properties and

directed issuance of notice to the defendants. The

defendant Nos.4, 13 and 16 applied under Order XXXIX

Rule 4 of the Code for vacation of that ex parte order.

10. By order dated 29.07.2022, the learned Single Judge

disposed of both, the original plaintiff’s application for

injunction and the defendants’ applications for vacation,

holding, inter alia, as follows:

(i) Under the Will dated 26.03.2004, the original

plaintiff did not acquire an absolute right to the

testator’s estate but only a limited beneficial

interest, which had not matured into an absolute

interest under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession

Act, 1956 (the ‘1956 Act’).

(ii) A doubt existed, at that stage, as to whether the

Will dated 26.03.2004 was the testator’s last will,

given that a subsequent Will dated 04.10.2008 had

been propounded and probate proceedings in

respect of it were pending.

(iii) The original plaintiff could not, in law, have

transferred the shareholding and interest in the

testator’s estate in favour of defendant Nos.4 and

(iv) The transfer of that interest and shareholding to

defendant Nos.4 and 9 was procured by undue

influence exercised by them upon the original

plaintiff.

(v) The defendant companies and LLPs were, in

substance, the alter egos of defendant Nos. 4 and

9 and partook of the nature of quasi-partnerships.

(vi) The defendant Nos. 4 and 9 had drawn loans and

advances from the companies, LLPs and other

family-owned entities, and applied those funds to

acquire properties and assets in their own names.

(vii) Various properties of the testator and of the

defendant companies and LLPs had been disposed

of, or were being disposed of by defendant Nos.4

and 9 after they acquired control of those entities.

11. On these findings, the learned Single Judge held that a

prima facie case for granting an injunction was made

out, and that the balance of convenience required that

the properties standing in the names of the defendant

companies and LLPs be preserved and their disposal be

restrained pending final adjudication of the suit. The

operative directions were as follows:

(i) No third-party interest, including by way of sale,

transfer or encumbrance, shall be created in

respect of the properties owned by defendant

Nos.13 to 17.

(ii) Defendant Nos. 4 and 9 are restrained from

transferring, selling, alienating or creating third-

party interest in: the property/office at Building

No.7, Basant Lok, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi; the flat

at Magnolias, Gurgaon; the accommodation on the

first and second floors of Tower B, Magnum

Towers, Golf Course Extension Road, Sector 58,

Gurgaon; and the factory land and building at

Village Khanpur, Purkazi, Laksar Road, District

Uttarakhand – 247663.

(iii) The foregoing directions shall not preclude

defendant No.13 from selling or transferring plots

developed in Madhuban Colony, Rajpura, Punjab.

IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIVISION BENCH

12. Aggrieved, defendant Nos. 4, 9, 13 along with M/s. JMD

Super Infratech Pvt. Ltd. preferred appeals under Order

XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code. During the pendency of those

appeals, the original plaintiff died on 09.01.2025. Six of

her seven grandchildren, together with three of her

children, were substituted as her legal representatives

pursuant to a family arrangement dated 12.02.2025.

13. By the impugned judgment dated 20.03.2026, the

Division Bench noted the limited scope of its jurisdiction

under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code – that, the grant

or refusal of an injunction being discretionary, an

appellate court does not undertake a fresh

reconsideration of the entire matter, nor substitute its

own view merely because it might have arrived at a

different conclusion on the same material, and that

interference is warranted only where the discretion has

been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala

fide, upon an irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or

contrary to settled legal principles; the guiding test being

whether a reasonable person could have reached the

same conclusion on the material before the trial court.

Applying that standard, the Division Bench nonetheless

proceeded to hold as follows:

(i) Clause 2 of paragraph III of the Will dated

26.03.2004, on a plain reading, expressly

authorised the original plaintiff to administer the

testator’s estate during her lifetime without

embargo.

(ii) Clause 3 of paragraph III of the said Will

contemplated division of the residual estate only

upon the original plaintiff’s demise, with one-third

of the residual estate to vest, after her death, in the

family of defendant No.2, including defendant No.4.

(iii) The original plaintiff was herself a shareholder in

the concerned companies and had, during her

lifetime, gifted shares to her granddaughter and the

granddaughter’s husband.

(iv) In CS(OS) No.382 of 2020, filed by her son Mr.

Virender Singh (defendant No.1), the original

plaintiff had admitted execution of the gift deeds

and transfer of her shares in favour of defendant

No.4 and her husband, and had never questioned

the correctness of those transfers.

(v) The delay in questioning the transactions, the

absence of any contemporaneous criminal

complaint, and the original plaintiff’s continued

participation in the corporate and legal affairs of

the entities during the relevant period were all

relevant to the existence of a prima facie case.

(vi) The injunction granted by the learned Single Judge

extended even to properties asserted by defendant

Nos.4 and 9 to be self-acquired, without a clear

prima facie nexus being shown between the

acquisition of those properties and the proceeds of

the impugned transfers.

(vii) The grant of injunction would stall the development

of ongoing projects, affecting not only defendant

Nos.4 and 9 but also third-party purchasers of

apartments and plots.

(viii) The preservation of the subject-matter of a dispute

cannot be treated as a substitute for the

foundational requirement of a prima facie case.

(ix) Section 89(8) of the Companies Act, 2013 expressly

provides that no right in relation to any share in

respect of which a declaration is required but has

not been made shall be enforceable by the

beneficial owner or any person claiming through

him, and that statutory embargo cannot be diluted

by treating non-compliance as a mere procedural

lapse.

(x) The questions of title, beneficial interest and

control were deeply contested and incapable of

summary determination at the interlocutory stage,

and, in the absence of a clear prima facie

entitlement, the learned Single Judge could not

have brushed aside the respondents’ reliance on

Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013 in the

manner that he did.

(xi) The interpretation of Section 14 of the 1956 Act

being pending before a Larger Bench of this Court,

any definitive or prima facie conclusion on its

applicability would be premature.

(xii) The injunction granted by the learned Single Judge

travelled beyond preservation and risked

conferring an unwarranted advantage upon the

plaintiff’s side, warranting interference in appeal.

14. On this reasoning, the Division Bench concluded that

the learned Single Judge had misapplied the settled

principles governing the grant of injunction, and the

order impugned before it could not be sustained. The

Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeals.

V. SUBMISSIONS

15. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for the

appellants, submits that the Division Bench erroneously

set aside a well-reasoned order of the learned Single

Judge, in contravention of the law laid down by this

Court1. It is submitted that the Division Bench ought to

have appreciated that a single granddaughter, defendant

no.4, has, by exercising undue influence over the

original plaintiff, usurped the entire family stake to the

exclusion of every other family member; that the finding

that Clause 2 of paragraph III of the Will dated

26.03.2004 conferred an absolute interest upon the

original plaintiff rests on a misreading of that clause;

that, as a consequence of the impugned transfers,

defendant No.4 has come to control properties worth

approximately Rs.1,035 crores, as against assets of only

about Rs.40 crores held by the rest of the family,

defendant Nos.4 and 9 together having appropriated

some 96.3% of the estate, leaving the remaining family

members with less than 4%; and that the mere pendency

of a reference to a Larger Bench does not erase the

precedential value of existing decisions. It is accordingly

urged that the impugned judgment be set aside.

