BASSANNA SINCE DECEASED BY LRS. VS. BHIMANNA ETC. ETC.

2026 INSC 838Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 1 of 21

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9923-9924 OF 2026

BASSANNA SINCE DECEASED BY LRS. APPELLANTS

AND OTHERS

VERSUS

BHIMANNA AND OTHERS RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J

1. The question that arises for consideration in these civil

appeals is whether a composite appeal filed under Section 96 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 19081 raising a challenge to a common

judgment of the trial Court rendered in two civil suits filed by the

same plaintiff would be maintainable, especially when certified

copies of the decrees passed in both the suits were filed along with

the said appeal, a prayer for dispensing with filing of more than

one certified copy of the common judgment was made and the

court fees payable for challenging both the decrees was also paid?

2. The predecessor of the appellants2 filed two suits, one for

1 For short, ‘the Code’

2 For short, ‘the plaintiff’

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 2 of 21

declaration that a registered sale deed executed by one defendant

in favour of another was null and void. The other suit was for

perpetual injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from

interfering with the joint possession of the plaintiff. Both the suits

were clubbed together and a common trial was held. The parties

thereafter led evidence and by a common judgment dated

07.12.1990, both the suits were dismissed. The plaintiff filed a

composite appeal under Section 96 of the Code raising a challenge

to the common judgment rendered in both the suits. Along with

the appeal, certified copies of the judgment as well as the decrees

passed in both the suits were filed. Court fees payable on two

separate appeals were also paid along with the memorandum of

appeal. It was prayed that the common judgment of the trial Court

dismissing both the suits be set aside and the appeal be allowed.

The appellate Court by its judgment dated 17.08.2007 allowed the

said appeal and decreed both the suits. Two second appeals filed

by the defendants were allowed by the High Court of Karnataka3

on the ground that since two separate suits had been filed before

the trial Court, it was necessary for the unsuccessful plaintiff to

have filed two separate appeals under Section 96 of the Code. Since

3 For short, ‘the High Court’

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 3 of 21

a composite appeal was filed, the High Court allowed the second

appeals and set aside the judgment of the first appellate Court.

Consequently, both the suits were dismissed.

3. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Advocate

appearing for the appellants submits that the High Court gave

more importance to the technical requirement of filing of two

separate appeals without taking into consideration the fact that

the composite appeal as filed was accompanied by certified copies

of both the decrees along with requisite court fees required to be

paid, assuming that two separate appeals would have been filed.

According to him, the trial Court having consolidated both the

suits as a result of which parties led common evidence and the

suits having been decided by a common judgment, there was no

reason, whatsoever, for the High Court to have non-suited the

appellants on the technical ground that two separate appeals had

not been filed. He further submitted that the impugned judgment

of the High Court left the appellants remediless inasmuch as the

judgment of the first appellate Court allowing the appeals preferred

by the appellants was set aside without any further direction.

There was no adjudication of the appellants’ claim on merits as the

second appeals were allowed on technical grounds. The learned

Senior Advocate sought to distinguish the decisions in Mallanna

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 4 of 21

alias Appaiah Vs. Smt. Muninanjamma alias Nanjamma4 and

Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Ltd. Vs. M/s Kerala Agro

Seeds5 that were referred to by the High Court while allowing the

second appeals. It was, thus, submitted that the impugned

judgment be set aside and the proceedings be remanded for being

decided afresh by the High Court on merits.

4. Per contra, Mr. Sharanagouda Patil, learned counsel

appearing for the respondents6 supported the impugned judgment

of the High Court. According to him, notwithstanding the fact that

the trial Court decided both the suits through a common

judgment, the plaintiff ought to have filed two separate appeals

under Section 96 of the Code. A singular appeal filed in such

circumstances was rightly held to be not maintainable by the High

Court. The law in this regard was rightly followed by the High

Court in the impugned judgment. It, therefore, could not be said

that any error was committed by the High Court when it held that

a singular appeal in such circumstances was not tenable. He

referred to the decisions in M/s S.A.L. Steel Limited Vs. M/s

Sreenidhi Trading Company and others7 and Sri Dinesh

4 R.S.A. No.90 of 1996 decided on 12.02.2001

5 R.F.A. No.554 of 2012 decided on 02.12.2019

6 For short, ‘defendants’

7 R.F.A. No.100242 of 2017 decided on 20.05.2024

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 5 of 21

Poojary Vs. Sri Venkappa Gowda8 wherein similar issues were

considered. He further submitted that the view taken in Mallana

alias Appaiah (supra) was the correct view. He, thus, submitted

that there was no merit in the present appeals and the same were

liable to be dismissed.

