MAGEBA BRIDGE PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED VS. M/S. TRADE CENTRE

2026 INSC 839Page 1 of 12

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No.10658 of 2026

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.24861 of 2025)

Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited

...Appellant(s)

Versus

M/s. Trade Centre

...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. A suit filed by the respondent was dismissed finding that

the plaintiff’s status as a registered partnership firm was not

proved before the Trial Court; the suit being hit by Section 69(2)

of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. An appeal was filed

contending that the Trial Court ignored the legal effect of Exhibit-

8, a Memorandum of Registration exhibited by the plaintiff,

conclusively proving the registration of the firm. The First

Appellate Court accepted the same, and after considering the

merits of the matter decreed the suit, directing the defendant to

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pay the appellant a sum of Rs.24,36,105/- along with interest @

6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realization of

the amount. The appellant herein, who was the defendant, is

challenging the judgment and decree passed by the First

Appellate Court, primarily on the contention that the suit claim

was barred by limitation and also on valid proof having not been

produced with respect to the registration of the plaintiff-firm. We

refer to the parties from their status in this appeal.

3. We have heard Sri Nikhil Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel

for the appellant and Sri Manish Goswami, learned Senior

Counsel for the respondent.

4. On a perusal of the impugned judgment, we are inclined to

hold that there was sufficient evidence to find the registration of

the respondent-firm. Exhibit-8 also produced herein, is a

memorandum issued by the Registrar of Firms, West Bengal,

acknowledging receipt of documents and it is also an intimation

that the documents have been filed/recorded/registered

pursuant to the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. It also indicates the

Registration No.L73931 allotted to the respondent-firm, clearly

showing that the firm was registered at least on 14.05.2010; the

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date revealed from Exhibit-8. The court also went on to look at the

document produced under Order XLI Rule 27(1) and found it to

be a certified copy of Form-VIII of the Registrar of Firms, duly

certified by the Registrar of Firms, West Bengal, whereby it was

reiterated that the Registration number of plaintiff-firm is L73931,

as it appears from Exhibit-8 and date of registration 14.05.2010 is

also in consonance.

5. In addition to the finding that Exhibit-8 by itself proved the

registration, it was also held that the application to produce

additional document has to be allowed since it would further the

cause of justice and enable the court to pronounce judgment

especially since the document produced corroborates Exhibit P8.

6. We find no reason to uphold the order of the Trial Court

rejecting the suit, finding the plaintiff to be not a partnership firm.

7. Now we come to the issue of limitation. The suit as we

noticed is for recovery of money and the plaint is produced at

Annexure P-27. The recovery sought is on the strength of the bills

raised, with respect to the supplies made by the respondent to the

appellant totalling Rs.23,41,693/-. The bills upon which the claim

was raised were shown with the details of date, invoice number,

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particulars, weight and amount, in the body of the plaint and the

Schedule; in a tabular form. Immediately, we have to notice that

the suit is filed on the strength of the bills raised against the

defendant and not based on any running account, though, the

parties are said to be having numerous transactions. Though, the

transactions with the respondent is admitted by the appellant

before the Company Court also, where the respondent had first

approached for winding up, and in the suit, the appellant resisted

the monetary claim on the ground that one of his employees had

fraudulently created documents to show receipt of goods, as

allegedly raised by the respondents, except with respect to two

bills which were admitted and paid up on receipt of notice.

8. Be that as it may, the respondent claimed that the cause of

action arose on 03.06.2008 when there was an admission of debt

and part payment. The ground of limitation is resisted on the

strength of the admission made on 02.09.2008, when part payment

was made, also with reference to Annexure P-18 dated

01.08.2008, the communication addressed by the appellant in

response to the demand raised by the respondent.

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9. It is also argued that the Company Court, before whom the

respondent had filed an application for winding up within the

limitation period, had permitted the suit to be filed within three

months from the date of disposal of the Company Petition.