1 Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp. SCC 727

16. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel for the

respondents, submits that the original plaintiff herself

approved every transaction now sought to be branded as

fraudulent; that the threshold for appellate interference

laid down in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) was duly met,

since the findings of the learned Single Judge were

themselves perverse; and that the impugned judgment

does not call for interference in these appeals.

VI. THE JURISDICTION: STATUTORY FORM,

EQUITABLE SUBSTANCE

17. The jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction though

statutory in form but equitable in substance. Section 36

of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 declares that preventive

relief is granted at the discretion of the court; Section

37(1) defines a temporary injunction and subjects it to

the Code. Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of the Code is directed,

in terms, at property “in danger of being wasted,

damaged or alienated”; Section 94(c) empowers the court

to grant such an injunction “to prevent the ends of

justice from being defeated.” Where a case falls outside

the letter of Order XXXIX, the court’s inherent power

under Section 151 supplements, though it does not

supplant, these express provisions2.

18. The remedy is, in its origin, the characteristic remedy of

the Court of Chancery, and its incidents, namely (i) it

operates in personam, (ii) it is discretionary, and (iii) it is

withheld where the common law remedy in damages is

adequate, are traceable to that origin. The width of a

discretion so conceived was addressed early. Sir George

Jessel M.R. took the view3 that the court’s power to grant

an injunction was, in principle, unlimited wherever it

would be right or just to do so; that width was promptly

qualified by the Court of Appeal:

“I have no doubt that the words ‘just or

convenient’ do not mean that the Court

can grant an injunction because it thinks

it convenient, but mean that the Court

should grant an injunction for the

protection of rights or the prevention of

injury according to legal principles.” –

North London Railway Co. v. Great

Northern Railway Co., (1883) 11 QBD

30, per Cotton L.J.

2 Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527

3 Beddow v. Beddow, (1878) 9 Ch D 89

19. The discretion is therefore, a judicial one, exercised

according to settled principles and not according to an

individual sense of convenience. It presupposes a right

in the applicant which the court is protecting. In the

instant case, the original plaintiff claimed beneficial and

testamentary interest in the family estate, now asserted

on her behalf by her legal representatives. Indian law

applies the equitable maxims to the same end. This

Court4 held that the grant of an interlocutory injunction

is a discretion to be exercised in a judicial manner and

in accordance with the settled principles of equity, so

that the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction is

itself examined by the court. On the pleadings and the

findings of the learned Single Judge, it is the conduct of

defendant Nos.4 and 9 in procuring the impugned

transfers – by undue influence practiced upon an elderly

widow residing in their household – that is squarely in

issue; that is a matter for trial, but at the interlocutory

stage it weighs in favour of preserving, rather than

4 Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 545

permitting further dealing with, the properties and

shareholding in question.

VII. THE OBJECT OF THE ORDER: PRESERVATION OF

THE SUBJECT – MATTER FOR TRIAL

20. The single most important proposition governing these

appeals is that an interlocutory injunction decides

nothing; it is a holding operation, so that the trial, when

it comes, is not a barren exercise. Lord Diplock’s

classical formulation5, has been adopted verbatim in

India:

“The object of the interlocutory injunction

is to protect the plaintiff against injury

by violation of his right for which he

could not be adequately compensated in

damages recoverable in the action if the

uncertainty were resolved in his favour

at the trial.”

21. The corresponding English refinement is the principle of

minimisation of irremediable error. As Hoffman J. put

it6, “the fundamental principle is that the court should

take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of

injustice if it should turn out to have been ‘wrong’.” The

same learned Judge, sitting in Privy Council7, restated

5 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396

6 Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd., [1987] 1 WLR 670

7 National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd. v. Olint Corpn. Ltd., [2009] 1 WLR 1405

the enquiry as being whether, if the injunction is refused

and the claimant succeeds, he can be adequately

compensated, and whether, if it is granted and the

defendant succeeds, the defendant can be adequately

compensated, the court adopting whichever course is

likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice.

22. The Indian formulation, adopting the American

Cyanamid language, is found in Wander Ltd. & Anr.

(supra), where this Court held that the interlocutory

remedy is intended “to preserve in status quo the rights

of the parties which may appear on a prima face case.”

This preservative purpose is echoed in the structure of

the statute itself: Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) speaks of

property “in danger of being wasted, damaged or

alienated,” and Section 94 of the Code speaks of

preventing “the ends of justice from being defeated.” This

Court8 explained that an interim order is intended to

protect the subject-matter of the proceedings until

disposal of the case, so that the ultimate relief, if the

party succeeds, is not rendered meaningless.

8 Zenit Mataplast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 388

23. Applying those touchstones here: the shareholding, LLP

interests and immovable properties in question

constitute the entire subject-matter of the suit. If

defendant Nos.4 and 9 are left free, pending trial, to

further alienate, encumber or otherwise deal with the

family companies, the LLPs or the properties acquired

with their proceeds, the decree in the plaintiff’s favour

whether resting on the Will dated 26.03.2004, or on a

finding of undue influence avoiding the impugned

transfers, or otherwise would be rendered an empty

formality. This is precisely the paradigm which Order

XXXIX Rule 1(a) is drafted to meet: it is directed not at

the merits of the claim but at the risk. That risk is

squarely present on the facts before us, and it is the loss

of control over the family entities, or the creation of

third-party rights in the properties acquired through

them, that no eventual decree could undo.

VIII. PRIMA FACIE CASE: A SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE

TRIED

24. The threshold for a prima facie case is a modest one. It

does not require proof of title; it requires only that the

claim not be frivolous or vexatious – a serious question

to be tried. A prima facie case does not mean a case

proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be

established if the evidence which is led in support of the

same were believed. While determining whether a prima

facie case had been made out, the relevant consideration

is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive

at the conclusion in question and as to whether that was

the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that

evidence9.

25. The classic modern statement is Dalpat Kumar v.

Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719:

“The existence of the prima facie right

and infraction of the enjoyment of his

property or the right is a condition for the

grant of temporary injunction. Prima

facie case is not to be confused with

prima facie title which has to be

established, on evidence at the trial.

Only prima facie case is a substantial

question raised, bona fide which needs

investigation and a decision on merits.”

26. This Court elucidated the meaning of expression ‘prima

facie case’ in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra)

to mean that the Court should be satisfied that there is

9 Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79

a serious question to be tried at the hearing, and there

is a probability that of plaintiff obtaining the relief at the

conclusion of the trial on the basis of the material placed

before the Court. The expression ‘prima facie case’

means a substantial question raised bona fide which

needs investigation and decision on merits and the

Court, at the initial stage, cannot insist upon a full proof

case warranting an eventual decree10.

27. Tested against that standard, the learned Single Judge’s

conclusion that a prima facie case was made out cannot

be faulted. The nature of the original plaintiff’s interest

under the Will dated 26.03.2004, and whether it

matured into an absolute interest under Section 14 of

the 1956 Act, is itself a substantial question; so too is

the effect of the subsequently propounded Will dated

04.10.2008, in respect of which probate proceedings

remain pending. The plea that defendant Nos.4 and 9,

while residing with an elderly widow dependent upon

them, procured transfer of virtually the entire family

10 Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad & Ors.; (2001) 5 SCC 568,

Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors.; (2024) 11 SCC 351

and State of Kerala v. Union of India; (2024) 7 SCC 183

shareholding and estate in their own favour, is not a

frivolous or vexatious plea, it self-evidently requires

proof at trial and cannot be shut out at the threshold.