5. Having given due consideration to the rival submissions, the

relevant provisions of the Code and material factual aspects

obtaining from the record, we are of the considered view that the

composite appeal preferred for challenging the common judgment

of the trial Court deciding two suits filed by the same plaintiff was

rightly entertained on merits. The judgment of the first appellate

Court could not have been set aside on the ground that two

separate appeals had not been filed. In any event, the lacuna, if

any, of not filing a separate memorandum of appeal was curable

in nature and could not be held to be fatal as the composite appeal

was accompanied by both decrees passed by the trial Court.

6. At the outset, a brief reference to certain factual aspects that

are available on record would be necessary. The plaintiff filed O.S.

No.14 of 1986 against the defendants seeking a declaration that

the registered sale deed dated 16.04.1977 executed by the second

8 R.S.A. No.2011 of 2016 decided on 03.03.2025

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 6 of 21

defendant in favour of the first defendant of land admeasuring

eight acres eleven guntas from Survey No.132/1-A was null and

void, thus, not binding on the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, the

plaintiff filed O.S. No.135 of 1987 against the first defendant

praying that the said defendant be restrained from interfering with

the plaintiff’s possession of land admeasuring four acres five

guntas from Survey No.132/1-Aa. Thus, while the first suit sought

a declaration as regards nullity of the sale deed dated 16.04.1977

in respect of a larger area of land from Survey No.132/1-A, the

second suit sought relief of permanent injunction against one of

the defendants in respect of a smaller portion of land from Survey

No.132/1-Aa. On behalf of the common defendant, an application

under Section 151 of the Code was moved with a prayer to club

the second suit with the first suit. The plaintiff’s counsel did not

object to the said prayer and, accordingly, the proceedings in the

second suit were ordered to be clubbed with the first suit vide order

dated 16.06.1988. As a result, common evidence was recorded in

the first suit. The trial Court in its judgment dated 07.12.1990

noted that the parties in both the suits were common and the

subject matter of the two suits was same. It further observed that

both suits had been clubbed together and common evidence had

been recorded. After considering the entire material on record, the

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 7 of 21

trial Court was pleased to dismiss both the suits filed by the

plaintiff. A copy of the common judgment was directed to be

preserved in the second suit.

7. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the dismissal of both the suits

preferred an appeal under provisions of Order XLI Rule 1 of the

Code, being R.A. No.2 of 1991. In the cause title of the appeal,

reference was made to the fact it was a composite appeal laying

challenge to the common judgment of the trial Court. Paragraphs

2 and 3 of the memorandum of appeal read as under:

“2. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decrees

passed in 0.S.No. 14/86 and 135/87 of the Munisifff at Shahapur,

dated. 7-12-1990 whereunder both the suits instituted by the present

appellant for appropriate reliefs. to which he was lawfully entitled,

which he claimed, came to be dismissed, for the reasons stated in the

Judgment, which is passed in common, in both the above referred

suits, which were clubbed by the Trial Court and tried together.

3. The certified copy of the Judgment and decrees in both the suits

are filed herewith claiming dispensation a copy of Judgment from

Hon'ble court. u/o 41 rule 1 CPC.”

[emphasis supplied by us]

The plaintiff valued the appeal by calculating the court fees

payable for challenging both the decrees. In paragraph 5 of the

memorandum of appeal, it was stated as under:

“5. (a) The Valuation of the reliefs as made in the Trial court of the

subject matter of dispute in O.S. No. 14 of 1986 was at Rs. 1000/-

u/s 24 (d) and paid court fee of Rs.100/- on the relief of declaration

that the sale deed No. 54 of 1977-78 dt. 16-4-77 executed by Deft.