10. Before we look into the question of limitation, which is a

mixed question of law and facts, we have to peruse the relevant

decisions, a host of which were placed before us by both sides.

11. The respondent/plaintiff relies on Kalpraj Dharamshi and

Anr. v. Kotak Investments Advisor Limited and Anr.1, wherein on

an application by the corporate debtor, Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process was initiated and the Resolution Professional

appointed, invited resolution plans. The appellant before this

Court, submitted its Resolution Plan after the last date as specified

by the RP, who invited all the applicants to file a Revised

Resolution Plan which led to the appellant’s plan being accepted.

The respondent before this Court who had applied on time and

had also furnished a Revised Resolution Plan, challenged the

acceptance of the appellant’s Resolution Plan before the High

Court. The High Court disposed of the writ petition finding an

1 (2021) 10 SCC 401

Page 6 of 12

alternate and efficacious remedy of filing an appeal before the

NCLAT. Going by the date on which the appellant received the

order of the NCLT, the appeal was delayed by 16 days. The

argument that the writ court was not a wrong forum, was not

accepted. This Court held so in Paragraph 64 of the said decision

as under: -

“64. Thus, this Court relying on the earlier judgments

in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux [Bhudan Singh v. Nabi

Bux, (1969) 2 SCC 481], J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric

Sohan [J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12

SCC 175: (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 656] and Consolidated

Engg. Enterprises [Consolidated Engg.

Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169]

observed, that the object of enacting the legislation is

to advance public welfare. The entire legislative

process is influenced by considerations of justice and

reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general

legislative intent in every piece of legislation. It has

been held by this Court, that in the absence of some

other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was

actually intended by the legislature, there is little

reason to believe, that it represents the legislative

intent. It is further observed, that the provisions

contained in Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act are

meant for grant of relief, where a person has committed

some mistake. In J. Kumaradasan Nair [J. Kumaradasan

Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC 175 : (2009) 4 SCC

(Civ) 656] , it has been observed, that when sub-section

(2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se is not

applicable, the same would not mean, that the

principles akin thereto would not be applicable.”

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12. It was also found that the petitioner had pleaded breach of

principles of natural justice since, before the NCLT the matter was

heard by a Member (Judicial) sitting single, while the order was

passed by a Division Bench. The delayed appeal before the

NCLAT was found to be possible of consideration since the

appellant was bona fide prosecuting a remedy before the High

Court, with due diligence.

13. Apposite would also be reference to Yeswant Deorao

Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari2, which is almost on

similar lines. Therein the question was as to whether the period

spent in pursuing an insolvency proceedings can be reckoned as

the period eligible for condonation under Section 14 of the

Limitation Act, when a delayed execution petition is filed. It was

categorically held that “There could be no exclusion of the time

occupied by the insolvency proceedings which clearly was not for

the purpose of obtaining the same relief (sic). The eventual

recovery in such a proceeding was held to be a ‘mere

consequence or result’. The relief was found to be different and so

was the procedure widely divergent. In Jignesh Shah and Anr. v.

2 1950 SCC 766

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Union of India and Anr.3 a converse situation was considered.

The filing of a civil suit was projected as a ground for the delayed

winding up petition filed before the High Court, which was sought

to be transferred to the NCLT. It was categorically held that the

filing of a suit for recovery based upon a cause of action, that is

within limitation cannot in any manner impact the separate and

independent remedy of a winding up proceeding. The converse

position applies squarely to this case that the initiation of a

winding up proceeding, which may or may not enable recovery,

will not impact the limitation for the separate remedy of suit for

recovery of money.