The Division Bench’s insistence on a “clear prima facie

nexus,” on a detailed reading of specific clauses of the

Will, on the effect of the original plaintiff’s conduct in a

separate suit, and on the applicability of Section 89 of

the Companies Act, 2013, required precisely the kind of

close, merits-based enquiry that the authorities

considered above hold to be impermissible at the

interlocutory stage. We wish only to record, and to

emphasise, that the finding of a prima facie case is

confined to the existence of a serious dispute for trial; it

is not, and is not intended to be, a finding upon the true

construction of the Will dated 26.03.2004, upon the

validity of the Will dated 04.10.2008, upon the

applicability of Section 14 of the 1956 Act or Section 89

of the Companies Act, 2013, or upon the truth of the

plea of undue influence, all of which remain squarely for

decision at trial.

IX. BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE

28. The Court, while dealing with the prayer for injunction

has also to advert itself to the second essential

ingredient for grant of injunction viz. ‘balance of

convenience’. In order to determine whether the balance

of convenience lies, the Court must weigh two matters.

The first is to protect the plaintiff against injury by

violation of his rights for which he could not be

adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the

action if the uncertainty were to be resolved in his

favour. The second matter is that the defendant’s need

to be protected against injury resulting from his having

been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for

which he could not be adequately compensated by an

undertaking if the uncertainty were to be resolved in

defendant’s favour at the trial11.

29. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated with approval

by this Court in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) and it has

been held that need to protect the plaintiff against the

11 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol-24, para 856, American

Cynamid Co. and Ethicon Ltd.; (1975) 1 All ER 504 and Fellowes and Son v.

Fisher; (1975) 2 All ER 829

injury by violation of his right for which he cannot be

compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the

uncertainty were to be resolved in his favour has to be

weighed against the corresponding need of the

defendant to be protected against injury resulting from

his having been prevented from exercising his legal

rights for which he would not be adequately

compensated. The Court, therefore, must weigh one

need against another and determine where the ‘balance

of convenience’ lies.

30. Here, the balance is not equally poised. What is

restrained is not any business or enterprise conducted

by defendant Nos.4 and 9 in their own right, but further

alienation of shareholding, LLP interests and immovable

properties whose very provenance is under a cloud.

Defendant Nos.4 and 9 lose nothing of substance by

being restrained from alienating assets to which their

title is itself under challenge; they remain free to possess

and enjoy those assets pending trial, and the learned

Single Judge’s order expressly carved out an exception

permitting defendant No.13 to continue selling

developed plots in Madhuban Colony, which meets, at

least in part, the concern that in injunction of this kind

may otherwise stall ongoing development and affect

third-party purchasers. The appellants, on the other

hand, stand to lose, irrecoverably, the very subject-

matter of the suit, comprising control of family

companies representing the substantial part of the

testator’s estate, should that control or the properties

acquired through it pass into the hands of strangers to

the suit during its pendency.

X. IRREPARABLE INJURY

31. The Court, while dealing with the prayer for grant of

injunction is required to consider the third essential

ingredient viz. irreparable injury. This Court in Gujarat

Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) has held that the Court

is required to satisfy itself that the party seeking

injunction needs protection from the consequences of

apprehended injury and the injury is such which cannot

be adequately compensated by way of damages. Thus,

the Court is required to satisfy itself that in case an

injunction as prayed for is not granted, the party seeking

the same will suffer irreparable injury.

32. A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a

matter of right. The grant of interlocutory injunction is a

remedy which is discretionary in nature. However, such

a discretion has to be exercised on the touchstone of

trinity test viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience

and irreparable injury12. It is equally well settled legal

proposition that the temporary injunction being an

equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be

exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is free from

blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands13.

33. This is precisely the injury that is irreparable in the

sense in which equity uses that word. Loss of controlling

shareholding in family companies, or the creation of

third-party rights in properties acquired with the

proceeds of disputed transfers, that a subsequent decree

cannot unwind, is the paradigm of such injury; it is not

mere financial loss capable of computation and recovery

12 Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 161

13 Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors.,

(2006) 5 SCC 282

from a solvent party, of the kind that courts, following

Evans Marshall & Co. Ltd. v. Bertola SA14, have held

to be adequately met by an award of damages. No decree

for money could restore to the appellants the specific

shareholding and properties in question, once alienated

to third parties during the pendency of the suit.

34. The plea that certain properties held by defendant Nos.4

and 9 are self-acquired does not, on the pleadings, alter

this conclusion. It is the appellants’ case – accepted, on

a prima facie view, by the learned Single Judge that these

properties were purchased with the proceeds of loans

and advances drawn from the family companies and

LLPs and with the sale proceeds of properties transferred

by the original plaintiff, without any independent source

of income being pleaded by defendant Nos.4 and 9 for

their acquisition. Properties so acquired are, for the

purposes of interim protection, properties traceable to

and standing in the place of the very shareholding and

proceeds whose transfer is impugned in the suit, and

must, for the present, be preserved along with them.

14 [1973] 1 WLR 349

Whether they are in truth self-acquired, and whether the

plea of traceability is ultimately made out, are matters

for trial and not for this Court, or indeed for the Division

Bench, to resolve at the interlocutory stage.

35. All three conditions, a prima facie case in the form of a

serious and substantial dispute requiring investigation,

a balance of convenience in favour of preservation, and

an injury that, if the shareholding and properties are

permitted to be alienated, would be irreparable in the

relevant sense, thus coexist, and were correctly found by

the learned Single Judge to coexist.

XI. THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE INTERFERENCE

36. An order on an application for temporary injunction is a

discretionary one, and an appellate court does not

ordinarily substitute its own discretion for that of the

court of first instance, save where the discretion has

been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or

in ignorance of the settled principles governing the grant

or refusal of such relief. The principle laid down in

Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) which has been approved

by subsequent decisions of this Court15, has been

guiding the appellate courts in the country for decades

while exercising the appellate jurisdiction considering

the correctness of the discretion and jurisdiction for

grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The order

of the learned Single Judge, resting as it does on seven

specific findings addressing the nature of the original

plaintiff’s interest under the Will, the doubt surrounding

its finality, the plea of undue influence, and the alter-ego

character of the defendant entities, cannot be said to be

arbitrary, capricious or perverse, nor to have been

passed in ignorance of settled principle. It is, on the

contrary, an order squarely anchored in the three

conditions that govern the grant of interim injunction.

The Division Bench’s substitution of its own

appreciation of the Will, of the parties’ conduct, and of

the applicability of statutory provisions bearing on the

final merits, for the exercise of discretion by the learned

Single Judge, was not warranted on the standard it had

15 Shyam Sel and Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC

634 and Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra)

itself correctly recited, and constitutes precisely the kind

of interference that Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) forbids.

XII. THE VICE OF THE MINI-TRIAL

37. Before parting with these appeals, we consider it

necessary to record our disquiet at a recurring feature of

orders passed under Order XXXIX of the Code, and of

appellate orders reviewing them, that reach this Court.