No.2 in favour of Deft. No.1 in respect of suit land Sy.No. 132/1A

measuring (8) acres (11) guntas of village Channur (K) Tq. Shahapur

is null and void and not binding on the pltf.

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 8 of 21

(b) In O. S.No.135/87, which was for the relief of Permanent

injunction simplicitor in respect of the suit land Sy.No. 132/1

measuring (4) acres (5) guntas of Channur (K) Tq. Shahapur. This

was valued at Rs.1000/- U/s 26(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1958 and a

C.F. of Rs. 100/- was, paid thereon.

(c) Thus, the court fee paid in the Reliefs sought for in the Trial

Court was Rs.200/- in all on the valuation of Rs.2,000/ and each suit

relief was valued at Rs. 1000/ each and C.F. paid was Rs. 100/-each

under appropriate provision of the Kar.C.P.S.V. Act, 5. There the

same court fee of Rs. 200/- is being paid in the appeal also as per

section (49) of the said Act, which is sufficient.”

Various grounds of challenge to the common judgment were

raised by the plaintiff. The prayer made in the memorandum of

appeal was as under:

“It is therefore humbly played that Hon'ble court be pleased to set

aside the Judgments and decreed in O.S.Nos.14/86 and 135/87 dt.

7-11-1990, by decreeing the suits as prayed for with costs

throughout, & thereby promote the ends of justice.”

8. The appellate Court decided the composite appeal by its

judgment dated 17.08.2007. While doing so, it referred to the

common evidence recorded in both the suits pursuant to they

being clubbed. It, thereafter, concluded that the common

judgment and decrees passed in both the suits was required to be

set aside. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and both the suits

were decreed. The sale deed dated 16.04.1977 was declared to be

not binding on the plaintiff and a decree for permanent injunction

restraining interference with the plaintiff’s possession in respect of

a smaller portion of the suit property was also passed.

9. The defendants being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 9 of 21

preferred two second appeals under Section 100 of the Code. One

of the grounds raised by them was with regard to maintainability

of a single appeal against the common judgment in the two suits.

The learned Judge of the High Court after referring to the decisions

in Mallana alias Appaiah and Karnataka State Agro Corn Products

Ltd. (supra) held that a singular appeal under Section 96 of the

Code by the plaintiff raising a challenge to the common judgment

in two suits was not tenable and the first appellate Court ought

not to have entertained a single appeal. On that reasoning, both

the second appeals were allowed and the judgment of the first

appellate Court was set aside. This adjudication is the subject

matter of challenge in these civil appeals.

10. From the aforesaid factual matrix, the undisputed position

that emerges is as follows:

a) The plaintiff in both the suits was the same.

b) While one defendant was common in both the suits, one suit

had an additional defendant.

c) At the request of the common defendant in both the suits, the

proceedings in both the suits were clubbed together. As a result,

common evidence was led in both the suits.

d) Though the plaintiff preferred a composite appeal challenging

the dismissal of both the suits through a common judgment, the

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 10 of 21

court fees payable on separate appeals raising challenge to the

common judgment of the trial Court were paid. A specific prayer

seeking setting aside of the common judgment in both the suits

was also made. Certified copies of both the decrees were also filed

along with the memorandum of appeal.

e) No objection, whatsoever, was raised by the defendants to the

filing of a composite appeal under Section 96 of the Code before

the first appellate Court and they contested the proceedings on

merits.

f) Challenge to the filing of a composite appeal was raised by

the defendants only in the second appeals preferred by them.

11. The clubbing of two or more suits is usually undertaken by

the trial Court in case the parties to the proceedings are common,

the subject matter of the suits is similar or for other analogous

reasons. Clubbing of proceedings is usually for the convenience of

parties contesting the same so as to avoid multiplicity of

proceedings, delay in adjudication as well as expenses incurred

therein. In M/s Chitivalasa Jute Mills Vs. M/s Jaypee Rewa

Cement9, this Court noticed the practice of consolidation of two or

more proceedings before the trial Court. It was observed that the

9 T.P.(C) No.16 of 2002 decided on 04.02.2004

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 11 of 21

Code does not specifically provide for consolidation of suits but the

same could be done under the inherent powers of the Court flowing

from Section 151 of the Code. Consolidation was usually done for

meeting the ends of justice after noticing substantial or sufficient

similarity of issues arising for decision in the suits. By virtue of

consolidation of proceedings, the parties are relieved of adducing

similar documentary and oral evidence in two suits but in different

trials. As noted above, consolidation of the two suits filed by the

plaintiff was at the request of the first defendant with the plaintiff

consenting to the same. Thus, even the common defendant was of

the view that both the suits needed to be tried together.