14. We are of the opinion that on the facts of this case Yeswant

Deorao Deshmukh2 & Jignesh Shah3 apply squarely. In this

context, we also have to notice that the Company Petition filed was

not entertained since it was found that, though slightly delayed,

the appellant issued a reply alleging that the substantial part of

the claim made by the respondent, was apparently ‘at the behest

and with the connivance of the erstwhile associates of our company’

(sic). Hence, there was a clear dispute raised and it was in the

3 (2019) 10 SCC 750

Page 9 of 12

context of the appellant having undertaken to provide security for

two bills i.e. TC/152 and TC/153, which were found in their

accounts too, that the respondent was relegated to the civil

remedy, further directing that deposit of Rs.12,38,000/- covered

by the bills bearing Nos.TC/152 and TC/153 be secured before

the Civil Court within 3 weeks; to facilitate which, the company

proceeding was kept in abeyance till the security is furnished,

failing which the Company Petition was entitled to be revived for

the sum of Rs.12,38,000/- with interest @ 8% per annum. The

acceptance of the bills was not an admission, giving up the plea

of limitation. There was also no extension of limitation by the

Company Court, which in any event, the Court was not competent

so to do. Hence, the clear finding was that there is no scope of

winding up of the appellant, the demand having been disputed

by the appellant. The decisions of this Court with respect to

finding a clear distinction between a winding up proceeding and

a suit for recovery of money simpliciter, applies squarely.

15. Be that as it may, we have to notice from the order of the

Company Court that the petition filed before it was affirmed on

07.02.2009 and filed on 10.02.2009. The suit was filed with the

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cause of action arising on 03.06.2008; when a demand was raised

by the respondent, on 01.08.2008; when it was responded by

Annexure P-18 and on 02.09.2008; when part payment was made.

However, Annexure P-18 indicates that there was no

acknowledgment of debt and the payment made was not a part

payment but the payment with respect to three invoices, admitted

as remaining due, by the appellant/defendant. The appellant by

Annexure P-18 admitted TC No.32/07-08, TC No.33/07-08 and TC

No.64/07-08, which was paid by the appellant, one of which; TC

No.64/07-08 dated 24.08.2007, did not even figure in the schedule

of the claim, as revealed from the plaint, which stood already paid

on 12.12.2007 before the notice of demand was issued.

16. It is also to be specifically noticed that the appellant had

agreed to provide security only for two bills i.e., TC/152/05-06

and TC/153/05-06 dated 30.01.2006 before the Company Court.

To surpass the limitation to file a suit for recovery of money as

covered by the bills dated 30.01.2006, it should have been filed

before 29.01.2009. Even if the date on which the Company Petition

was filed, is taken for the purpose of determining limitation,

reckoning the period spent in prosecuting the Company Petition

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under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the date of filing the

Company Petition i.e., 10.02.2009, falls outside the limitation

period making academic the discussion on whether Section 14

can be applied or not, at least with respect to the said bills. As for

the other bills, the last of them is dated 06.03.2007, which remains

unpaid and the suit was filed on 05.06.2010 after the limitation

expired; to find which Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh2 and Jignesh

Shah3 are relevant.

17. We categorically find that Annexure P-18 did not

acknowledge the debt as sought to be recovered by the

respondent, evidenced by the bills, more fully described in the

schedule to the plaint. The suit as we found was filed on the

strength of the invoices raised and not on the basis of a running

account. The mere deduction shown with respect to the payment

of the admitted bills, in the schedule to the plaint, will not make it

a running account. The notice of demand, the reply issued or the

payment made on admission of two bills, with disputes raised with

respect to the other bills, demolishes the case set up by the

respondent-plaintiff on cause of action as emanating from the

plaint.

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18. We find absolutely no reason to sustain the order of the

High Court in the First Appeal and, hence, reverse the same to the

extent of granting the relief of recovery, despite our finding that

the suit was properly instituted by a partnership firm, whose

registration has been proved in accordance with law. The claim

for recovery is hit by limitation. The suit, hence, stands dismissed

for that reason.

19. The appeal stands allowed.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

.......…….……………………. J.

(J. B. PARDIWALA)

....……….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12, 2026.