Such orders are, with increasing frequency, running into

pages of close analysis of the rival documents, weighing

the probable outcome of issues of title, undue influence

or fraud, and expressing views, in substance, on which

party is likely to succeed at trial. Orders become lengthy

for a single reason: the court passing them has, whether

consciously or not, entered upon the final merits of the

controversy and conducted what is, in substance, a

mini-trial upon affidavits and documents that properly

await the leading of evidence.

38. This is not what Order XXXIX requires, nor what the law

permits - whether of the court of first instance or of an

appellate court reviewing it. Lord Diplock’s caution16,

that the interlocutory stage is not the occasion to resolve

conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to decide difficult

questions of law calling for mature consideration, has

been consistently accepted in India. This Court17,

emphasised the court’s reluctance to decide difficult

questions of law or fact at the interlocutory stage. The

scope of examination on an application under Order

XXXIX – and, equally, of an appeal against an order

made on such an application – is confined to the limited

and threshold question whether the plaintiff has shown

a serious dispute meriting investigation at trial; it does

not extend to an examination of the final effect, probative

value or ultimate merits of the documents annexed to

the pleadings, which is the trial court's task, to be

undertaken after evidence and not before.

39. Measured against this standard, the judgments of the

learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench bear

the marks of a mini-trial. Having correctly stated the

limited standard of appellate interference laid down in

16 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396

17 Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1

Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) that interference is

warranted only where the discretion below has been

exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or

contrary to settled principles of law regulating the grant

or refusal of temporary injunctions. The Division Bench

proceeded, over twelve detailed findings, to construe

individual clauses of the Will dated 26.03.2004, to weigh

the effect of delay and of admissions said to have been

made in a separate suit, to apply Section 89 of the

Companies Act, 2013 to the facts, and to assess whether

a “clear prima facie nexus” had been demonstrated

between specific acquisitions and specific proceeds.

Each of these is a matter of substance properly reserved

for trial; none of them is a matter upon which an

appellate court, confined to asking whether the Single

Judge’s discretion was perversely or arbitrarily

exercised, may substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence.

40. We accordingly do not approve the practice of writing

lengthy, merits-laden orders, whether at the

interlocutory stage or in appeal from it, on applications

for temporary injunction, and emphasise that courts

confine such orders to recording, with reasons, their

findings on the three settled conditions of prima facie

case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury,

without embarking upon an examination of the final

merits or the probable outcome of the issues that

properly arise for trial.

XIII. CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE ORDER

41. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are allowed.

The judgment and order dated 20.03.2026 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

in FAO (OS) No.96 of 2022, FAO(OS) NO.97 OF 2022,

FAO(OS) No. 98 of 2022, FAO(OS) NO.99 OF 2022,

FAO(OS) NO.33 OF 2024 and FAO(OS) NO.49 OF 2024

is set aside, and the order dated 29.07.2022 of the

learned Single Judge is restored. We hold and direct as

follows:

(a) The interim injunction granted by the learned Single

Judge by order dated 29.07.2022, in the terms set

out in paragraph 9 above, shall stand restored and

shall continue in operation until further orders of the

learned Single Judge in the suit.

(b) This order proceeds upon a prima facie appraisal of a

serious dispute requiring investigation at trial. It

shall not be read as any expression of opinion on the

true construction of the Will dated 26.03.2004, the

validity of the Will dated 04.10.2008, the plea of

intestacy, the applicability of Section 14 of the 1956

Act or of Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013, the

plea of undue influence or fraud, or the plea of self-

acquisition – all of which shall be decided by the trial

court on evidence, uninfluenced by any observation

in this judgment.

of these questions, recorded in the impugned

judgment, shall similarly stand effaced and shall not

bind or influence the trial court.

(d) The appellants shall continue to be bound by, and

shall renew if required, the undertaking as to

damages furnished before the learned Single Judge.

(e) The learned Single Judge shall take up and dispose

of CS(OS) No.589 of 2021 as expeditiously as

possible, preferably within a period of eight months.

42. The appeals are accordingly allowed in the above terms.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. There

shall be no order as to costs.

……………..……………………………….J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

………………………………………………J.

[ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12, 2026.

2026 INSC 8431

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2026

(@ SLP (C) NOS. 12592–12597 OF 2026)

SHRUTI MANAV SHARMA & ANR. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

SUNANINA SINGH & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals present a question regarding the nature

of interlocutory jurisdiction and limits of appellate

interference with exercise of judicial discretion in

granting temporary injunctions. The controversy

requires this Court to examine whether the Division

Bench of the High Court while exercising jurisdiction

under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (the ‘Code’), was justified in

substituting its own view for that of the learned Single

Judge notwithstanding the settled principles governing

appellate review of discretionary orders.

I. THE APPEALS

3. These appeals arise from the final judgment and order

dated 20.03.2026 passed by a Division Bench of the

High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO (OS) No.96 of

2022, FAO(OS) NO.97 OF 2022, FAO(OS) No. 98 of 2022,

FAO(OS) NO.99 OF 2022, FAO(OS) NO.33 OF 2024 and

FAO(OS) NO.49 OF 2024, whereby the Division Bench,

in exercise of its jurisdiction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r)

of the Code, set aside the order dated 29.07.2022 passed

by the learned Single Judge granting an interim

injunction in favour of Mrs. Sita Chaudhary (the ‘original

plaintiff’), and allowed the appeals preferred by the

defendants. These appeals, by the original plaintiff’s

legal representatives and other family members

aggrieved by the reversal, seek restoration of the

injunction granted by the learned Single Judge.

II. THE FACTS

4. Shri Devinder Singh Chaudhary (the ‘testator’) had, over

his lifetime, established various companies,

partnerships and trusts, in which the capital or

shareholding held principally by the testator and his

wife, the original plaintiff, with a minuscule

shareholding held by third parties. These entities were

asset-holding entities. The testator died on 05.12.2009.

According to the original plaintiff, the testator had

executed a Will on 26.03.2004 governing the succession

of his shares in the family assets. According to one of his

sons, Mr. Deepinder Singh, the testator had instead

executed a subsequent Will dated 04.10.2008; whereas

according to another son, Mr. Virender Singh, the

testator died intestate.

5. After the testator’s death, his granddaughter, Ms.

Sunanina Singh (defendant No.4), and her family moved

to Chandigarh and began residing with the original

plaintiff. Between 19.12.2018 and 06.06.2019, the

original plaintiff executed a series of gift deeds and

Limited Liability Partnership (“LLP”) transfer

agreements, transferring capital and shareholding in the

family entities, effecting sales of property, and advancing

interest-free loans, particulars of which are set out

below:

Date Corporate

Entity

Transferor Transferee Shares/Capital

19.12.2018 Amba

Promoters &

Developers

Pvt. Ltd.

(Defendant

No.16)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

6000 shares

19.12.2018 P.E.

Manning

(Consultants)

Pvt. Ltd.

(Defendant

No.15)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

18,012 shares

14.03.2019 Ruchi

Towers LLP

(Defendant

No.14)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

62% LLP

Capital

14.03.2019 Rama

Packing &

Wires

Industries

LLP

(Defendant

No.17)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

47% LLP

Capital

24.04.2019 Ruchi

Towers LLP

(Defendant

No.14)

Rajpura

Steel

Tubes Pvt.