12. The trial Court having clubbed both the suits, considered the

common evidence led by the parties and thereafter by its common

judgment dismissed both the suits. It specifically directed that

copy of the common judgment be preserved in the second suit. The

specific averments made by the plaintiff in the memorandum of

appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code have been referred to

hereinabove. The proviso to Order XLI Rule 1(1) of the Code

empowers the appellate Court to dispense with the filing of more

than one copy of the judgment of the trial Court whenever two or

more suits are tried together and a common judgment is delivered.

The object behind the said provision, as noticed in P.A. Oommen

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 12 of 21

Vs. Moran Mar Baselius Marthoma10, is to avoid extra expenses

where more cases than one are disposed of by a common judgment

by empowering the appellate Court to dispense with the necessity

of filing more than one copy of the judgment. Such request for

dispensing with filing of an additional copy of the judgment of the

trial Court was also made by the plaintiff. Significantly, the

requisite court fees payable for challenging the common judgment

and decrees in both suits was also paid by the plaintiff. The prayer

made in the memorandum of appeal was clear seeking setting

aside of the common judgment in both the suits. The composite

appeal was filed along with certified copies of the common

judgment and decrees passed in both suits.

It can, thus, be seen that all necessary requisites for

challenging the common judgment of the trial Court were satisfied

by the unsuccessful plaintiff. The requirements of Order XLI Rule

1 (1) and (2) of the Code were fully complied with and the composite

appeal as filed was complete in all respects. All statutory

requirements were satisfied by the plaintiff while preferring an

appeal under Section 96 of the Code.

13. At this stage, we may notice some situations which require

10 1992 INSC 175

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 13 of 21

filing of separate appeals by aggrieved parties, notwithstanding the

adjudication of the proceedings by a common judgment. In a case

where two different plaintiffs file separate suits against a common

set of defendants and the proceedings are clubbed together, on

dismissal of the suits by virtue of a common judgment, both

plaintiffs would be required to independently challenge the adverse

outcome rendered in their respective suits. Where in a suit, the

defendant files a counter-claim and the suit as well as the counter-

claim are dismissed, both parties would be required to file separate

appeals raising a challenge to the dismissal of the suit and

counter-claim, respectively. There could be various other

situations requiring an aggrieved party to specifically challenge a

common judgment and decree passed in the matter. However, in

the present case, the plaintiff in both the suits is one and the same.

Both his suits were dismissed by the trial Court by a common

judgment. He did challenge the common judgment, though in a

single appeal but after paying requisite court fees payable on

separate appeals. He specifically prayed for setting aside the

judgment and decree passed in both the suits. All necessary

ingredients contemplated in Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule

1 of the Code were satisfied. The deficiency, if any, was the absence

of a separate memorandum of appeal for each appeal. In other

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 14 of 21

words, what could be challenged by filing two separate appeals was

done by filing a composite appeal. The deficiency was more of ‘form’

and not of ‘substance’. This deficiency was curable and did not

render the composite appeal not maintainable. In our view, the

composite appeal preferred by the plaintiff was liable to be

entertained on merits. If at all the High Court was of the view that

a separate memorandum for each appeal was necessary for

challenging the common judgment rendered in two suits filed by

the same plaintiff, an opportunity to cure said deficiency ought to

have been afforded to the plaintiff. The defect was not of such a

nature so as to entail setting aside the judgment of the appellate

Court without any adjudication on merits.

14. For considering the maintainability of a composite appeal at

the behest of an aggrieved party, the test of res judicata would also

be crucial. Various situations in which the bar of res judicata

would apply are contemplated by Section 11 of the Code. It is

material to note that res judicata would apply only qua a judgment

and not a decree. We may with advantage refer to the judgment of

the Nagpur High Court in Manohar Vinayak and others Vs.