Ltd.

Ajay

Kadyan

38% LLP

Capital

06.06.2019 Industrial

Cables

(India) Ltd.

(Defendant

No.13)

Sita

Chaudhry

Sunaina

Singh

21,21,240

6. In addition, during the period of her residence with the

original plaintiff, the defendant no.4 caused a farmhouse

at ‘The Green’, Village Rajokri, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New

Delhi, to be sold through the original plaintiff for a sum

of Rs.4.72 crores, and obtained a further sum of Rs.50

crores by way of loans and advances. With the funds so

obtained, the defendant No.4 and Mr. Ajay Kadyan

(defendant No.9) purchased flats at DLF Magnolias and

Magnum Towers, Gurgaon, a factory at Laksar,

Uttarakhand, and sports and luxury cars.

7. Mr. Virender Singh, one of the sons of the original

plaintiff and the testator, filed CS (OS) No.382 of 2020

on 20.11.2020, challenging the transfers made by the

original plaintiff. The original plaintiff filed a written

statement opposing prayers in the suit. She

subsequently moved out of Chandigarh and began

residing with her other granddaughter, Mrs. Shruti

Manav Sharma who is the sister of defendant No.4.

8. On 21.10.2021, the original plaintiff instituted the suit,

namely, CS (OS) No.589 of 2021, pleading that she was

an elderly widow in poor health; and that defendant

Nos.1 to 12 were members of her family while defendant

Nos. 13 to 17 and 19 held the testator’s estate; and that

defendant Nos. 4 to 9, taking advantage of her old age,

had procured the execution of the gift deeds and were

disposing of properties held in the names of various

companies. The plaint averred that defendant Nos. 4 and

9 had systematically procured transfer of her

shareholding and LLP interests in their own names by

illegal and fraudulent means, particulars of which were

set out in paragraph 16 of the plaint. She sought, among

other reliefs, (i) declaration that the transfers in favour

of defendant Nos.4 and 9 were null and void; (ii)

permanent and mandatory injunction restraining

defendant Nos. 4 and 9 from exercising any right or

authority founded on those transfers, including in

respect of defendant Nos.13 (Industrial Cables (India)

Ltd.), 15 (P.E. Manning Consultants Pvt. Ltd.) and 16

(Amba Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd.), and in

respect of the transferred interests in defendant No.14

(Ruchi Towers LLP) and defendant No.17 (Rama

Packaging and Wire Industries LLP); (iii) a mandatory

injunction directing restoration of the shareholding and

LLP interests to their position as on the date of the

testator’s death; and (iv) an injunction restraining

alienation of the subject properties. Along with the

plaint, she filed I.A. No.14829 of 2021 under Order

XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, seeking an interim

injunction.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LEARNED SINGLE

JUDGE

9. By an ad interim order dated 12.11.2021, the learned

Single Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo

with regard to the alienation of the properties and

directed issuance of notice to the defendants. The

defendant Nos.4, 13 and 16 applied under Order XXXIX

Rule 4 of the Code for vacation of that ex parte order.

10. By order dated 29.07.2022, the learned Single Judge

disposed of both, the original plaintiff’s application for

injunction and the defendants’ applications for vacation,

holding, inter alia, as follows:

(i) Under the Will dated 26.03.2004, the original

plaintiff did not acquire an absolute right to the

testator’s estate but only a limited beneficial

interest, which had not matured into an absolute

interest under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession

Act, 1956 (the ‘1956 Act’).

(ii) A doubt existed, at that stage, as to whether the

Will dated 26.03.2004 was the testator’s last will,

given that a subsequent Will dated 04.10.2008 had

been propounded and probate proceedings in

respect of it were pending.

(iii) The original plaintiff could not, in law, have

transferred the shareholding and interest in the

testator’s estate in favour of defendant Nos.4 and

(iv) The transfer of that interest and shareholding to

defendant Nos.4 and 9 was procured by undue

influence exercised by them upon the original

plaintiff.

(v) The defendant companies and LLPs were, in

substance, the alter egos of defendant Nos. 4 and

9 and partook of the nature of quasi-partnerships.

(vi) The defendant Nos. 4 and 9 had drawn loans and

advances from the companies, LLPs and other

family-owned entities, and applied those funds to

acquire properties and assets in their own names.

(vii) Various properties of the testator and of the

defendant companies and LLPs had been disposed

of, or were being disposed of by defendant Nos.4

and 9 after they acquired control of those entities.

11. On these findings, the learned Single Judge held that a

prima facie case for granting an injunction was made

out, and that the balance of convenience required that

the properties standing in the names of the defendant

companies and LLPs be preserved and their disposal be

restrained pending final adjudication of the suit. The

operative directions were as follows:

(i) No third-party interest, including by way of sale,

transfer or encumbrance, shall be created in

respect of the properties owned by defendant

Nos.13 to 17.

(ii) Defendant Nos. 4 and 9 are restrained from

transferring, selling, alienating or creating third-

party interest in: the property/office at Building

No.7, Basant Lok, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi; the flat

at Magnolias, Gurgaon; the accommodation on the

first and second floors of Tower B, Magnum

Towers, Golf Course Extension Road, Sector 58,

Gurgaon; and the factory land and building at

Village Khanpur, Purkazi, Laksar Road, District

Uttarakhand – 247663.

(iii) The foregoing directions shall not preclude

defendant No.13 from selling or transferring plots

developed in Madhuban Colony, Rajpura, Punjab.

IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIVISION BENCH

12. Aggrieved, defendant Nos. 4, 9, 13 along with M/s. JMD

Super Infratech Pvt. Ltd. preferred appeals under Order

XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code. During the pendency of those

appeals, the original plaintiff died on 09.01.2025. Six of

her seven grandchildren, together with three of her

children, were substituted as her legal representatives

pursuant to a family arrangement dated 12.02.2025.

13. By the impugned judgment dated 20.03.2026, the

Division Bench noted the limited scope of its jurisdiction

under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code – that, the grant

or refusal of an injunction being discretionary, an

appellate court does not undertake a fresh

reconsideration of the entire matter, nor substitute its

own view merely because it might have arrived at a

different conclusion on the same material, and that

interference is warranted only where the discretion has

been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala

fide, upon an irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or

contrary to settled legal principles; the guiding test being

whether a reasonable person could have reached the

same conclusion on the material before the trial court.

Applying that standard, the Division Bench nonetheless

proceeded to hold as follows:

(i) Clause 2 of paragraph III of the Will dated

26.03.2004, on a plain reading, expressly

authorised the original plaintiff to administer the

testator’s estate during her lifetime without

embargo.

(ii) Clause 3 of paragraph III of the said Will

contemplated division of the residual estate only

upon the original plaintiff’s demise, with one-third

of the residual estate to vest, after her death, in the

family of defendant No.2, including defendant No.4.

(iii) The original plaintiff was herself a shareholder in

the concerned companies and had, during her

lifetime, gifted shares to her granddaughter and the

granddaughter’s husband.

(iv) In CS(OS) No.382 of 2020, filed by her son Mr.

Virender Singh (defendant No.1), the original

plaintiff had admitted execution of the gift deeds

and transfer of her shares in favour of defendant

No.4 and her husband, and had never questioned

the correctness of those transfers.

(v) The delay in questioning the transactions, the

absence of any contemporaneous criminal

complaint, and the original plaintiff’s continued

participation in the corporate and legal affairs of

the entities during the relevant period were all

relevant to the existence of a prima facie case.

(vi) The injunction granted by the learned Single Judge

extended even to properties asserted by defendant

Nos.4 and 9 to be self-acquired, without a clear

prima facie nexus being shown between the

acquisition of those properties and the proceeds of

the impugned transfers.

(vii) The grant of injunction would stall the development

of ongoing projects, affecting not only defendant

Nos.4 and 9 but also third-party purchasers of

apartments and plots.

(viii) The preservation of the subject-matter of a dispute

cannot be treated as a substitute for the

foundational requirement of a prima facie case.

(ix) Section 89(8) of the Companies Act, 2013 expressly

provides that no right in relation to any share in

respect of which a declaration is required but has

not been made shall be enforceable by the

beneficial owner or any person claiming through

him, and that statutory embargo cannot be diluted

by treating non-compliance as a mere procedural

lapse.

(x) The questions of title, beneficial interest and

control were deeply contested and incapable of

summary determination at the interlocutory stage,

and, in the absence of a clear prima facie

entitlement, the learned Single Judge could not

have brushed aside the respondents’ reliance on

Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013 in the

manner that he did.

(xi) The interpretation of Section 14 of the 1956 Act

being pending before a Larger Bench of this Court,

any definitive or prima facie conclusion on its

applicability would be premature.

(xii) The injunction granted by the learned Single Judge

travelled beyond preservation and risked

conferring an unwarranted advantage upon the

plaintiff’s side, warranting interference in appeal.

14. On this reasoning, the Division Bench concluded that

the learned Single Judge had misapplied the settled

principles governing the grant of injunction, and the

order impugned before it could not be sustained. The

Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeals.

V. SUBMISSIONS

15. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for the

appellants, submits that the Division Bench erroneously

set aside a well-reasoned order of the learned Single

Judge, in contravention of the law laid down by this

Court1. It is submitted that the Division Bench ought to

have appreciated that a single granddaughter, defendant

no.4, has, by exercising undue influence over the

original plaintiff, usurped the entire family stake to the

exclusion of every other family member; that the finding

that Clause 2 of paragraph III of the Will dated

26.03.2004 conferred an absolute interest upon the

original plaintiff rests on a misreading of that clause;

that, as a consequence of the impugned transfers,

defendant No.4 has come to control properties worth

approximately Rs.1,035 crores, as against assets of only

about Rs.40 crores held by the rest of the family,

defendant Nos.4 and 9 together having appropriated

some 96.3% of the estate, leaving the remaining family

members with less than 4%; and that the mere pendency

of a reference to a Larger Bench does not erase the

precedential value of existing decisions. It is accordingly

urged that the impugned judgment be set aside.

1 Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp. SCC 727

16. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel for the

respondents, submits that the original plaintiff herself

approved every transaction now sought to be branded as

fraudulent; that the threshold for appellate interference

laid down in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) was duly met,

since the findings of the learned Single Judge were

themselves perverse; and that the impugned judgment

does not call for interference in these appeals.

VI. THE JURISDICTION: STATUTORY FORM,

EQUITABLE SUBSTANCE

17. The jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction though

statutory in form but equitable in substance. Section 36

of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 declares that preventive

relief is granted at the discretion of the court; Section

37(1) defines a temporary injunction and subjects it to

the Code. Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of the Code is directed,

in terms, at property “in danger of being wasted,

damaged or alienated”; Section 94(c) empowers the court

to grant such an injunction “to prevent the ends of

justice from being defeated.” Where a case falls outside

the letter of Order XXXIX, the court’s inherent power

under Section 151 supplements, though it does not

supplant, these express provisions2.

18. The remedy is, in its origin, the characteristic remedy of

the Court of Chancery, and its incidents, namely (i) it

operates in personam, (ii) it is discretionary, and (iii) it is

withheld where the common law remedy in damages is

adequate, are traceable to that origin. The width of a

discretion so conceived was addressed early. Sir George

Jessel M.R. took the view3 that the court’s power to grant

an injunction was, in principle, unlimited wherever it

would be right or just to do so; that width was promptly

qualified by the Court of Appeal:

“I have no doubt that the words ‘just or

convenient’ do not mean that the Court

can grant an injunction because it thinks

it convenient, but mean that the Court

should grant an injunction for the

protection of rights or the prevention of

injury according to legal principles.” –

North London Railway Co. v. Great

Northern Railway Co., (1883) 11 QBD

30, per Cotton L.J.

2 Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527

3 Beddow v. Beddow, (1878) 9 Ch D 89

19. The discretion is therefore, a judicial one, exercised

according to settled principles and not according to an

individual sense of convenience. It presupposes a right

in the applicant which the court is protecting. In the

instant case, the original plaintiff claimed beneficial and

testamentary interest in the family estate, now asserted

on her behalf by her legal representatives. Indian law

applies the equitable maxims to the same end. This

Court4 held that the grant of an interlocutory injunction

is a discretion to be exercised in a judicial manner and

in accordance with the settled principles of equity, so

that the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction is

itself examined by the court. On the pleadings and the

findings of the learned Single Judge, it is the conduct of

defendant Nos.4 and 9 in procuring the impugned

transfers – by undue influence practiced upon an elderly

widow residing in their household – that is squarely in

issue; that is a matter for trial, but at the interlocutory

stage it weighs in favour of preserving, rather than

4 Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 545

permitting further dealing with, the properties and

shareholding in question.

VII. THE OBJECT OF THE ORDER: PRESERVATION OF

THE SUBJECT – MATTER FOR TRIAL

20. The single most important proposition governing these

appeals is that an interlocutory injunction decides

nothing; it is a holding operation, so that the trial, when

it comes, is not a barren exercise. Lord Diplock’s

classical formulation5, has been adopted verbatim in

India:

“The object of the interlocutory injunction

is to protect the plaintiff against injury

by violation of his right for which he

could not be adequately compensated in

damages recoverable in the action if the

uncertainty were resolved in his favour

at the trial.”

21. The corresponding English refinement is the principle of

minimisation of irremediable error. As Hoffman J. put

it6, “the fundamental principle is that the court should

take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of

injustice if it should turn out to have been ‘wrong’.” The

same learned Judge, sitting in Privy Council7, restated

5 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396

6 Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd., [1987] 1 WLR 670

7 National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd. v. Olint Corpn. Ltd., [2009] 1 WLR 1405

the enquiry as being whether, if the injunction is refused

and the claimant succeeds, he can be adequately

compensated, and whether, if it is granted and the

defendant succeeds, the defendant can be adequately

compensated, the court adopting whichever course is

likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice.

22. The Indian formulation, adopting the American

Cyanamid language, is found in Wander Ltd. & Anr.

(supra), where this Court held that the interlocutory

remedy is intended “to preserve in status quo the rights

of the parties which may appear on a prima face case.”