Laxman Anandrao Deshmukh and others11 wherein it was held

11 AIR 1947 Nagpur 248

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 15 of 21

as under:

“29. In order that a decision should operate as res judicata it should

be quite independent of the proceedings to which it is pleaded as a

bar. The principle of res judicata cannot apply in the same proceeding

in which the decision is given and by parity of reasoning it cannot

apply to the consolidated proceedings. When by consent of parties or

by an order of the Court the two suits are consolidated they have no

independent existence and nothing decided in one of the two

consolidated suits can operate as res judicata if that decision was

appealed against. This is because there are no two independent

decisions.”

This position has been further explained in Narhari and

others Vs. Shankar and others12 as far back in 1950. This Court

observed therein as under:

“…The plaintiffs in their appeal to the High Court have impleaded all the

defendants as respondents and their prayer covers both the appeals and

they have paid consolidated court fee for the whole suit. It is now well settled

that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there

need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up.

As has been observed by Tek Chand J. in his learned judgment in Mst.

Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli13 mentioned above, the determining factor is not the

decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the

estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the

judgment. The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits.

Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given

simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only

one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present

case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same

judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there

is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same

judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with

a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two

decrees in substance are one…”

15. In the present case, as the plaintiff had challenged the

common judgment and decrees passed in the two suits filed by him

in a composite appeal, the bar of res judicata would not be

attracted. A specific challenge having been mounted to the

12 1950 INSC 24

13 AIR 1927 Lah. 289.

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 16 of 21

common judgment by raising numerous grounds in the

memorandum of appeal, the appeal was liable to be entertained on

merits notwithstanding the fact that it was a composite appeal filed

along with requisite court fees, certified copies of the common

judgment and both the decrees. Thus, even on this count, the

plaintiff cannot be non-suited.

16. Another aspect to be noted is that the High Court after

holding that the composite appeal preferred by the plaintiff was

not tenable, proceeded to allow both the second appeals and

consequently, set aside the common judgment and decrees passed

in both the suits. Resultantly, the plaintiff has been left remediless

without there being any adjudication of either of his suits on

merits. The deficiency in the composite appeal preferred by the

plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code was more in its ‘form’ than

‘substance’. Hence, an opportunity ought to have been granted to

the plaintiff to cure the deficiency which merely required

presentation of an additional memorandum of appeal. This

requirement is purely procedural in nature and the plaintiff cannot

be made to suffer for such deficiency, if it could be called so. It

must be borne in mind that the right of appeal is a substantive

right of a party who cannot be deprived of the same merely for

procedural defects. The attempt of Courts should always be to

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 17 of 21

adjudicate the case on merits rather than to put an end to the

proceedings for failure to comply with procedural requirements.

‘Form’ should not be permitted to prevail over ‘substance’. The

rules of procedure enumerated in the Code are treated as the

handmaid of justice and are not to be utilised as a sword to curtail

the proceedings. On the question of granting an opportunity to a

party to cure a procedural deficiency, we may refer to the

observations made in paragraph 7 of the decision in Charan Singh

Vs. Ram Saroop14 wherein it has been observed as under:

“7. …Once the first appellate court found, correctly, that challenge

to the common judgment of the trial court dated 16th March, 2021

had been laid in a composite appeal but it is the requirement of law

to file two appeals with separate memoranda of appeal, which had

not been filed by the appellant, the court ought to have at least alerted

the appellant by making him aware of the requirement of law and

giving him the liberty to file a separate memorandum of appeal. In

fact, in terms of Order XLI Rule 1 of the CPC, the appellate court has

the power to even dispense with the requirement of law of filing copy

of the impugned judgment twice over if it is part of the memorandum

of appeal already filed. In any event, the defect was not such that it

was incurable. The composite appeal was filed well within the period

of limitation and, except for the fact that a separate memorandum of

appeal was not filed, no other defect, far less serious defect, was

shown to exist. If even after being alerted the appellant had failed to

file a separate memorandum, the first appellate court would have

been perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal. It is not shown to us

that any such endeavour was made.”