This preservative purpose is echoed in the structure of

the statute itself: Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) speaks of

property “in danger of being wasted, damaged or

alienated,” and Section 94 of the Code speaks of

preventing “the ends of justice from being defeated.” This

Court8 explained that an interim order is intended to

protect the subject-matter of the proceedings until

disposal of the case, so that the ultimate relief, if the

party succeeds, is not rendered meaningless.

8 Zenit Mataplast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 388

23. Applying those touchstones here: the shareholding, LLP

interests and immovable properties in question

constitute the entire subject-matter of the suit. If

defendant Nos.4 and 9 are left free, pending trial, to

further alienate, encumber or otherwise deal with the

family companies, the LLPs or the properties acquired

with their proceeds, the decree in the plaintiff’s favour

whether resting on the Will dated 26.03.2004, or on a

finding of undue influence avoiding the impugned

transfers, or otherwise would be rendered an empty

formality. This is precisely the paradigm which Order

XXXIX Rule 1(a) is drafted to meet: it is directed not at

the merits of the claim but at the risk. That risk is

squarely present on the facts before us, and it is the loss

of control over the family entities, or the creation of

third-party rights in the properties acquired through

them, that no eventual decree could undo.

VIII. PRIMA FACIE CASE: A SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE

TRIED

24. The threshold for a prima facie case is a modest one. It

does not require proof of title; it requires only that the

claim not be frivolous or vexatious – a serious question

to be tried. A prima facie case does not mean a case

proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be

established if the evidence which is led in support of the

same were believed. While determining whether a prima

facie case had been made out, the relevant consideration

is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive

at the conclusion in question and as to whether that was

the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that

evidence9.

25. The classic modern statement is Dalpat Kumar v.

Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719:

“The existence of the prima facie right

and infraction of the enjoyment of his

property or the right is a condition for the

grant of temporary injunction. Prima

facie case is not to be confused with

prima facie title which has to be

established, on evidence at the trial.

Only prima facie case is a substantial

question raised, bona fide which needs

investigation and a decision on merits.”

26. This Court elucidated the meaning of expression ‘prima

facie case’ in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra)

to mean that the Court should be satisfied that there is

9 Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79

a serious question to be tried at the hearing, and there

is a probability that of plaintiff obtaining the relief at the

conclusion of the trial on the basis of the material placed

before the Court. The expression ‘prima facie case’

means a substantial question raised bona fide which

needs investigation and decision on merits and the

Court, at the initial stage, cannot insist upon a full proof

case warranting an eventual decree10.

27. Tested against that standard, the learned Single Judge’s

conclusion that a prima facie case was made out cannot

be faulted. The nature of the original plaintiff’s interest

under the Will dated 26.03.2004, and whether it

matured into an absolute interest under Section 14 of

the 1956 Act, is itself a substantial question; so too is

the effect of the subsequently propounded Will dated

04.10.2008, in respect of which probate proceedings

remain pending. The plea that defendant Nos.4 and 9,

while residing with an elderly widow dependent upon

them, procured transfer of virtually the entire family

10 Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad & Ors.; (2001) 5 SCC 568,

Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors.; (2024) 11 SCC 351

and State of Kerala v. Union of India; (2024) 7 SCC 183

shareholding and estate in their own favour, is not a

frivolous or vexatious plea, it self-evidently requires

proof at trial and cannot be shut out at the threshold.

The Division Bench’s insistence on a “clear prima facie

nexus,” on a detailed reading of specific clauses of the

Will, on the effect of the original plaintiff’s conduct in a

separate suit, and on the applicability of Section 89 of

the Companies Act, 2013, required precisely the kind of

close, merits-based enquiry that the authorities

considered above hold to be impermissible at the

interlocutory stage. We wish only to record, and to

emphasise, that the finding of a prima facie case is

confined to the existence of a serious dispute for trial; it

is not, and is not intended to be, a finding upon the true

construction of the Will dated 26.03.2004, upon the

validity of the Will dated 04.10.2008, upon the

applicability of Section 14 of the 1956 Act or Section 89

of the Companies Act, 2013, or upon the truth of the

plea of undue influence, all of which remain squarely for

decision at trial.

IX. BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE

28. The Court, while dealing with the prayer for injunction

has also to advert itself to the second essential

ingredient for grant of injunction viz. ‘balance of

convenience’. In order to determine whether the balance

of convenience lies, the Court must weigh two matters.

The first is to protect the plaintiff against injury by

violation of his rights for which he could not be

adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the

action if the uncertainty were to be resolved in his

favour. The second matter is that the defendant’s need

to be protected against injury resulting from his having

been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for

which he could not be adequately compensated by an

undertaking if the uncertainty were to be resolved in

defendant’s favour at the trial11.

29. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated with approval

by this Court in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) and it has

been held that need to protect the plaintiff against the

11 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol-24, para 856, American

Cynamid Co. and Ethicon Ltd.; (1975) 1 All ER 504 and Fellowes and Son v.

Fisher; (1975) 2 All ER 829

injury by violation of his right for which he cannot be

compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the

uncertainty were to be resolved in his favour has to be

weighed against the corresponding need of the

defendant to be protected against injury resulting from

his having been prevented from exercising his legal

rights for which he would not be adequately

compensated. The Court, therefore, must weigh one

need against another and determine where the ‘balance

of convenience’ lies.

30. Here, the balance is not equally poised. What is

restrained is not any business or enterprise conducted

by defendant Nos.4 and 9 in their own right, but further

alienation of shareholding, LLP interests and immovable

properties whose very provenance is under a cloud.

Defendant Nos.4 and 9 lose nothing of substance by

being restrained from alienating assets to which their

title is itself under challenge; they remain free to possess

and enjoy those assets pending trial, and the learned

Single Judge’s order expressly carved out an exception

permitting defendant No.13 to continue selling

developed plots in Madhuban Colony, which meets, at

least in part, the concern that in injunction of this kind

may otherwise stall ongoing development and affect

third-party purchasers. The appellants, on the other

hand, stand to lose, irrecoverably, the very subject-

matter of the suit, comprising control of family

companies representing the substantial part of the

testator’s estate, should that control or the properties

acquired through it pass into the hands of strangers to

the suit during its pendency.

X. IRREPARABLE INJURY

31. The Court, while dealing with the prayer for grant of

injunction is required to consider the third essential

ingredient viz. irreparable injury. This Court in Gujarat

Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) has held that the Court

is required to satisfy itself that the party seeking

injunction needs protection from the consequences of

apprehended injury and the injury is such which cannot

be adequately compensated by way of damages. Thus,

the Court is required to satisfy itself that in case an

injunction as prayed for is not granted, the party seeking

the same will suffer irreparable injury.

32. A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a

matter of right. The grant of interlocutory injunction is a

remedy which is discretionary in nature. However, such

a discretion has to be exercised on the touchstone of

trinity test viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience

and irreparable injury12. It is equally well settled legal

proposition that the temporary injunction being an

equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be

exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is free from

blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands13.

33. This is precisely the injury that is irreparable in the

sense in which equity uses that word. Loss of controlling

shareholding in family companies, or the creation of

third-party rights in properties acquired with the

proceeds of disputed transfers, that a subsequent decree

cannot unwind, is the paradigm of such injury; it is not

mere financial loss capable of computation and recovery

12 Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 161

13 Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors.,

(2006) 5 SCC 282

from a solvent party, of the kind that courts, following

Evans Marshall & Co. Ltd. v. Bertola SA14, have held

to be adequately met by an award of damages. No decree

for money could restore to the appellants the specific

shareholding and properties in question, once alienated

to third parties during the pendency of the suit.

34. The plea that certain properties held by defendant Nos.4

and 9 are self-acquired does not, on the pleadings, alter

this conclusion. It is the appellants’ case – accepted, on

a prima facie view, by the learned Single Judge that these

properties were purchased with the proceeds of loans

and advances drawn from the family companies and

LLPs and with the sale proceeds of properties transferred

by the original plaintiff, without any independent source

of income being pleaded by defendant Nos.4 and 9 for

their acquisition. Properties so acquired are, for the

purposes of interim protection, properties traceable to

and standing in the place of the very shareholding and

proceeds whose transfer is impugned in the suit, and

must, for the present, be preserved along with them.

14 [1973] 1 WLR 349

Whether they are in truth self-acquired, and whether the

plea of traceability is ultimately made out, are matters

for trial and not for this Court, or indeed for the Division

Bench, to resolve at the interlocutory stage.

35. All three conditions, a prima facie case in the form of a

serious and substantial dispute requiring investigation,

a balance of convenience in favour of preservation, and

an injury that, if the shareholding and properties are

permitted to be alienated, would be irreparable in the

relevant sense, thus coexist, and were correctly found by

the learned Single Judge to coexist.

XI. THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE INTERFERENCE

36. An order on an application for temporary injunction is a

discretionary one, and an appellate court does not

ordinarily substitute its own discretion for that of the

court of first instance, save where the discretion has

been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or

in ignorance of the settled principles governing the grant

or refusal of such relief. The principle laid down in

Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) which has been approved

by subsequent decisions of this Court15, has been

guiding the appellate courts in the country for decades

while exercising the appellate jurisdiction considering

the correctness of the discretion and jurisdiction for

grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The order

of the learned Single Judge, resting as it does on seven

specific findings addressing the nature of the original

plaintiff’s interest under the Will, the doubt surrounding

its finality, the plea of undue influence, and the alter-ego

character of the defendant entities, cannot be said to be

arbitrary, capricious or perverse, nor to have been

passed in ignorance of settled principle. It is, on the

contrary, an order squarely anchored in the three

conditions that govern the grant of interim injunction.

The Division Bench’s substitution of its own

appreciation of the Will, of the parties’ conduct, and of

the applicability of statutory provisions bearing on the

final merits, for the exercise of discretion by the learned

Single Judge, was not warranted on the standard it had

15 Shyam Sel and Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC

634 and Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra)

itself correctly recited, and constitutes precisely the kind

of interference that Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) forbids.

XII. THE VICE OF THE MINI-TRIAL

37. Before parting with these appeals, we consider it

necessary to record our disquiet at a recurring feature of

orders passed under Order XXXIX of the Code, and of

appellate orders reviewing them, that reach this Court.

Such orders are, with increasing frequency, running into

pages of close analysis of the rival documents, weighing

the probable outcome of issues of title, undue influence

or fraud, and expressing views, in substance, on which

party is likely to succeed at trial. Orders become lengthy

for a single reason: the court passing them has, whether

consciously or not, entered upon the final merits of the

controversy and conducted what is, in substance, a

mini-trial upon affidavits and documents that properly

await the leading of evidence.

38. This is not what Order XXXIX requires, nor what the law

permits - whether of the court of first instance or of an

appellate court reviewing it. Lord Diplock’s caution16,

that the interlocutory stage is not the occasion to resolve

conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to decide difficult

questions of law calling for mature consideration, has

been consistently accepted in India. This Court17,

emphasised the court’s reluctance to decide difficult

questions of law or fact at the interlocutory stage. The

scope of examination on an application under Order

XXXIX – and, equally, of an appeal against an order

made on such an application – is confined to the limited

and threshold question whether the plaintiff has shown

a serious dispute meriting investigation at trial; it does

not extend to an examination of the final effect, probative

value or ultimate merits of the documents annexed to

the pleadings, which is the trial court's task, to be

undertaken after evidence and not before.

39. Measured against this standard, the judgments of the

learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench bear

the marks of a mini-trial. Having correctly stated the

limited standard of appellate interference laid down in

16 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396

17 Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1

Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) that interference is

warranted only where the discretion below has been

exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or

contrary to settled principles of law regulating the grant

or refusal of temporary injunctions. The Division Bench

proceeded, over twelve detailed findings, to construe

individual clauses of the Will dated 26.03.2004, to weigh

the effect of delay and of admissions said to have been

made in a separate suit, to apply Section 89 of the

Companies Act, 2013 to the facts, and to assess whether

a “clear prima facie nexus” had been demonstrated

between specific acquisitions and specific proceeds.

Each of these is a matter of substance properly reserved

for trial; none of them is a matter upon which an

appellate court, confined to asking whether the Single

Judge’s discretion was perversely or arbitrarily

exercised, may substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence.

40. We accordingly do not approve the practice of writing

lengthy, merits-laden orders, whether at the

interlocutory stage or in appeal from it, on applications

for temporary injunction, and emphasise that courts

confine such orders to recording, with reasons, their

findings on the three settled conditions of prima facie

case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury,

without embarking upon an examination of the final

merits or the probable outcome of the issues that

properly arise for trial.

XIII. CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE ORDER

41. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are allowed.

The judgment and order dated 20.03.2026 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

in FAO (OS) No.96 of 2022, FAO(OS) NO.97 OF 2022,

FAO(OS) No. 98 of 2022, FAO(OS) NO.99 OF 2022,

FAO(OS) NO.33 OF 2024 and FAO(OS) NO.49 OF 2024

is set aside, and the order dated 29.07.2022 of the

learned Single Judge is restored. We hold and direct as

follows:

(a) The interim injunction granted by the learned Single

Judge by order dated 29.07.2022, in the terms set

out in paragraph 9 above, shall stand restored and

shall continue in operation until further orders of the

learned Single Judge in the suit.

(b) This order proceeds upon a prima facie appraisal of a

serious dispute requiring investigation at trial. It

shall not be read as any expression of opinion on the

true construction of the Will dated 26.03.2004, the

validity of the Will dated 04.10.2008, the plea of

intestacy, the applicability of Section 14 of the 1956

Act or of Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013, the

plea of undue influence or fraud, or the plea of self-

acquisition – all of which shall be decided by the trial

court on evidence, uninfluenced by any observation

in this judgment.

of these questions, recorded in the impugned

judgment, shall similarly stand effaced and shall not

bind or influence the trial court.

(d) The appellants shall continue to be bound by, and

shall renew if required, the undertaking as to

damages furnished before the learned Single Judge.

(e) The learned Single Judge shall take up and dispose

of CS(OS) No.589 of 2021 as expeditiously as

possible, preferably within a period of eight months.

42. The appeals are accordingly allowed in the above terms.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. There

shall be no order as to costs.

……………..……………………………….J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

………………………………………………J.

[ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12, 2026.