17. Coming to the decisions as relied upon by the learned counsel

for the parties, in Mallanna alias Appaiah (supra), A had filed a suit

for eviction of B from the suit property. B in turn had filed a suit

14 Civil Appeal Nos.1585-1586 of 2025 decided on 03.02.2025

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 18 of 21

for specific performance of an agreement with regard to the same

property against A. The trial of these suits was held separately. The

trial Court, however, passed a common judgment after which

decrees were drawn separately. B preferred an appeal against the

common judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by A. That

appeal was allowed. In second appeal filed by A, it was urged that

B not having challenged the judgment and decree passed in the

suit filed by B, the judgment of the trial Court could not have been

interfered with. In that context, it was held that both parties having

filed separate suits against each other, the trial of the suits was

separate. The judgment and decree in those suits were different. It

was only for convenience that a common judgment was passed by

the trial Court. Since B did not challenge the judgment of the trial

Court passed in his suit, the first appellate Court could not have

interfered in the single appeal preferred by B challenging the

judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by A. The aforesaid

facts indicate that the plaintiff in one suit was the defendant in the

other suit filed by the defendant. For this reason, no support of

this decision can be taken by the respondents inasmuch as in the

present case, both the suits were filed by one and the same

plaintiff.

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 19 of 21

18. In M/s S.A.L. Steel Limited (supra), suit was filed by A for

recovery of money against B while B filed a counter-claim against

A. While the suit filed by A was decreed, the counter-claim filed by

B was dismissed. The question as to maintainability of a single

appeal against the decree passed in the suit as well as the counter-

claim was raised. Reliance was placed on the decision of the

Himachal High Court in Ramesh Chand Vs. Om Raj and others15.

However, during the course of hearing, the prayer made in the

counter-claim was not pressed by B. Hence, the question of

maintainability was not decided by the High Court.

In Sri Dinesh Poojary (supra), A had filed a suit for permanent

injunction against B. In that suit, B filed a counter-claim. The suit

filed by A was dismissed while the counter-claim filed by B was

allowed. A filed an appeal challenging the dismissal of his suit but

did not challenge the decree passed in the counter-claim. After

referring to the decision in Ramesh Chand (supra), it was held that

a single appeal in such circumstances was not maintainable.

Again, this decision does not assist the respondents in view of the

facts therein. It cannot be disputed that if in a suit, a counter-

claim is also filed, the plaintiff, if aggrieved, by the dismissal of the

15 R.S.A. No.57 of 2017 decided on 17.05.2022

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 20 of 21

suit and grant of counter-claim would be required to challenge that

adjudication in two separate appeals.

19. In Ramesh Chand (supra), the Division Bench of the Himachal

Pradesh High Court was considering a reference made to it in view

of conflict of opinion between decisions of different Single Benches.

The question was whether a common appeal questioning the

correctness of the judgment and decree passed in a civil suit as

well as in the counter-claim was legally maintainable. While

answering the reference, the Division Bench in paragraph 42(i)

held that when two suits were consolidated and tried together with

common evidence being led by the parties resulting in a common

judgment and decree, the same could be subjected to challenge by

way of a single appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party. This

conclusion, in our view, supports the case of the appellants and

reliance placed thereon is justified. It is not necessary for us to

refer to the other principles laid down in the said decision as those

issues do not arise in these appeals.

20. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the

judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The question as

framed is answered by holding that the composite appeal filed by

the plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code was maintainable in the

Civil Appeal Nos.9923-9924 of 2026 Page 21 of 21

circumstances in which it was presented. The first appellate Court

rightly entertained it and adjudicated it on merits. The High Court

committed an error in holding that the composite appeal filed by

the plaintiff was not maintainable. Accordingly, the judgment of

the High Court dated 02.09.2022 passed in RSA Nos.3214 of 2007

and 3215 of 2007 is set aside. Both the second appeals preferred

by the respondents herein stand restored before the High Court for

being adjudicated afresh on merits. We clarify that the respective

contentions of the parties on merits have not been gone into in the

present civil appeals and the second appeals be decided by the

High Court on their own merits.

21. The Civil Appeals are allowed in aforesaid terms leaving the

parties to bear their own costs. Pending interlocutory application

is also disposed of.

…...………………………..J.

[ UJJAL BHUYAN ]

.…..………………………..J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI,

AUGUST 12, 2026.